

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE



SYLLABUS
STRATEGY AND POLICY
NOVEMBER 2006 – FEBRUARY 2007

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

FOREWORD

This pamphlet contains the syllabus for the Strategy and Policy Course for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College, November 2006 – February 2007.

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STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and Policy Course is designed to teach students to think strategically. Strategy is the relationship between war's purpose, objective, and means. The aim of the course is to sharpen the student's ability to assess how alternative strategic courses of action best serve to achieve overall national objectives. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, about a range of potential strategies, and about the strategic effects of joint and interagency operations.

The task for policy makers, strategists, and operational planners in translating operational outcomes into enduring strategic results is never easy or straightforward. The Strategy and Policy Course examines how the overall international strategic environment shapes strategies and outcomes. In turn, the course also examines the strategic effects of operations, exploring how battlefield outcomes change the strategic environment. Success on the battlefield, for example, might open up new strategic opportunities. Meanwhile, operational failures might close off promising strategic courses of action. This interaction between the operational use of military force and strategic outcomes can lead to unanticipated results. The history of warfare provides many examples of lopsided military victories that were largely unforeseen by planners. In addition, the commitment of large numbers of forces and huge resources sometimes produce meager strategic results. Unanticipated second- and third-order effects time and again frustrate planners, who seek to dominate the battlefield and the course of operations.

Of course, in war, the enemy always seeks to frustrate the best-laid plans and impose high risks and costs on operations. The Strategy and Policy Course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by those engaged in the fighting. A skillful adversary seeks to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Further, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create a strategic environment that frustrates decisive outcomes. The skilled strategist and war planner thus understand that the enemy has a vote in determining the war's outcome. The Strategy and Policy Course gives critical attention to how an enemy's actions form part of the dynamic violent interaction that is the test of war.

The Strategy and Policy Course adopts a unique interdisciplinary approach to strategy. The course integrates the disciplines of history, political science, and international relations, along with military factors from the profession of arms—such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics—into a coherent approach that provides students with a conceptual frame of reference to analyze complex strategic problems and formulate strategies to address them.

The curriculum consists of two core components: an examination of leading strategic theorists on war and analysis of key case studies. The works of major strategic thinkers—such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett—provide a foundation on which the course builds an analytical framework that students can use to understand the interrelationship between the realms of policy, strategy, and operations. The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss the ways in which political leaders and strategic planners in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) dealt with the challenges associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The case studies highlight many different types of wars and cover a wide range of policy and strategy problems. This in-depth analysis of a wide range of case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current problems in policy and strategy but also about those that might emerge in the future.

The Strategy and Policy Course addresses Senior Level Learning Areas for professional military education established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on professional military education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College for the development of an elite senior-level course, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The views of leading teachers of strategy and policy practitioners, as well as feedback from graduates, shape the course's content. The Strategy and Policy Course also reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty.

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, the need for levelheaded strategic analysis and clear policy guidance is of the utmost importance. The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, one of the country's leading authorities on professional military education, has put it well: "*This Nation does not have enough strategists.*"¹ The goal of the Strategy and Policy Course is to educate joint warfighters who are strategically minded and skilled at critical analysis.

Course Themes

The Strategy Department has developed eleven interrelated themes for use in the Strategy and Policy Course. These themes are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of "school solutions," for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula. Rather, they are sets of questions designed to provoke thought, discussion, and evaluation of alternative strategic courses of action. They will be used throughout the course because they can contribute to understanding the reasons for strategic effectiveness in contemporary war. The themes cannot provide the answers. Nonetheless, they are of critical importance as points of departure for analysis and deliberation on key choices in strategy and policy decision-making. These themes thus provide a starting point for

¹ The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, "Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders," *Military Review* (July-August 2006), p. 3. Emphasis in the original.

undertaking a critical analysis, assessing the match between alternative policy objectives and strategic courses of action.

We have divided these themes for the Strategy and Policy Course into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of formulating and executing strategies that support national policies; and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

STRATEGY AND POLICY COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE PROCESS

- 1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY,
STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**
- 2. THE DECISION FOR WAR**
- 3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**
- 4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER**
- 5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND
REASSESSMENT**
- 6. WAR TERMINATION**
- 7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE ENVIRONMENT

- 8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 9. THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY**
- 10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY**
- 11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
STRATEGY**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

What were the most important political interests and objectives of the antagonists? Did these interests and objectives emerge from a sound understanding of geopolitics and geostrategy? To what extent were objectives driven by a threat to the homeland? Were these interests shaped by culture, ideology and/or religion? If so, how? Were these interests and objectives clearly articulated and understood? If a country or a belligerent possessed coherent long-term political objectives, as well as medium-term and short-term ones, were these sets of objectives compatible or in conflict? If the objectives were pursued by peaceful means, what instruments of national power did the country choose to employ? Were the correct instruments selected? If not, how might a country have performed better?

Were the problems that gave rise to the war susceptible to military resolution? If leaders decided to employ armed force in pursuit of their political objectives, did they also plan to use instruments of power other than military ones in support of their strategy? Were these plans appropriate? If war was chosen, did the military component of strategy tend to “crowd out” non-military components or considerations? What value did each participant in the conflict place on its political objectives? Were the costs and risks of the war anticipated? How did political and military leaders propose to manage these risks? Were the risks commensurate with the benefits and rewards to be achieved?

What strategic guidance did the political leadership provide to the military? What was the quality of that guidance? Did the strategic guidance place restraints on how force could be used? Were those restraints so stringent as to reduce the chance of operational success? Was the policy so amorphous that it was difficult to match a strategy to it? What military strategies did the belligerents adopt? Did the strategies strike an appropriate balance between defense and offense? To what extent did these strategies support their respective policies? At any point in the war did strategy drive policy? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the linkage between the achievement of military objectives and the achievement of political objectives? Did the political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically? What was the quality of the strategic leadership of the belligerents in the transition from peace to war, in the waging of war, and in the transition from war back to peace? Was the outcome of the war more the product of sound strategy and superior leadership on the part of the victors or more the result of self-defeating courses of action by the losing side?

2. THE DECISION FOR WAR

What were the causes of the war? Can a distinction be usefully drawn between the underlying causes of the conflict and the proximate cause of the opening of

hostilities? Did war develop because of the long-term rise of a major new power? Could the outbreak of the war have been averted by more skillful diplomacy? Was any attempt made to appease or engage a potential enemy, and if so, were the results productive or counterproductive? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence the outbreak of war? If the war broke out despite an effort by one side to deter the other, why did deterrence fail? Were superior deterrent strategies available? In an effort to promote deterrence, did one side forward deploy some of its forces? If so, did the deterrent forces become vulnerable to preemptive attack? Was there something about the politics, culture, religion, or society of a belligerent that made him impossible to deter?

Given the political objectives sought, was the choice to go war a rational one? Was it based on an accurate appreciation of a state's (or non-state actor's) own capabilities, military potential, and vulnerabilities as well as those of its enemy? What role, if any, did military leaders play in the decision for war? Did they attempt to push the political leaders into the war? Did they attempt to restrain the political leaders from going to war? Or did they offer the political leadership a balanced analysis of the available strategic options? How did the nature of the political objectives shape the decision to go to war? What role, if any, did a vision of an ideal international order play in the decision to go to war? Did cultural, social, or religious considerations influence the decision to go to war? Did geopolitical concepts or geostrategic calculations influence the decision? Was the war conducted in self-defense? Was control over a disputed territory central to the decision for war? Was it undertaken to protect an ally or coalition partner? Was it waged to uphold a preexisting balance of power? Was it waged to overturn a preexisting balance of power? Was the war preemptive? If so, how accurate was the information about imminent enemy military action? Was the war preventive? If so, were the forecasts made about the growth in enemy capabilities reasonable and justifiable? Was the outbreak of the war optimally timed from the standpoint of the belligerent that initiated it? To what extent did careful predictions about the likely behavior of coalition partners and neutral states factor into the decision to go to war? If the war began with a surprise attack, what impact did that attack have? If another party intervened in an ongoing conflict, why did it do so? Was that intervention decisive in determining the war's outcome?

If the choice to go to war was in some measure irrational, then why? Did ideology skew decision-making? Religious beliefs? Unrealistic ambition? Status anxiety? False perceptions of threats? Erroneous historical analogies? Misconceptions about geopolitics or geostrategy? Did cultural arrogance promote either overconfidence or an underestimation of the enemy? Were there peaceful strategies that were potentially as promising or more promising than military ones that were nonetheless dismissed or overlooked? Did a third party or parties "drag" major powers into a war that none of them wanted? Did one power miscalculate how another power would respond to an aggressive or threatening action? Did the war start "by accident"?

3. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was the intelligence collected concerning the interests, intentions, capabilities and will of a country's rivals and potential enemies? What was the relative contribution of human sources and technology to the process of intelligence collection? Did superiority in intelligence collection technology actually produce superior intelligence? Were there features of a belligerent's own political system, culture, or society that facilitated or inhibited the collection of intelligence against it, and if so how? Were there characteristics of a belligerent's political system, bureaucracy, society, or culture that made it more difficult accurately to interpret or use the intelligence it collected? If a belligerent suffered a surprise attack, why was he taken by surprise?

Once war broke out, how successful were each belligerent's efforts to deny the enemy information about his own capabilities and intentions? As the war unfolded, how well in the event did each belligerent know both himself and his enemy? Were plans for the war based on an objective net assessment of friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses? How well did each belligerent understand the culture, society, values, religious practices, political system, military traditions, and military potential of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in the plans for the war? Was account taken of nonrational or unpredictable behavior on the part of the enemy? Was account taken of the possibility of the enemy's employment of asymmetric warfare or, if they existed, weapons of mass destruction? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly predict the nature of the war upon which they were embarking? Did they anticipate that the nature of the war might change over time? Did any leader stand out for his mastery of the art of assessment?

Did a country have a formal planning process designed to translate national policy into executable military strategies? If so, how effective was it? How responsive was it to changes in the international or domestic political environments? To what extent did the planners think about larger strategic issues, not just about operational concerns? Did the planners have to take account of two or more fronts or theaters? If so, how did they establish geostrategic priorities among those fronts or theaters? Were theater plans consistent with national strategies and geostrategic priorities? If the realization of national policy required the application of non-military instruments of power in addition to military force, was there any interagency mechanism for coordinating that application with the use of military power? What was the impact of interagency coordination on the development of strategic plans? Did coordination require fundamental changes in the quality and/or quantity of the planned use of military force? If allies were included in the planning process, how did their participation modify the war plans? Was a serious effort made to study the "lessons" of previous wars, and if so how did it affect planning for war at the levels of both grand strategy and theater strategy? To what extent did plans bear the imprint of service doctrines and/or reflect accepted principles of war? Did plans correctly identify the enemy's strategic center or centers of gravity? His critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationships among political ends and military and non-military means? If weapons of mass

destruction existed, how did their existence influence the plans of those belligerents who had them and those who did not? To what extent did plans rely upon deception, surprise, information operations and/or psychological operations? To what extent were plans for information operations well integrated with plans for other military operations? What were the principal strategic effects planners sought to achieve? Did planning make adequate allowances for the inevitable fog, friction, chance and uncertainty of war? Did planners envision the possibility of a quick decisive victory? If so, was their vision realistic? If a war of attrition was likely, did planners anticipate the different stages through which such a war might pass and the full range of operations that might be necessary? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated, and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be? Did any strategic leader distinguish himself for his brilliance, intuition, and/or imagination as a planner?

4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

How robust and well balanced were the diplomatic, informational, military and economic components of a belligerent's power? Did a belligerent's political and military leaders understand the strategic capabilities, effects and limitations of the different forms of national power at their disposal? Did the leaders take into account the political, financial, social and logistical constraints on the employment of the available instruments of national power? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives and information operations coordinated, synchronized and deconflicted with military operations?

How well did diplomacy support military power? How well did military power support diplomacy? What contribution did diplomats make to the understanding of other cultures, societies, and political systems? Did diplomats demonstrate an ability to think strategically? Did a country's diplomatic service develop an institutional point of view? If so, did that point of view help or hinder the state's attempt to match its grand strategy to its policy? Did diplomats act effectively to prevent the escalation of a war? To negotiate a timely and advantageous settlement to a war? To what extent did a country's diplomatic success depend on its actual relative power? To what extent did that success depend on the perception of its power?

How well did a belligerent utilize its economic resources in support of its political aims? Did it seek to influence other parties by means of subventions, foreign aid, loans, direct investment, or trade treaties? Did it attempt to deter or coerce its enemies by means of denial of aid, selective embargoes, partial or total suspension in trade relations, or blockades? If one belligerent engaged in economic warfare against another, how accurate were the assumptions he made about the effects of his economic campaign on the public health, standard of living, and/or will power of his enemy? What roles did the naval and/or air instruments play in the execution of such economic warfare?

Did a belligerent have an information strategy? Was it developed through an interagency process? How flexible, imaginative and comprehensive was it? If a

belligerent tried to improve its image abroad, how did it attempt to do so and with what success? Were the informational and/or propaganda campaigns of a belligerent aimed at the correct audiences? Were those campaigns based on a sound understanding of the culture, society, religion(s), values, traditions and language(s) of the targeted audience? If a belligerent was interested in promoting its own ideology abroad, how did it attempt to do so and with what results? If a belligerent was interested in countering what it deemed to be a noxious ideology abroad, what means did it employ? To what extent did it succeed? How well did political and military leaders engage in strategic communication with their domestic audience? How persuasive were the justifications they offered for the war? To what extent did political and military leaders manage to convince the domestic audience that their strategies would produce the desired results?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of military power for maximal national strategic and theater strategic effectiveness? Were plans that called for the use of different forms of military power informed by a common set of assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the achievement of the political objectives? If one side in a conflict was conspicuously more “joint” than the other, how important was this superior “jointness” to the outcome of the war? What limitations prevented a belligerent from attaining an optimal integration of its land, naval, and air operations during the war? Did any leaders stand out for their success in transcending those limitations? If army officers played a dominant role in the formulation of strategy, did they understand how the naval and air instruments could be used most effectively? Did naval commanders understand the circumstances under which it made strategic sense for them to risk their fleets? Was there a new domain of warfare in which a belligerent was able to operate to good strategic effect? Did strategists exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did any belligerent successfully translate asymmetries of technology into a strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or during the war, and if so, did its operational consequences produce lasting strategic results? Did a belligerent make effective use of unconventional forms of military power and/or engage in irregular warfare?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately were the consequences of interaction with the opponent predicted and anticipated by the parties to a peacetime conflict or by the belligerents in an open war? What effects did interaction with the opponent or enemy have on the nature (and the perception of the nature) of the conflict or war? Did the existence of weapons of mass destruction influence that interaction? At the outset of war, was the initial strategy implemented as planned, or were the prewar strategic plans disrupted by unexpected enemy action? Was the interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to what the enemy did? How skillfully did a belligerent accommodate himself to the fog, friction and uncertainty of war? If the war became an attritional conflict, how successful were the belligerents in devising ways and means for intensifying the effects of attrition

upon their opponents? Was the side that began on the defensive able to make a successful transition to the offensive? Did any strategic leader stand out as an adaptive improviser?

If a belligerent chose to open or contest a new theater of war, did this signify the adoption of a new policy objective or a new strategy, or was it merely an extension of a preexisting strategy? Was it a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater? Or was it an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created by the evolution of the war? Did it involve fighting the enemy in a different location or fighting an entirely new enemy? If the latter, what were the strategic consequences of fighting an additional enemy? Did it make strategic sense to open or contest the new theater? Was the new theater opened at the correct time? Did the social, cultural, religious, political, geostrategic and topographical environment of the theater promote military success, and if so, did that success have strategic “spillover” effects in the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening or contesting the theater and supporting operations there? If opening or contesting a new theater involved risking the fleet, how well did naval commanders manage that risk?

If the initial strategy proved to be successful, did that strategic success drive changes, whether wise or ill advised, in the political objectives? Alternatively, if the initial strategy proved to be unsuccessful or too costly, was there an opportune reassessment of either or both political objectives and strategy? If an additional state or other parties intervened on behalf of one side in the conflict, did this force the opposing side to rethink its policy and/or strategy and, if so, how? If there were any changes or adjustments in policy and/or strategy during the war, were these based on a rational and timely reexamination of the relationship between the political objective and the means available, both military and non-military?

6. WAR TERMINATION

How and why did the war come to an end? Did the war end due to the collapse of one of the belligerents? As a result of the capitulation of one of the sides? By means of negotiated settlement? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side’s military operations support its diplomacy? Did the war end because of the unambiguous material or psychological destruction or defeat of one belligerent by the other? To what extent was the end of the war due to the exhaustion of the belligerents? Did one of the belligerents sue for peace after rationally concluding that the costs of continuing to fight outweighed the value of any political object that might be gained? Did that rational calculation occur only after a change of leadership on the losing side? Had the losing side earlier squandered realistic opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to overthrowing its enemy’s political regime, did that commitment translate into a longer war and heavier casualties? Did the end of the war come as a surprise? If so, did that surprise catch the victor unprepared to manage the process of war termination to his best advantage?

Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? In an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary, did it overstep the culminating point of victory? Or did the winning side stop too short to give the political settlement of the war a good chance to endure? Did the winning side carefully consider what specific demands to make on the enemy in fulfillment of its general political objectives? If the winning side chose to go further militarily in pursuit of greater political demands, what actual leverage did it acquire over the enemy? Did the long-term benefits of going further outweigh the short-term costs? If a leading power on the winning side put forward political demands that were opposed by its allies, what leverage, if any, did it exert on those allies to gain their acquiescence?

Was there a truce? If so, did military leaders negotiate the terms of the truce? In doing so, did they have, and heed, strategic guidance from their political leaders? Did the terms of the truce crucially shape the postwar settlement? To what extent did the postwar settlement satisfy the political objectives of the winning state or coalition? To what extent was the losing side or coalition reconciled to its political and military losses? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? Had the victor planned adequately for the transition from war to peace? If the victorious belligerents had achieved the unlimited aim of overthrowing the enemy regime, were they ready to carry out an occupation of the defeated country? If the victorious belligerents had pursued a more limited aim and had left the enemy regime in place, were they ready to execute, if necessary, a postwar policy of containment of the defeated country? Did the victors make appropriate deployments for postwar stability operations? Did they understand the cultural, religious, social and geopolitical contexts in which such operations would take place?

7. WINNING THE PEACE AND PREPARING FOR WAR

To what extent did the stability or instability of the settlement of the war stem from the nature of the settlement itself? Was the underlying conflict that had given rise to the war definitely resolved by the war? What were the implications, if any, of the “nature of the war” for the durability of the settlement? In the aftermath of a civil war, did a stable new political order emerge, or was there a recurrence of state failure? How did the outcome of an interstate war affect the geostrategic position of the victors in relation to the vanquished? Did a victorious power emerge from the war substantially stronger in relative and absolute terms? If so, did it attempt to exploit that strength to reshape the international order in a fundamental way? What ideological and/or geopolitical concepts informed the reshaped international order? Did the members of the winning coalition maintain the collective will to enforce the peace? Did the victorious coalition survive for long in the postwar era? Did old allies become new threats? If so, why? Did postwar occupations of defeated countries turn old enemies into new friends or allies? If so, how? Did the victorious powers “downsize” their military forces to such an extent that they undercut their ability to continue to secure the postwar international order and prevent the outbreak of a new war?

What were the major “lessons” of the war? What did the victorious side think that they were? What did the losing side consider them to be? How were the “lessons” of the previous war absorbed into the policies of winning, losing, and neutral powers? How were the “lessons” of the previous war absorbed into the military thought and doctrine of winning, losing, and neutral powers? Did strategic leaders presume the next war would be similar to the last one? Or did they strive to create conditions that would make the next war utterly dissimilar to the previous one? What impact did the previous war have on the character and tempo of military-technological progress and on the development of operational art? Was such progress seen as likely to favor the offense or the defense in the next war?

At what point did it become apparent that a postwar era had given way to a prewar era? Were there countries that should have recognized that transition earlier? Were there crises that portended the next war? If so, how well did status quo powers manage those crises? Did preoccupation with stabilizing the settlement of the last war distract attention from the next war that loomed? Were preparations for the next war hampered by bad memories, guilty feelings, or long-term material costs from the last war? Did anticipation of mass destruction to the homeland in the next war affect preparations for it? Were preparations for the next war driven by a sense of injustice or a desire for revenge? How ready were a country’s government, society, and military establishment when a new war broke out? Were they ready for different types of war and a broad range of military operations?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND POLICY THE ENVIRONMENT

8. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were those efforts and why? Did the belligerents manage to create multinational coalitions? If so, what common interests and/or policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners agree on who the primary enemy was? Did coalition partners generally agree about the strategy to be pursued in the war? If not, why not? What were the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power that each partner brought to the coalition? Was there effective strategic coordination and burden sharing within a coalition, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did information, intelligence, and material resources pass among the members of a coalition? How important was coalition cohesion to the outcome of the war? Did that cohesion have ideological, cultural or geopolitical underpinnings? What contribution did intra-coalition diplomacy make to the cohesion?

Did the strategies of the coalition have the effect of solidifying it or splitting it apart? Did strategies have the effect of strengthening an opposing coalition or weakening it? To what extent did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated during the war, was this chiefly the result of internal stress, external pressure, or a combination of both? If coalition partners were culturally diverse, did cultural or religious differences contribute to internal stress? Did coalition dynamics help or hinder efforts to match strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to strategic success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? If the winning coalition did not fall apart soon after the end of the war, what accounted for its postwar vitality?

How did the outcome of the war change the international system? Were there concerted efforts to reform those aspects of the international system that were thought to have caused the war? Were new international organizations and/or other transnational arrangements established in order to secure the peace? Did the war result in changes in the international distribution of both hard and “soft” power that had not been anticipated? What were the implications of the outcome of the war for the belligerents’ political stability, social structure, economic viability, ability to attract allies, and future military potential? Did the war stimulate non-state actors to rise up against existing states or empires? Did the war produce geopolitical change in the distribution of power among different regions? What were the implications of the outcome of the war for domestic and regional economies? For the world economic system as a whole? Did postwar economic instability breed new sources of political instability in the international environment?

9. THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

What sort of economic system did the country possess? Was it predominantly agricultural, mercantile, industrial, or post-industrial? To what extent did the government direct or control economic activity, and with what results? Did the defense industrial base (where one existed) do a good job of producing the weapons and developing the military technology that the country needed? Was a belligerent able to benefit militarily from ongoing or recent waves of technological innovation in the industrial, transportation, or communications sectors of the civilian economy? Was the economic system as a whole sufficiently dynamic, productive, and broad-based to support the country's strategic efforts to preserve or enhance its position in the international arena? Did a country's strategic efforts have the "feedback" effect of strengthening or weakening the country's economy? Did a gap open over time between strategic commitments and economic/fiscal resources available to support those commitments? If so, what were the ultimate consequences of that gap for the country's security?

In wartime, how effectively did each belligerent mobilize the economic resources at its disposal? Did governments make wise decisions about how to allocate resources, including manpower, among different uses? Was there an effective interagency process for making such allocation decisions? How did a belligerent's financial strength, natural resources, manufacturing plant, scientific expertise, and technological prowess affect its ability to wage war? Were belligerents able to maneuver creatively but prudently around financial constraints? What were the implications of a belligerent's system of public finance for its staying power in a protracted war? Which of the belligerents had superior logistical systems for moving manpower and materiel to the theaters of war and sustaining forces there? How vulnerable were those systems to enemy interdiction? What role did shipping play in the logistical systems? Was the outcome of the war due more to material superiority or superior strategy?

If a belligerent adopted a strategy of economic warfare, how appropriate was this strategy and how well was it integrated with other strategies? How vulnerable were the belligerents to attack by strategies of economic warfare? How economically self-sufficient were they? How important were communications by sea to the functioning of a belligerent's economy? If air power was available, did the structure of a country's industrial sector and the location of its key productive assets make that belligerent especially vulnerable to strategic bombing? How adept were the belligerents at working around the effects of attacks on their material capability to wage war?

10. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF STRATEGY

Who were the main institutional players in the development of strategy? What were their roles, relationships, and functions? By what processes did they develop, integrate, and apply ends, ways, and means? How did theater commanders fit into the overall chain of command? How were the military forces of each belligerent organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing and training for joint and combined warfare? Did a regular interagency process exist to coordinate the

employment of military power with the use of other instruments of national power in pursuit of a belligerent's political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might that process have been improved? How freely was information shared among military and civilian agencies?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did this affect the design and execution of strategy? Did such rivalries impede the presentation of a coherent military point of view on strategy to the civilian leadership? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional? If dysfunctional, why was this so and what were the consequences? Did problems in the chain of command, the interagency process, or the institutional structure of governmental authority contribute to excessive friction in civil-military relations? If there was intense competition within the governmental elite or among the participants in the interagency process, did this obscure the military leaders' understanding of the political objectives of the war? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aim affect the wartime civil-military relationship? If the political leaders demanded of the military instrument something that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed overly stringent political restraints on the use of force, how did the military leadership respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, what was the reaction of the civil leadership? How attuned were military leaders to the need to assess and manage risk? How did the personalities of the key military and civilian leaders affect the civil-military relationship and the making of policy and strategy? Did any leader manifest conspicuous ability in managing civil-military relations and making sound tradeoffs between political and military considerations?

Did the transition from war to peace, or from one form of war to another, lead to any major institutional changes in the organization of a country's national security system? How well did new national-security institutions or a reformed interagency process perform in the next war? Were new institutions and old institutions able to work together effectively in both wartime and peacetime? Did institutional changes affect how the political and military leadership either divided their respective tasks or shared responsibility for strategy?

11. THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

How did a belligerent's culture, society, ideology and religion affect the formulation of policies and strategies? Did a belligerent's culture, ideology and social structure affect the quality of the policy/strategy match? Did a belligerent possess a discernable "strategic culture" or "way of war" and, if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior?

If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or part, how did the character of military action affect its course and outcome? Did non-military action or factors have a greater impact on how the struggle turned out? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture, values, social structure, or religion give either belligerent a clear advantage? Did information operations and/or strategic

communication have the effect of either reinforcing or negating any such advantage? If a conflict pitted different ethnic or religious groups against each other, how did the mobilization of ethnic and/or religious passions affect the conduct and outcome of the war? Was the war marked by heavy resort to terrorism? Was it possible for external powers to resolve the conflict by military or diplomatic intervention? If so, how? If not, why not?

Was the embodiment of Clausewitz's trinity—the relationship among government, people and the military—able to withstand the shock of battlefield reverses, catastrophic damage to the homeland, or the strain of protracted war? If not, why not? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary's society from within? Did information operations play a significant role in any such weakening? Did a belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient "incremental dividends"—periodic successes or tokens of success—to maintain support for the war? Or did the strategy have the effect of diminishing domestic support for the war? Did belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and if so, with what success? Did the existence of communications media outside governmental control make it difficult for political leaders to manage public opinion at home and influence attitudes abroad? Did the "passions of the people" make it difficult for political and military leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy?

Course Process and Standards

1. Methodology. Each case study will be examined in depth through a combination of presentations, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student has been assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each of these seminars will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic. Seminar discussion is crucial to understanding the issues and the relevance of the individual case studies. It is thus essential that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the issues examined by the case study, as well as course themes and objectives.

3. Presentations. Students will attend formal presentations each week. At the conclusion of a presentation, the speaker will field questions from the audience. This question and answer period is considered an integral part of the presentation. Students are encouraged to avail themselves of that opportunity to ask their questions so that others in the audience may benefit from the answer.

4. Required Readings. Before seminar, students are expected to have read the required books and articles assigned for that week's topic. These readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are all the readings that are required for seminar preparation, for the essays, and the final examination. In addition, for some cases, the Department has provided on its website an "additional subject bibliography" for students who may care to pursue their interest in a case. Additional subject bibliography readings are not in any

way required for success in this course. At the conclusion of the course, books must be returned to the Publication Issue Room within four weeks.

5. Pretutorials and Tutorials. The faculty moderators will hold tutorials during regularly scheduled office hours. These conferences will normally be with the students who are preparing essays, but may be used for any other consultation desired by either the students or the moderators. A pretutorial is required for every essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. A regular tutorial session will follow, in which the thesis of the essay will be discussed. Students who are writing essays should schedule a tutorial session with their moderators no earlier than one week before the date on which the essay is due. All students are encouraged to take advantage of these individual tutorials with their moderators as an aid in the preparation of their seminar essays.

6. Seminar Essays. Each student will submit two essays on questions listed in the syllabus. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. An essay should be no less than eight and no more than twelve double-spaced typewritten pages (12-pitch font); the norm is ten pages.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis on issues where the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical “think piece” in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the required reading. For this reason, students **should not consult past student papers on their assigned topics**; doing so would contradict department policy, negate the whole purpose of this exercise in independent analysis, and deprive the student of a valuable opportunity to exercise original strategic thought.

A good essay will demonstrate five elements: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator no later than the starting time for the seminar for which it is assigned. In addition, the student will distribute a copy of the essay to each member of the seminar. If students are able to circulate their essays the day before the seminar, their moderators and fellow students would have the opportunity to read the papers and incorporate material from them into seminar discussion.

7. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussion is an important part of this course. Seminar moderators evaluate the contribution made by each student, assessing the quality of the student’s input. The goal in assigning a classroom contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues’ learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening

attentively to presentations, and thinking about both. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar. Not to contribute or to say very little in seminar undercuts the learning experience of everyone in the seminar and hurts a student's classroom contribution grade.

8. Examination. Students will be given a final examination at the end of the term. The exam answer is expected to analyze the issue raised by the question selected and synthesize relevant material drawn from the entire course.

9. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work are prohibited at the Naval War College. Definition of these acts and their consequences are discussed in detail in the Naval War College Standard Organization & Regulations Manual (SORM). To access the SORM, go to Internet Explorer, and underneath "Organization" click on SORM/Instructions/SAP. Once in this site, click on "SORM Instructions and Annexes" and proceed to Annex A, Section 8: pg. A-8-A-1 to A-8-A-3). Students are encouraged to read this section of the SORM in detail before writing their first paper. If in doubt, consult with your faculty moderators.

10. Grades and Grade Appeals. Grading will be in accordance with the current Naval War College Instruction 1520.2 series. A final course grade of B- or above is required for an award of a Master's degree. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

Essays—25 percent for the first essay; 30 percent for the second essay

Final Examination—25 percent

Seminar Preparation and Contribution—20 percent

All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

A+ (98): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the topic. Indicates brilliance.

A (95): Work of superior quality that is, at least in part, original.

A- (92): Above the average expected of graduate work. An insightful essay.

B+ (88): A well-executed paper that meets all five standards of an essay listed above.

B (85): Average graduate performance. An essay that is on the whole a successful consideration of the topic.

B- (82): An essay that addresses the question, has a thesis clearly stated but not fully supported, and that either does not treat counterarguments thoroughly or has structural flaws.

C+ (78): Sufficiently analytical to distinguish it from a C, but still lacks the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (75): Indicates that the work is marginal and fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (72): Attempts to address the question, approaches a responsible opinion, but is conspicuously below average in one or more of the elements listed above.

F (65 or lower): Indicates that the essay has failed to address the question or has resulted from plagiarism.

The Naval War College SORM Annex A, Section 2 on Examination and Grading, sets forth the following procedures for appealing grades assigned in the Strategy Department. A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders for an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout. The second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it were submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chairman will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will normally be final.

11. Seminar Preparation and Contribution Grading. Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

A+ (98): Strikes an outstanding balance of 'listening' and 'contributing.' Demonstrates complete preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic.

A (95): Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be prepared for every seminar. Contributions highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts.

A- (92): Above the average expected of a graduate student. By the insightful quality of contributions commands the respect of colleagues. Fully engaged in seminar discussions.

B+ (88): A positive contributor to seminar meetings. Joins in most discussions. Contributions reflect understanding of the material.

B (85): Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar.

B- (82): Contributes. Sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counter-arguments, or present a structurally sound position.

C+ (78): Sometimes contributes voluntarily; more frequently needs to be encouraged. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (75): Contribution is marginal. Attempts to put forward a plausible opinion through inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight that is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions.

C- (72): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

F (65): Student fails to contribute in any substantive manner. Extremely disruptive or uncooperative. Completely unprepared for class.

12. Course Critique. Student input is vital to the future development of this course. The critique is available from a link on the Strategy Department website or at the following URL https://nwcportal.nwc.navy.mil/surveys/sp_eoc_cnw_200611.htm. **Strategy faculty will not have access to your critique until after course grades have been recorded at the end of the term.** Each student will be provided with a password that will provide access to the critique and permit work on it at any time during the semester. **DO NOT SHARE THIS PASSWORD WITH ANYONE.** Student seminar leaders will be provided with a list of passwords for use in the event that a student forgets theirs.

Students do NOT have to complete the entire critique in one sitting. The critique can be completed one page at a time and then saved. Annex C is a paper copy of the critique that can be annotated as the course progresses, if desired, to assist in making the required entries in the electronic critique. Note that the hard copy is provided as a convenience and will not be accepted in lieu of the electronic critique at course

completion. Seminar leaders will ensure that all students have completed their course critiques prior to the final exam and will provide this information to the seminar moderators so that individual student grades can be promptly released upon course completion.

13. Web Page. Access to the Strategy Department web page can be gained through the Naval War College web site. Currently all elements of the College of Naval Warfare course syllabus are contained on the web page. To gain access to the Department web page, either click on Strategy and Policy under “Academics/Students” on the NWC Intranet page and go to the College of Naval Warfare under “Courses” or log on to the Internet and go to <http://www.nwc.navy.mil>, then make the following selections:

“Academics”

“Strategy & Policy” (under Courses)

“College of Naval Warfare” (under Courses)

Along the left side of the screen, click on the various sections to the syllabus (i.e., Critique, Foreword, Course Objectives and Content, etc.). Information regarding specific presentations can be found at “Presentations.” The User Name is “strategycnw” and the password is “cnw2006”. Please refer any questions to Carol Keelty (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator): E-mail: carol.keelty@nwc.navy.mil; Phone (401) 841-2188; Rm. C-214.

THE STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY 2006-2007

Professor John H. Maurer, the Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a graduate of Yale University and holds a M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he was executive editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, and held the position of senior research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In addition, he served on the Secretary of the Navy's advisory committee on naval history. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval arms control between the two world wars, and a recently published study about Winston Churchill's views on British foreign policy and strategy. At present, he is working on several research projects: a study on the transformation of naval warfare that occurred during the era of the two world wars; and, a book about Winston Churchill and Great Britain's decline as a world power. In June 2001, he received the U.S. Navy's Meritorious Civilian Service Award.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Bailey, U.S. Air Force, graduated with honors from the United States Air Force Academy in 1986. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from the Ohio State University, as well as degrees from the Air Command and Staff College and the Naval War College, where he graduated with distinction. As an intelligence officer, Lt Col Bailey has served in a variety of positions from fighter wing to the Air Staff, and his career includes assignments in the Air Force's Office of Legislative Liaison and as a member of the faculty at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

Commander B. Kyle Barrett, U.S. Navy, is a 1986 graduate of Guilford College in North Carolina. He holds a B.S. in Biology and Chemistry, an M.S. in Molecular Biology from Carnegie Mellon University, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction in 2000. He was commissioned through OCS in 1989 and began his naval career as an Intelligence Officer. CDR Barrett completed a lateral transfer to Naval Flight Officer in 1992 and flew a total of over 3500 hours in the A-6E *Intruder* on board the USS INDEPENDENCE forward deployed in Japan, and the E-6A/B *TACAMO*. His most recent tour was as an Operations Plans officer in the U.S. European Command European Plans and Operations Center in Stuttgart, Germany, where he coordinated security for the 2004 Olympics in Athens, Greece and later focused on cooperative security issues in Africa.

Commander Michael A. Borrosh, U.S. Navy, is a 1985 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He holds a B.S. in Physical Science and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is a qualified Surface Warfare Officer and Naval Flight Officer. He has completed various operational tours and instructor duty in the A-6E and EA-6B aboard USS SARATOGA (CV-60), USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67), USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and Incirlik AFB, Turkey. His staff tours include recruiting duty and action officer Chief of Naval Operations Staff, Policy and Doctrine Division (N512).

Colonel David A. Brown, U.S. Army, is a designated Army Strategist who holds a BA in Philosophy from Carson Newman College, a diploma from the Defense Language Institute for studies in the Greek language, a diploma from the Army's Command and General Staff College, a MS from Long Island University in Counseling and Leader Development, and a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies Program. COL Brown's career spans over 22 years in Field Artillery units and a variety of command and staff positions in the US and overseas. His operational experience includes nuclear weapons programs, combat experience in Desert Storm, frequent visits to Bosnia and Kosovo and operational planning experience at Battalion, Brigade, Division and Theater levels, where he served as 1st Armored Division Chief of Plans and Chief of Contingency Plans for United States Army Europe. COL Brown also served as a Tactical Officer at the US Military Academy, West Point and most recently commanded the United States Army Garrison, Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He is a recipient of the James D. Forrestal Award for excellence in Strategy and Force Planning and a recent graduate of the Institute of Counter-Terrorism's Executive Studies Program at Herzliya, Israel. He has lectured extensively on ethics, theology and history and is the author of *Intifada & The Blood of Abraham, Lessons in Asymmetrical Warfare - Written in Stone*, published by the Association of the United States Army's Institute of Land Warfare.

Professor Jon F. Danilowicz, is a Department of State Faculty Advisor on detail to the Naval War College. He holds a BSFS degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service as well as an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction in 2003. Since joining the U.S. Foreign Service in 1989, he has served in U.S. Embassies in Dhaka, Bangladesh; Harare, Zimbabwe; Maputo, Mozambique; and Islamabad, Pakistan. His most recent assignment was as Director of the Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in Panama City, Panama. He has also served in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, and the Department of State's Operations Center in Washington.

Colonel Kevin S.C. Darnell, USAF, is the Senior Air Force Advisor to the President, U.S. Naval War College. He is a Master Navigator with over 3,900 flight hours and holds degrees in Psychology (B.A. Maine), Systems Management (M.S. Southern California), and National Security Studies (M.A. NWC). He is a distinguished graduate of USAF Undergraduate Navigator Training School, Instructor Training School, Squadron Officer School, and the Naval War College. From 2000 to 2003 Colonel Darnell taught in the S&P Department and lectured on airpower theory and the Gulf War. He returns to Newport following 19 months as the Air Attaché to Saudi Arabia and 12 months in Iraq. While assigned to Multi-National Force-Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Colonel Darnell served as the NATO-EU-Coalition branch chief and, later, as the Policy Division chief of the DCS for Strategic Effects. His division analyzed policy options and formulated strategies to achieve them for the CG, MNF-I. Major efforts under his tenure included dialogue with the Kurdish Regional Government leadership on Iraqi stability, support to the ratification of the Iraqi constitution, Sunni engagement, risk mitigation during the December 2005 national elections, political responses to the

Samarra Golden Mosque bombing, improving Iraqi ministerial capacity, and the disarmament and reintegration of unlawful armed groups.

Professor Frank “Scott” Douglas performed his doctoral work with Columbia University’s Political Science department, focusing on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. He also holds an MA from Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a BSFS degree from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. Prof. Douglas holds an area studies certificate in East /Central Europe from Columbia’s Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. In addition to his scholarly work, he has served as an election observer in Bosnia and as the director of a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic. He is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets*, as well as a new project analyzing the United States’ and Al-Qaeda’s struggle to best one another’s strategic information operations and define the nature of the war to their advantage.

Captain Stephen G. Gabriele, U.S. Navy, is a distinguished graduate of both the U.S. Naval Academy (1979) and the Naval War College (2003). A submarine officer, he had command of USS ALBUQUERQUE (SSN 706) and was most recently Commander Undersea Surveillance with worldwide oversight of the navy’s Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. Other assignments include operational tours on several submarines and staffs, Executive Assistant to the navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs, and several training commands. Captain Gabriel served as Director of the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) Central Command Friendly Forces Coordination Center (F2C2) in Bahrain during a 6-month sabbatical from the War College in 2006.

Captain Paul Gallagher, U.S. Navy, is a 1978 Graduate of Marquette University and holds a Masters degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College. A career Naval Flight Officer, he flew the E-2C Hawkeye. In addition to time spent in the VAW community CAPT Gallagher was the Assistant Navigator on the USS INDEPENDENCE, and he Commanded Tactical Air Control Squadron Twenty Two. Some other assignments include Commander Carrier Group Eight, and Commander Striking and Support Forces South, in Naples Italy.

Professor Marc A. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Relations. He has taught at Georgetown University, the University of Rhode Island and the US Air Force War College. He also serves as a political commentator for local radio and news stations as well as for RI and national print media. In addition, Dr Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. Dr. Genest has received fellowships, grants and awards from numerous organizations including the United States Institute of Peace, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harry S. Truman Foundation and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy. Professor Genest was also the recipient of the University of Rhode Island’s Teaching Excellence Award. Professor Genest’s

books include, *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations* and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, terrorism, American foreign policy and public opinion. His current work is entitled, “Winning the War of Ideas in the Age of Global Terrorism.”

Professor Timothy D. Hoyt received his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in 1997. At Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, 1998-2002, he taught graduate courses on security in the developing world, South Asian security, technology and international security, and military strategy. In October 2003, he testified before two subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia. Dr. Hoyt’s recent publications include chapters and articles on the war on terrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war on terrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, military innovation in the developing world, and the impact of nuclear weapons on recent crises in South Asia. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel*. He is currently working on a book on American military strategy in the 21st century, and also on a study of the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005.

Professor Colin F. Jackson is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School (MBA, Finance), Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (MA, International Economics and Strategic Studies), and Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School (BA, Public and International Affairs). He did his doctoral work in Political Science (Security Studies) at MIT. Professor Jackson’s current research includes work on counter-insurgency, military operations in urban terrain, public and private sector risk management, organizational learning, and intelligence operations. Prior to entering academia, Professor Jackson worked for several years in the corporate sector in financial trading, telecommunications, transportation markets, and power development. Previously, he had served four years on active duty with the United States Army in Germany as a tank and cavalry officer. Professor Jackson continues to serve as a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Lieutenant Colonel R. Scott Jarvis, U.S. Air Force, joined the Strategy & Policy faculty in June 2005 after graduating from the Naval War College (CNW). He is a 1984 graduate of Iowa State University and holds an M.S. in International Relations from Troy State University, an M.S. in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. A career civil engineer officer, he has held a wide variety of assignments from the wing to HQ Air Force-level throughout Europe, the Pacific, and CONUS. Prior to arriving in Newport, Lt Col Jarvis commanded the 366th Civil Engineer Squadron at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho from 2002-4.

Professor David E. Kaiser holds a Ph.D. from Harvard and has taught at Harvard and at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the author of *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War*; a bold and wide-ranging book analyzing five centuries of conflict entitled *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler*; books on baseball and the case of Sacco and Vanzetti; and, most recently, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War*, as well as numerous articles.

Professor Heidi E. Lane earned her Ph.D. at the University of California, Los Angeles. She has conducted extensive field research in the Middle East and was a research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. As a former U.S. Fulbright scholar, she spent two years conducting research and studying Arabic in Damascus, Syria. Her sub-areas of specialization are ethnic-conflict and religious nationalism, insurgency and terrorism, and political liberalization in the Middle East. She is currently completing a book manuscript, entitled “Orders from God? Ethno-Religious Discourse and the Implications of Transnational Networks on Group Mobilization and Violent Conflict,” which focuses on the increased importance of transnational networks among ethnic and religious opposition movements in the Middle East. Prof. Lane received her B.A. from the University of Chicago and her M.A. at UCLA. She has previously taught as a visiting instructor in the Department of Government at Claremont McKenna College.

Commander Thomas Lang, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. from Central Michigan University and an M.A. from the Naval War College, where he graduated with distinction. During assignments in operational and training squadrons as a Radar Intercept Officer, he flew the F-14 Tomcat over 4200 hours and made over 1000 carrier arrested landings. He has also completed staff assignments with a Carrier Battle Group, the Navy Staff in the Pentagon and, prior to joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, the European Staff Element of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, in Mons, Belgium.

Professor Bradford A. Lee earned his Ph.D. from Cambridge University and was a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard University, where he taught for eight years before coming to the Naval War College in 1987. At Harvard, Professor Lee was awarded the Levenson Memorial Teaching Prize as the best teacher among the assistant and associate professors. He has written extensively on strategy, diplomacy, politics, and economics in the affairs of modern states. He recently co-edited, and contributed a chapter on war termination to, *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality*, a volume in honor of the late Michael Handel. He is now at work on a book, entitled “Theories of Victory,” an analysis of how military operations translate into political results.

Commander Daniel J. Lynch, U.S. Navy, holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester, an M.S. from Troy State University, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. A career naval aviator, he has served in a number of operational, staff and instructional tours in the SH-3H, HH-1N, and TH-57. Before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he served as Executive Officer of the Naval ROTC Unit at Purdue University.

Commander J. Scott McPherson, U.S. Navy, is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College and one of the first officers selected for the NWC's Permanent Military Professor Program. He has served as a Naval Flight Officer and instructor in several carrier aircraft including the E-2C, A-6E, and EA-6B. From 2000-2003, he served in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Directorate of Operations (J-3) as Executive Flag Assistant to the Director for Information Operations, Psychological Operations Officer, and Branch Chief of the Special Activities Division in support of world-wide operations including ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. He is currently working towards his PhD in the ethical aspects of space weaponization.

Professor Thomas M. Nichols holds the Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy. A former Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, he holds a Ph.D. from Georgetown University and the Certificate of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University. He previously taught international relations and government at Georgetown University and Dartmouth College. He has served as a legislative aide in the United States Senate, a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency, and was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He was previously a Secretary of the Navy Fellow at the Naval War College and served on the National Security Decision Making Department faculty. He is currently also a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City. He is the author of *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992*; *The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic*; and *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War*. He is currently completing a book about international norms regarding preventive war.

Commander Ronald J. Oard II, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of Purdue University and holds master's degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA as well as the Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, upon completing nuclear power training he served as a Repair Division Officer in USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CNV 69) and later as Electrical Officer in USS LONG BEACH (CGN 9). He also served as Navigator in USS CLAUDE V. RICKETTS (DDG 5) and Operations Officer in USS FORT MCHENRY (LSD 43). Commander Oard most recently served at sea as Executive Officer in USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44). His shore assignments include Steam Propulsion Instructor at Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course. Before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he was assigned for three years to the Headquarters Staff, U.S. Transportation Command.

Professor Sarah C. M. Paine earned a B.A. in Latin American Studies at Harvard, an MIA at Columbia's School for International and Public Affairs, an MA in Russian at Middlebury, and a Ph.D. in history at Columbia. She studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan, and wrote the prize-winning book, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (M. E. Sharpe, 1996), and *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (Cambridge, 2003), and co-edited with Bruce A. Elleman *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805-2005* (Routledge, 2006). She has received year-long grants twice from the Fulbright Program

(Taiwan, Japan), twice from the International Research & Exchanges Board (Taiwan, Soviet Union), and once each from the Committee for Scholarly Communication with the PRC (China) and Hokkaido University's Slavic Research Center (Japan). Currently, she is writing a book on Soviet-Japanese rivalries in Manchuria (1931-1949) and co-editing "Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom."

Professor Michael F. Pavković received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in history from the University of Hawaii at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College he served as an associate professor of history at Hawaii Pacific University where he also coordinated the programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has presented papers at national and international conferences and has also published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is currently completing a book, entitled "War in World History: Society, Technology, and War," for McGraw Hill's College Division. He has held summer fellowships at West Point in Military History and at Harvard University's Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.

Commander Thomas P. Rosdahl, U.S. Navy, is a 1987 graduate of Villanova University and holds a Master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. A career naval aviator, he has had a number of operational, staff and instructional tours in the UH-1N, EP-3E and T-34C. Before joining the Strategy and Policy Department, he served on the staff of Commander, Patrol Reconnaissance Wing TWO, Kaneohe Bay, HI.

Professor Steven T. Ross holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He has taught at the NWC since 1973, and has served as a political-military analyst for the DIA and the CIA. He has published many books including *European Diplomatic History 1789-1815*; *Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy 1792-1799*; *From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866*; *American War Plans 1919-1941*; *American War Plans, 1941-1945*; *American War Plans, 1945-1950*; *Historical Dictionary of the Wars of the French Revolution*; *American War Plans 1939-1945*; *US War Plans 1941-1945*; and *US War Plans 1890-1939*. Among his more than 40 scholarly presentations have been the Harmon Memorial Lecture at the Air Force Academy and the Biggs Lecture at Virginia Military Institute.

Professor Joyce E. Sampson is a veteran of the United States Air Force. Dr. Sampson earned her Ph.D. in political and military history from The Florida State University in April 2001. Specializing in Early Modern British History, her doctoral dissertation was a biography of Major-General Thomas Harrison, one of Oliver Cromwell's regimental commanders during the English Civil Wars, 1640-1660. As a doctoral candidate, Professor Sampson received the J. Leitch-Wright Research Award (1998) and a Florida State University Fellowship (1998-1999). Now Director of the Web-Based course for Strategy and Policy, Dr. Sampson has four years experience teaching and managing virtual classrooms, and fifteen years' teaching experience in "real" classrooms, including a semester at Florida State's London Study Program in the United Kingdom. More

recently, she has developed a minor in Middle Eastern Studies, and is teaching electives courses on Islam and the Middle East, Modern Iran, and Modern Iraq at the U.S. Naval War College, and for the School of Continuing Education at Providence College. She has presented aspects of her research in 17th-century English History at the late Lord Conrad Russell's Stuart Seminar at the prestigious Institute for Historical Research, University of London, the North American Conference for British Studies, and at the Midwestern, Pacific Coast, and Southern Conferences of British History. She has also contributed articles to the *New Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004), the *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), *The Readers' Guide to British History* (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2002), *The Historical Dictionary of Late Medieval England* (Greenwood, 2001), and *History: Review of New Books* (1997 and 2002).

Professor John R. Schindler received his B.A. and M.A. in history from the University of Massachusetts, and his Ph.D. in history (European/military) from McMaster University in 1995. Prior to joining Strategy and Policy, he served with the National Security Agency for nearly a decade as an intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer, work which took him to more than a dozen countries. He previously served on the faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College and the National Cryptologic School. He has published widely on military history, intelligence and strategy, terrorism and insurgency, and Balkan/East European affairs. He is the author of *Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War*, and recently completed *Unholy Terror: Bosnia and the Global Jihad*. His next book is a study of the Austro-Hungarian military and total war, 1914-1918.

Colonel Peter T. Underwood, U.S. Marine Corps, holds a B.A. from the Virginia Military Institute, an M.A. in History from Duke University and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College. His career has included multiple assignments in the Far East and Europe. Staff assignments have been at the Battalion, Regimental, Air Group, Division, MARFOR, and Unified Command level. He has served as a history instructor at the US Naval Academy and holds the designations of Joint Service Officer and Western European Regional Specialist. He commanded MEU Service Support Group-31, 31st MEU and has most recently served as Chief of Staff Marine Corps Logistics Command and Commander, Multi-Commodity Maintenance Center Albany Georgia.

Professor Karl F. Walling received a joint Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science and the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government*, and many studies of American and European political thought and action. He has taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Carleton College, Ashland University, and Colorado College, and was a Fellow at the Liberty Fund before coming to Naval War College. At present he is writing on Thucydides, as well as strategy and policy in American political thought.

Professor Andrew R. Wilson is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara and received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Before joining the Naval War College faculty, Dr. Wilson taught Chinese History at both Wellesley College and at Harvard, where he received several awards for teaching excellence. He is the author of numerous articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, *Sun Tzu's Art of War*, as well as the Chinese diaspora. He is also the author or editor of two books on the Chinese overseas, *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916* and *The Chinese in the Caribbean*. Recently he has been involved in editing a multi-volume history of the China War, 1937-1945; a conference volume entitled *War and Virtual War*; and is completing a new translation of *Sun Tzu's Art of War*. Among his other duties at the Naval War College, Professor Wilson is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group.

Captain Robert S. Winneg, U.S. Navy, holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester and an M.A. from the Naval War College. A career Naval Flight Officer in the P-3C Orion, he had command of Patrol Squadron One. He has served in a variety of operational and staff assignments, including duty in the Pentagon and as Chief of Staff to the Commander, Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance Forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet. He most recently served as the Commanding Officer of NAS Brunswick, Maine.

Professor Toshi Yoshihara is a graduate of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, holds a M.A. from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, and received a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has taught in the Department of Strategy at the U.S. Air War College. In addition, he has served at the American Enterprise Institute, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He is the author of over twenty books and articles on the international strategic environment in Asia, maritime strategy and sea power, strategic culture, information warfare doctrine, military space programs, and the theory and practice of counterinsurgency operations.

I. MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THOUGHT

A. General: How do theories of war fit into professional military education? One answer to that question emerges from a syllogism. If officers or officials want to act effectively in the real world of war, they have to be able to think productively. To think productively, they have to organize their minds properly. To organize their minds properly, they have to assimilate useful concepts, broad perspectives, relevant considerations, and leading questions. The S&P course themes supply the questions. The individual modules of the course highlight considerations appropriate to various real-world strategic circumstances. The modules as a whole, with their wide range of historical and contemporary case studies, provide broad perspective on current strategic problems and may reveal patterns with some predictive value for the future. The theorists whom we study offer the concepts that shape our understanding of war and that help guide our selection of strategic courses of action.

Where should we turn for theoretical guidance? There are no better places to start than with Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Though produced long ago, both texts still provide solid conceptual foundations for understanding war, strategy, and leadership. The authors of both were primarily concerned with the intellectual development of professional military officers, whom they identified as vital to the security of the state. Both expected their students to use their minds critically and creatively—as does the Naval War College. Clausewitz was systematic in his approach, whereas the *Sun Tzu* was suggestive, and the two were representatives of very different cultures; yet as Michael Handel pointed out (Required Reading 3 below), they partook of a common strategic logic. Each, however, took that logic in some distinctive directions, in ways that give us plenty of important ideas to work with in this course and in the real world.

Clausewitz's description and analysis of the essential characteristics of war have never been superseded. Wars at all times and in all places feature a dynamic swirl of uncertainty and chance, of violence and intellect, of physical forces and moral forces, of passions and politics. New technology may on occasion diminish but will never dispel the “fog” and “friction” that Clausewitz sees as permeating war. Indeed, Sun Tzu suggests that a smart commander will try to increase the fog and friction on the enemy side. War will always be the violent but purposeful clash of interacting wills that Clausewitz portrays. Sun Tzu usefully adds to the picture that war is also a contest of information.

Though Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* both shy away from an exaltation of principles as veritable formulas for proper practice, they each offer prescriptive concepts. Both stress the importance of making assessments before taking action. The famous Sun Tzuian injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our contemporary concept of “net assessment.” The Clausewitzian injunction to concentrate forces against the enemy's “center of gravity” is still at the heart of US joint military doctrine and

planning processes. Clausewitz's concept of the culminating point of victory also remains embedded in contemporary doctrine and planning. The *Sun Tzu*, with its emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise, foreshadowed many aspects of what we now call "maneuver warfare"-- an important element of modern approaches to warfare, not least among US Marines. The ancient Chinese text also stands as a forerunner of certain aspects of contemporary information operations, especially the use of deception. Indeed, *The Art of War* treats information superiority as a key determinant of strategic success. Clausewitz, for his part, was more skeptical that intelligence and deception could deliver what the *Sun Tzu* promised.

The most important prescriptive point for students of strategy in these two texts—a point on which we can readily see the authors in full agreement—is that war must serve a rational political purpose. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* stress the need to match strategy to policy, as do the first theme of this Strategy and Policy course and official documents such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and *National Military Strategy of the United States*. Military (and non-military) instruments must be used in ways calculated to achieve specified political objectives. What is more, both Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* emphasize, the costs of waging war must be taken into rational account. Clausewitz counsels his readers that as the costs come to exceed the "value of the object" in a war, the use of force must be reassessed and even renounced. Sun Tzu cautions against allowing the costs of protraction in a war to undermine the social and economic stability of one's own political system. Adhering to such strictures of rationality in war is no easy matter. Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* are well aware that irrationality abounds in war. Chance, complexity, human passions, and factors beyond human control all make rational calculation very difficult. The enemy may act or react in quite unpredictable ways. Indeed, in a warning worth the close attention of current theorists of effects-based operations, Clausewitz highlights how hard it is to anticipate the effects that the actions of one side will have on the other side in a war.

It is at this point that the crucial issue of strategic leadership looms large in both *On War* and *The Art of War*, as it does in this course. Strategic leaders must master interaction with the enemy if they are to succeed in achieving policy aims within rational constraints. Much of the detailed analysis by Clausewitz and many of the aphorisms in the *Sun Tzu* are about the attributes and activities of strategic leadership necessary to handle the problems of rationality and interaction effectively. Clausewitz highlights character, experience, and intuition. The *Sun Tzu* plays up calculation, creativity, and flexibility. What they say can be tested in light of the strategic leaders who stand out in the historical modules of this course and considered in relation to contemporary models of leadership. Students should also bear in mind that what makes for superior operational leadership may not make for superior strategic leadership (and vice versa).

Two categories of strategic leaders are in evidence in both *On War* and *The Art of War*: political leaders and military leaders. Under the rubric of "civil-military relations" we shall consider the interactions of these two sets of leaders throughout this course. Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* provide much food for thought and material for debate about the proper roles of political and military leaders. Both agree that political leaders must

determine the overall policy objectives that military (and non-military) strategies must support in any war. At the same time, the dynamics of interaction and other pressures faced by military commanders in the theaters of war give rise to civil-military tensions regarding the best ways and means to employ force against the enemy. Students should consider carefully the different approaches to the resolution of those tensions that Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* offer.

A hallmark of the Strategy and Policy course is the many different types of war and the wide range of operations that it covers. Here, too, our two texts of classical theory give us advantageous points of departure. Clausewitz, in a famous passage, stresses the importance for both political leaders and military leaders of understanding the nature of the war that they face. He also broaches a distinction between wars of limited and unlimited political objective that can serve as a good first step in understanding how one war may differ from another; we in this course add other variables to the analysis of different types of war that we shall come across and categorize. Clausewitz provides a further impetus to this course and to strategic leaders in the real world when he points out how the character of warfare may change, sometimes quite dramatically, from one era to the next. Indeed, we can see in *On War*, and in *The Art of War* as well, the imprint of transformations of war in the respective eras in which they were composed. The Strategy and Policy course, covering as it does many eras of warfare from the ancient world to the twenty-first century, allows students to gain a well-rounded understanding of how and why such transformations have occurred in the past and the present. As we approach the end of the course, where we deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the demise of a communist superpower, and the rise of transnational jihadist networks of non-state actors, we shall find in the ancient Sun Tzu text suggestions about a range of operations that we can adapt, well over two millennia later, to the strategic problems of prevailing against a nuclear power in a “cold war” and outmaneuvering non-state actors in a global counterinsurgency. As a wise man once averred, if one wants to find new ideas, start by looking in old books.

Of course, strategic leaders in the twenty-first century cannot find everything that they need or want in the classical texts. Required Reading 4 for this module surveys new ideas about contemporary strategic issues. Those with new ideas often criticize, either explicitly or implicitly, Clausewitz and (less frequently) the *Sun Tzu*. One set of critics has argued that the classical theorists are of little help with regard to irregular warfare involving non-state actors. It is noteworthy, however, that the first and foremost theorist and practitioner of warfare by non-state actors, Mao Tse-tung, drew substantially on both Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* (as we shall see in Module VII). There is also evidence that would-be AQAM (Al Qaeda and Associated Movements) strategic thinkers have been studying *On War* and *The Art of War*. Another set of critics has suggested that modern technological developments have revolutionized warfare to such an extent that classical strategic theory is at best of secondary relevance. But, as we shall have ample opportunity to see in this course, new technology is only one source of transformations in warfare even at the operational level and is only one element in patterns of success and failure at the strategic level. A third group of analysts, those who advocate greater reliance on the use of “soft power” by the United States, may implicitly look askance at

classical strategic theory because it encourages leaders to think too much about military instruments and too little about non-military instruments. But in fact neither Clausewitz nor the *Sun Tzu* encouraged readers to dismiss the importance of non-military courses of action. For Clausewitz, after all, war was the “continuation of policy” with the “addition” of military means to non-military means. And for the *Sun Tzu*, the ideal outcome was to win without fighting. One need not resort to violence to execute the two strategic options most highly recommended in *The Art of War*--thwarting the enemy’s strategy and disrupting the enemy’s alliances.

The Joint Staff, in their guidance to American war colleges about learning objectives in joint professional military education, emphasizes the importance of understanding how JIM (Joint, Interagency, and Multinational partners) uses DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic instruments of power) in a multidimensional effort to achieve strategic success. There is not much well-developed theory, classical or contemporary, to ease our way into these broad areas of inquiry. For sea power and maritime strategy, in subsequent modules we will take on board the celebrated theoretical (and historical) writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. For air power, there is not a wide-ranging body of theoretical writing of equal stature, but we will examine how theoretical notions of the strategic effects of the air instrument have played out in wars since 1940. Beyond some partial insights from Corbett, we lack from theorists, and thus will have to supply for ourselves, a full-fledged exposition of how joint and combined military operations can make a decisive difference at the strategic level in various types of wars. As for non-military instruments, wielded by civilian agencies as well as military services, there is no substantial theory to guide us in understanding how diplomatic, informational, and economic influence actually works, apart from some embryonic international-relations theory about economic sanctions (as a putative alternative to the use of military force). Again, we will have to proceed largely on our own. This course is a long intellectual journey into the various domains and dimensions of contemporary strategy. The classical theorists do no more—and no less—than enable us to take the first steps of this journey.

The most distinguished Congressional expert on joint professional military education, the Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, has recently written that “as time passes, I appreciate the timelessness of Clausewitz’s thoughts on the art of war and strategy more and more. These ideas, distilled from history, his extensive and broad wartime experience, and his powerful intellect, will continue to be relevant in the future.”² On his National Security Booklist, after the Constitution of the United States, the next three items listed are Clausewitz’s *On War*, the *Sun Tzu Art of War*, and Handel’s *Masters of War*. This course builds a formidable structure on the foundation provided by the relevant ideas and concepts of the classical masters of war. It provides materials for renovations of and additions to the structure as we move forward in time. And it provides the tools to use the course as a platform for strategic leaders to find creative solutions to the strategy and policy problems of the twenty-first century.

² The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. Representative, “Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders,” *Military Review* (July-August 2006), p. 3.

B. Topics for Discussion:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. “Policy,” he states, “will permeate all military operations.” At the same time, he notes that “the political aim is not a tyrant,” that political considerations do not determine “the posting of guards,” and that “policy will not extend its influence to operational details.” How can we reconcile the first statement with the last two? Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that offered in *The Art of War*?

2. The authors of *The Art of War* and *On War* agree that, although war can be studied systematically, strategic leadership is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this proposition for the study of strategy and war?

3. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are “the culminating point of victory,” “the center of gravity,” and “the need to be strong at the decisive point.” How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are they as valuable on the strategic level as they are on the operational level?

4. Evaluate the role of intelligence in *The Art of War*. Would Clausewitz agree with the *Sun Tzu* view? Which view is more relevant today?

5. Clausewitz emphasized the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and how do they interact?

6. *The Art of War* says that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” while Clausewitz stated that very limited and defensive objectives might be secured by the mere deployment of force. Are these two statements contradictory or complementary?

7. In Chapter 1 of Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz makes a theoretical distinction between war in theory—which tends to escalate until all the available forces are used—and war in reality or in practice. How do the two types of war differ from each other? Why are most wars waged with less than total effort?

8. Clausewitz, on page 69 of *On War*, recognized two kinds of war, involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other? Is one type of war more political than the other?

9. Some proponents of “transformation” and network-centric warfare have suggested that technological advances may soon lift the “fog of war” completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

10. Which theorist do you regard as more relevant to the current global war on terrorism, Clausewitz or the *Sun Tzu*?
11. Contemporary writers on strategy emphasize the growth of violence by non-state actors since 1945, suggesting that such conflicts cannot be evaluated by reference to Clausewitz's trinity. Do you agree?
12. One of the preferred strategies presented in *The Art of War* is to disrupt an enemy's alliances, and Clausewitz argues that an ally can sometimes be the enemy's center of gravity. How, and to what extent, do these insights relate to the current war against terrorist extremism?
13. Does the *Sun Tzu* represent a culturally different, quintessentially Asian approach to strategy in contrast to Clausewitz's Western approach?
14. What is Clausewitz's definition of "military genius"? How does it differ from the vision of strategic leadership in *The Art of War*?
15. Proponents of "fourth-generation warfare" challenge the validity of Clausewitz for understanding warfare in the twenty-first century. Is Clausewitz largely irrelevant for today's strategists?
16. Both *On War* and *The Art of War* were written in response to revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare. Which text, however, is the better guide for political and military leaders attempting to anticipate and manage changes in warfare during the periods of peace between major wars?
17. Do these classic works in strategic thought provide much guidance for using information as an instrument of national power?

C. Required Readings:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1989. Author's Preface, Comment and Notes; Book 1; Book 2, Chapters 2-3, 5-6; Book 3; Book 4, Chapter 11; Book 5, Chapter 3; Book 6, Chapters 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chapters 2-5, 22; Book 8.

[This translation of *On War*, undertaken by the noted historians Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with a commentary by the famous strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976, in the immediate aftermath of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. More than thirty years later, it remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz's famous work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149.

[Samuel B. Griffith's experience in the United States Marine Corps, as well as his deep knowledge of Asian languages and cultures, make his translation of this important text both scholarly and approachable for the professional soldier.]

3. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-39, 53-63, 77-117, 135-154, 165-193 (including the map), 215-253, 299-302.

[The late Michael Handel, who served on the faculty of the Naval War College, argues in *Masters of War* that, despite some important differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal strategic logic or unified strategic theory that transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. This book is relevant to subsequent modules, making it an invaluable reference for the study of Strategy and Policy.]

4. Freedman, Lawrence. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*. Adelphi Paper 379. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.

[Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading strategic analysts, provides a masterful and comprehensive overview of contemporary strategic thought. He examines key concepts and issues in strategy that have gained prominence since the end of the Cold War: irregular warfare, transformation, revolutions in military affairs, network-centric warfare, culture-centric warfare, asymmetric wars, fourth-generation warfare, terrorism, counterterrorism, grand strategy, globalization, strategic communication, information operations, and the changing international strategic environment.]

5. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (Selected Readings)

[Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper (USMC, ret.) assesses the usefulness of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the value of the education that he received as a student at the Naval War College for his professional development.]

II. DEMOCRACY, LEADERSHIP, AND STRATEGY IN A LONG WAR: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

A. General: The Strategy and Policy Course evaluates key concepts and frameworks for analysis in strategy and policy by studying the Peloponnesian War. This conflict, although it occurred 2500 years ago in ancient Greece, remains timely for analyzing strategy and the employment of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives. In this conflict, the Delian League, controlled by a sea power, democratic Athens, fought the Peloponnesian League, led by the militaristic land power, Sparta. The contest between the two sides resulted in a long war, lasting twenty-seven years. The prominent historian Thucydides provided an account of this struggle. Thucydides served as a general in the Peloponnesian War. He meant for his history to be “a possession for all time,” and that has indeed turned out to be the case. All wars, Thucydides wrote, will resemble this one, as long as human nature remains the same. So his account of this particular war was meant to provide a microcosm of all war. If you have seen this war, you have seen something that endures in them all. By understanding this one conflict, you may understand the persistent problems of strategy and policy more thoroughly and deeply than if you read an entire library. Whether the issue is the nature of strategic leadership, homeland security, the disruptive effects on society and politics of a biological catastrophe, how and when to mount joint and combined operations, generating and sustaining domestic and international support in a long war, confronting an adversary with asymmetric capabilities, controlling the sea, understanding an enemy from a radically different culture, the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, the use of revolution to undermine an enemy’s regime or alliances, the constraints and opportunities supplied by geopolitical position, the unique problems, strengths, and weaknesses of democracies at war, or the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, Thucydides supplies archetypes, or models, of the recurring problems of strategy, with his readers usually left to judge how well the particular leaders of the time were able to solve them. Such appears to be Thucydides’ thesis: he offers more strategic wisdom than perhaps any other historian of politics and war. We need to take him seriously. He could be right.

To test Thucydides’ bold thesis, it may help to consider how he is different from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Whereas they introduced us to essential elements of strategic theory, Thucydides supplied a school of hard knocks, the lessons of experience, which invite us today to understand how a great democracy, much like our own in many respects, lost a war to a bitter rival and its free way of life as a result. The stakes are high in this case study: if we cannot understand the strategic strengths and weaknesses of ancient Athenian democracy, perhaps we will not understand our own democracy, thus condemning ourselves to follow in the footsteps of Athens. Learning from its example may be the prerequisite for thinking clearly about the strategic problems and advantages of democracy in our own age. To be sure, the differences between Athenian “pure democracy” and modern “liberal, representative democracy” are as glaring as the similarities are intriguing, and the differences are cultural as well as institutional. The great Athenian leader, Pericles, advocated retreating behind the long walls of Athens

before a land assault by Sparta and its allies. Yet he also encouraged his people to seek immortal fame, perhaps the most coveted goal among Greeks since the age of Homer, with Athens earning its unique glory by dominating the sea and ruling over more Greek cities than any Greek city before it. Whereas both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu encouraged rational calculations about the interests of the state, Thucydides revealed the extent to which passion always threatens to escape rational control in time of war, with fatal consequences for both policy and strategy. Indeed, during his accounts of the plague in Athens, the civil war in Corcyra, the witch hunt for religious heretics in Athens, and the revolution and counter-revolution in Athens, Thucydides sometimes seems to be leading his readers on a journey to Hades, that is, to strategic madness, with not merely democratic institutions, but civilization itself proving extraordinarily fragile in the face of the passions unleashed and encouraged during this war. Terrorist attacks on diplomats; atrocities, like the mass murder of school children; even genocide, sometimes merely proposed as for the case of Mytilene, but sometimes actually carried out, as at Plataea, Scione, and Melos – all these horrors fill the pages of Thucydides’ account and make one wonder whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft.

Thucydides also goes beyond Clausewitz and Sun Tzu by emphasizing the extent to which you cannot understand either strategy or policy without looking at the politics that shape them. So while Thucydides takes pains to describe unfolding battles, he also compels us to look at political speeches and debates, with different leaders (Archidamus, Pericles, Cleon, Demosthenes, Brasidas, Nicias, Alcibiades, etc.) competing for the power to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as operational commanders in far-flung theaters. The goals of the belligerents and the strategies they choose to achieve them at any stage of this war are not self-evident. Indeed, the different leaders of different cities in Thucydides’ account often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. As we do what we can to peer through Thucydides’ “fog of politics”, we are forced to come to terms with the limits of understanding in any war, in which not merely chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but also the private interests and ambitions of different political and military leaders often triumph over the interest of the state. Hence, strategy is most emphatically a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political factions at home, and relations between political and military authorities frequently proving decisive in the success or failure of different campaigns under the Spartan commander, Brasidas, and the Athenian commanders, Alcibiades and Nicias, especially.

The origins of this great war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two Greek cities, Corcyra and Corinth, over control of Corcyra’s colony, Epidamnus. The dispute eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into what for the ancient Greeks might have been considered a world war. Yet as Thucydides’ account unfolds, he makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta’s fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta’s allies (Corinth especially) to persuade Sparta to lead them to overthrow the Athenian empire before it was too late to stop it from dominating the rest of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenian political and military leader, Pericles, to cave in to ultimatums from the Peloponnesian League force us to think carefully about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it meant to succeed

(strategy). Which side was trying to preserve the status quo? Which was trying to overturn it? Is it possible that each side was trying to preserve and revise the status quo? Were their ends limited, unlimited, or some mix of both? What gave either side hope of success?

Simple answers to these questions are hard to come by, but it helps to think about the likely nature of the war, which Thucydides predicted would be like no other in ancient Greece. Not only would it be an asymmetric struggle between a land power and a sea power; it would also be a conflict between two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses. And the coalitions would be led by two cities with radically different characteristics. Sparta was a militarized regime in which an elite group of citizens, who were also soldiers from age six to sixty, dominated brutally over a majority of the population, the Helots, whom the Spartans had enslaved several hundred years previously. Yet Sparta also had a complex constitutional system of government, with multiple checks and balances, making Sparta the city most admired in Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Fearing slave revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away too long. In contrast, the Athenians proved to be energetic, innovative, and adventurous. They consistently tested the limits of the humanly possible and sailed almost anywhere in the ancient Greek world their ships could carry them. Their democratic system of government and way of life made them the freest people in Greece at home, though abroad, even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its allies like a tyrant by demanding tribute at the point of a sword. In contrast, Sparta did not demand tribute from its allies, who followed it more voluntarily. Trade and tribute from its allies made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, but living off the labor of its slaves, Sparta was self-sufficient while Athens depended on supplies and revenue from abroad. If Sparta's regime sometimes made it too cautious, Athens' regime perhaps made it too bold, meaning that Thucydides forces us to assess the nature of this war not merely in terms of the military capabilities, plans, and objectives of the belligerents, but also in light of all the relevant material, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditionally, Greek warfare consisted of hoplites (heavy armored infantry) from two different cities massing against each other to fight for some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won in one battle on single day, so the Spartans especially were unprepared materially and intellectually for the revolution in military affairs, the Athenian strategic defense initiative, of the long walls enabling Athens to feed itself by sea and withstand a lengthy siege of the city. Predictably, as the conflict unfolded, the Athenian sea power found it difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against the Spartan land power, and vice versa, thus producing a protracted stalemate, as well as much unhappiness on the home front in Athens especially. As much as anything, frustration with the stalemate fueled the angry, vengeful passions that led the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate the traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not necessarily in their strategic interest. Yet success for either side depended on finding a way to make strategy a rational means to political ends. Hope of decisive victory appeared to depend as much on compensating for either side's strategic weaknesses through other means of national power, diplomacy,

intelligence, and economic aid especially, as on gaining leverage through its traditional strengths on land or sea. So Thucydides shows us each side reassessing its initial policies and strategies. The Athenians, for example, opened a new theater at Pylos in the Peloponnese to inspire a revolt of the Helot slaves against the Spartans. Sparta's ally, Corinth, used revolution to knock Athens' ally, Corcyra, out of the war; and Sparta uncharacteristically took the initiative to liberate Athens' allies, most of which were unreachable for Sparta by sea, in a daring land campaign in another distant theater in Thrace.

Significantly, such reassessments went hand in hand with changing political and military leaders in Athens and Sparta. Pericles did not invent the strategy of defending Athens by land while expanding the empire by sea; that honor, including the strategic revolution of using the long walls to transform Athens into a de facto island, belonged to one of his predecessors, Themistocles, but Pericles did put some version of that strategy into execution. The strengths and weaknesses of his strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, as well as the leadership qualities of the Spartan king Archidamus, must be evaluated against the successes and failures of their successors. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander, Brasidas, in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian commander, Demosthenes, in joint and unconventional operations, supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. In contrast, the Athenian political general, Cleon, always sparks controversy over the sorts of political demands to make against an enemy when it sues for peace. Whereas the pious Athenian commander, Nicias, often seemed to be a conservative Spartan in Athenian clothing, the daring (some say reckless) Athenian commander, Alcibiades, no less often personified the energetic, innovative spirit of Athens, both when he served as a commander and advisor and when his playboy lifestyle so offended the Athenians that they tried him in absentia and sentenced him to death. If Nicias's caution (some say indecision and superstition) in Sicily lost the opportunity for Athens to exploit its gains and avoid disaster, much credit belongs to the Spartan theater commander, Gylipus, for exploiting Athenian mistakes in Sicily to tie Sparta's overextended enemy down in a two-front war. The ultimate model of strategic adaptation, however, may be the Spartan admiral, Lysander. After almost three decades of war, he found a way to defeat Athens in its own element, at sea, thus suggesting that however useful indirect strategies may be for weakening an enemy, decisive victory may still require overthrowing his center of gravity. To explore the strengths and weaknesses of these diverse strategic leaders, we have included in the readings some biographical sketches from the ancient historian, Plutarch, who discusses their personalities and accomplishments in greater detail than Thucydides.

Given the length and costs of this war, not merely to Athens and Sparta, but to all of Greece, it is reasonable to ask whether each side should have reassessed its political goals enough to make a lasting peace. Thucydides shows first Athens during the plague that killed as much as a third of its people, then Sparta after its defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria, and then both Athens and Sparta, after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis, seeking peace, but never quite managing to terminate the war effectively. Whether this was because one side or the other demanded too much politically or failed to go far

enough militarily to compel its enemy to do its will is a matter of dispute. So too is whether the famous Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace in Greece or was doomed to failure because it had not eliminated the original causes of the war and lacked effective enforcement mechanisms. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea, occurred during the Peace of Nicias, one must question whether the Athenians would have done best to have committed everything to aid their principal ally on land, Argos, to defeat the Spartan army decisively, or to have labored to fix the peace before it broke down completely. Ironically, the climax of Thucydides' account, the famous Sicilian expedition, began while Athens was still technically at peace with Sparta, thus making it possible for some to assume Athens would not have to fight on two fronts if it went to war in Sicily.

Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily reads like a novel, or perhaps more accurately, a Greek tragedy. It shifts back and forth between the home front in Athens and the field in Sicily, which compels us to inquire how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign, and vice versa. Indeed, all course themes are relevant for understanding this campaign. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city, exactly the worst strategic option, from a Sun Tzuian point of view, unless there is no other alternative. Whether the resulting quagmire and ultimate loss of the cream of the Athenian army and navy was because of unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, poor assessment, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy is always a matter of vigorous debate. Don't forget, however, to think about Athens' failure to acquire significant allies in Sicily, friction and chance, Athenian distraction with scandals on the home front, Athens' lack of cavalry in Sicily, and poor relations between theater commanders and the Athenian people. A Clausewitzian critical analysis of the expedition might also consider failures to make timely reassessments, and failures to exploit Athenian command of the sea. Not to be forgotten are the skill of Spartan leaders, Corinthian and Sicilian reinforcements to Syracuse, technological innovation, the toughness and adaptability of Syracuse (a democracy almost as large as Athens), bad luck, shifting morale, and just about anything else that can go wrong when a theater commander (Nicias) loses the initiative. Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient in adversity, and perhaps more moderate strategically when the chips were down than when the fortunes of war were in their favor. They recovered enough from defeat in Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade, though they could not afford to lose a major naval battle, lest they lose command of the sea and control of the sea lines of communications necessary to feed their people. With a coup d'état at home, revolt among their allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta and its allies, however, there is no doubt that the Sicilian expedition had weakened Athens substantially.

Whether Sparta and its allies could have defeated Athens without the Persian intervention that enabled them to overthrow Athens at sea is another disputed question, but many suggest it was not Sparta that defeated Athens in this war. Athens' greatest defeat prior to its surrender occurred in Sicily. Had Athens not overextended itself, or

had relations between its generals and the Athenian people not distorted the proper match between strategy and policy, then perhaps Athens might have won the war, or failing that, have avoided catastrophic defeat. To whatever extent modern democracies, like the United States, share in the characteristics of ancient Athens, Thucydides' account of the strategic failure of this great democracy supplies us an opportunity to look ourselves in the mirror. Thucydides does not flatter his readers. He shows us both human nature and the character of democracy, warts and all. Certainly in that respect, Thucydides is in harmony with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How coherent were the policies and strategies of Sparta and its allies during the Archidamian War (431-421 BC).
2. During the plague, the Athenians came to blame Pericles for a policy that led to war and a strategy that seemed incapable of winning it, but Thucydides seemed to think that Athens' major mistake was to abandon the political goals and strategy of Pericles (see Book II, paragraph 65). Who is right, Thucydides or the critics of Pericles?
3. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?
4. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta?
5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens?
6. Which side was more successful at using revolts as a tool of policy, Athens or Sparta and its allies?
7. Which theater commander was most skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic results, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?
8. Was the Sicilian Expedition a good idea badly executed, or a bad idea?
9. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict?
10. Which strategic leader in this war came closest to fitting Clausewitz's definition of a military genius?
11. Which leader in this war came closest to Sun Tzu's ideal of a general?

12. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems they reveal about the process of war termination.

13. “Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances which caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations.” Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.

14. In light of the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace and the many quarrels among Athenian military and political leaders, in what ways did problems in civil-military relations have an impact on strategic effectiveness in this war?

15. “Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself.” Explain why you agree or disagree.

16. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

17. How strategically effective were the strikes made by both sides on the Athenian and Spartan homelands in determining the war’s outcome?

C. Required Readings:

1. Strassler, R. B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Books 1-8, pages 3-483; Epilogue, pages 549-554.

[Arguably the deepest and most comprehensive mind ever to study the relation between politics and war, Thucydides covers all eleven of our course themes in his account of this war, but compels his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy on their own.]

Key Passages:

Book I - pages 3-85. (Especially the speeches).

Book II - Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.
- Pericles’ Funeral Oration, the Plague and the Policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III - Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
- The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.
- Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

- Book IV - Athens' success at Pylos, pages 223-246.
 - Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.
 - Brasidas captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.
- Book V - Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.
 - The Alliance between Athens and Argos, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.
 - The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.
- Book VI - Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.
- Book VII - Athenian disaster, pages 427-478.
- Book VIII - Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.
- Epilogue - The end of the war, pages 549-554.

2. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated with an introduction by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 79-108, 252-318.

[Plutarch's famous biographies of Themistocles, Alcibiades, and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership, the transformation of Athens into a sea power, the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations, and debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively.]

3. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Chap. 1.

[The well-known historian Donald Kagan provides an account that is helpful for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.]

4. Walling, K.F. "Reader's Guide to Key Leaders, Battles, Cities, and Concepts of the Peloponnesian War." Naval War College, 2002.

[Keep this reference by your side as you read Kagan, Thucydides, and Plutarch, to look up names, battles, cities, and concepts that may be unfamiliar to you.]

III. COMMANDING THE MARITIME COMMONS: GREAT BRITAIN'S GRAND STRATEGY AND RISE TO NAVAL MASTERY—THE WARS OF THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS

A. General: Winning command of the seas—that is, the maritime environment that Alfred Thayer Mahan said presented itself as “a wide common” (*The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, p. 25)—and the strategic effects that a country derives from exercising that command, provide the principal subjects in grand strategy examined in this module of the Strategy and Policy Course. Commanding the commons can become a crucial enabler for the development of a successful joint and combined strategy. The innovative strategic thinkers Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett provide an analytical foundation for assessing how controlling the maritime domain contributes to winning wars and shaping the international environment. Strategic leadership entails putting together different instruments of national power into a grand strategy that leverages a country's strengths and compensates for its weaknesses. This case study examines how Great Britain developed and put to use a powerful seagoing, warfighting force in pursuit of national interest. By the early nineteenth century, “Britain had an unchallenged command of the sea, in quantity and quality, materially and psychologically, over her actual or potential enemies.” (Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, p. 543) Mahan evaluates the elements of sea power in peace and war, as well as the assessment of risk versus reward in naval strategy. Mahan presents an analytical framework and strategic guidelines for taking risks in a war at sea that deserve in-depth appraisal. Meanwhile, Corbett is often considered a leading and early strategic analyst of modern joint and combined operations. In addition, this course module provides a cautionary tale about the danger of strategic overextension brought on when a great power dissipates its resources by undertaking campaigns in secondary theaters that prove unexpectedly costly and difficult to terminate. This case study affords an opportunity to assess why superiority in conventional military and naval capabilities do not automatically translate into strategic success, as weaker adversaries adopt asymmetric, irregular methods of warfare to protract the fighting. This case study also contributes to course learning objectives by promoting critical thinking about the strategy and policy framework for analysis.

These fundamental topics in grand strategy figure prominently in Great Britain's emergence as the world's leading maritime power by the beginning of the nineteenth century and its use of this dominance at sea, in both war and peace, to shape the international environment in its favor. Gaining this commanding position at sea did not come easily: Britain fought a long war, consisting of no fewer than seven major conflicts against France, its main rival for empire and naval mastery, over a period that stretched between the late 1680s and 1815. An examination of the final series of wars—the War for American Independence (1778-1783), the struggle against the French Republic (1793-1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815)—offers insights into how Britain came to command the commons in this long contest with France.

The first conflict examined offers an object lesson in the failure of strategic leadership. In the War for American Independence, Britain's leaders failed to design a

grand strategy that brought into balance their policy objectives with the military and naval capabilities at their disposal. Consequently, Britain suffered a serious defeat, with the United States successfully rebelling from British rule. This setback owed much to the role played by France, which supplied the Americans with arms, money, supplies, advisers, as well as French ground and naval forces. American and French forces, carrying out the most successful joint and combined operation of the eighteenth century, inflicted a stunning defeat against the British at Yorktown. This victory proved decisive in breaking the will of the British government to fight against American independence. Meanwhile, in contrast to the role played by Britain's decision makers, George Washington demonstrated his strategic leadership in a way that contributed significantly to the war's outcome.

Britain faced an even more daunting challenge in subsequent wars against France, led at first by an expansionist revolutionary regime and later by Napoleon. These French regimes, mobilizing considerable military power and transforming warfare on land, won victory after victory on European battlefields. Napoleon's exploits on the battlefield, of course, have made him the most legendary of all ground commanders. His prowess made France seem unbeatable and came close to securing French hegemony over Europe. Britain defeated this extremely dangerous challenge by dint of its own tremendous mobilization of effort. This effort, coupled with good strategic judgment on the part of British leaders, led to Britain's dominance of the maritime environment. As the fighting progressed, the barriers to entry faced by adversaries seeking to contest Britain's mastery at sea became very high. "If there was any period in history when Britannia could have been said to have ruled the waves," writes the noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy, "then it was in the sixty or so years following the final defeat of Napoleon. . . . So unchallenged, so immense, did this influence [of British sea power] appear, that people spoke then and later of a 'Pax Britannica', finding the only noteworthy equivalent in history to be the centuries-long domination of the civilized world by imperial Rome." (*Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, p.149) In this case study, we examine the strategic leadership of the soldier-statesman Napoleon, as well as Britain's famous Admiral Lord Nelson and military commander the Duke of Wellington.

Another objective of this case study is to explore the interrelationship among economic sources of strength, the managerial skills of government organizations, and strategic effectiveness in wartime. Britain's command of the maritime commons rested on the strength of British finances, manufacturing, and trade as well as the Royal Navy. Britain's financial strength enabled it to maintain powerful armed forces and support coalition partners. Trade also helped to buttress Britain's economic strength. In addition, in the closing stages of the long struggle with France, Britain pioneered the Industrial Revolution, becoming the world's leading manufacturing power. Defeating France at sea also depended on the Royal Navy's management as well as warfighting skills, which effectively harnessed the resources provided to it by the British government. This combination of commerce, finance, and industry, along with naval prowess, made Britain a formidable adversary in wartime and, subsequently, a superpower throughout the nineteenth century.

This module of the course explores the writings of the noted strategic analysts and naval historians Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Mahan served as a professor and the second president of the Naval War College. While in Newport, he turned his lectures on strategy into a best-selling series of books entitled *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. These books brought great fame both to their author and the Naval War College. Mahan wrote in an era of transformation in technology and naval warfare, as well as of major change in the international environment, with the rapid rise of new great powers to challenge existing leaders on the world stage. Despite these rapid changes, Mahan saw in the examination of historical case studies a way to discern underlying principles to guide political and naval leaders in the making of grand strategy. Mahan maintained: "From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock." (*Influence of Sea Power*, p. 88) One objective motivating Mahan was to alert Americans to the growing importance of sea power for the United States on the eve of the twentieth century. Mahan provided a high-level analysis of grand strategy, exploring the interrelationship among geopolitics, naval strategy, society, economy, and government institutions. The study of Britain's rise as a sea power, through the wars it fought against France, the Netherlands, and Spain, provided Mahan with the case studies that he needed to elaborate on grand strategy and identify keys to strategic effectiveness in wartime.

Mahan's writings also highlighted the issue of risk in the use of naval forces in wartime. In *The Influence of Sea Power*, Mahan castigated British leaders for the naval strategy that they employed during the War for American Independence. Mahan maintained that Britain should have used their naval forces in an aggressive way. The risk-averse behavior of the British leadership gave French forces an opportunity to pull off the joint and combined operation that resulted in the stunning victory at Yorktown and American independence. By adopting a more aggressive strategy during the wars of the French Republic and Napoleon, Britain obtained better outcomes, winning a string of memorable naval victories: the Glorious First of June, St. Vincent, Camperdown, the Nile, and, most memorably, Trafalgar. These successes depended, among a number of factors, on a marked qualitative edge in the combat power of British naval forces over their adversaries. .

Another major strategic theorist examined in this module of the course is Julian Corbett. A contemporary of Mahan, Corbett wrote detailed naval histories. His lofty reputation as a naval historian prompted the Royal Navy's leadership to offer him an appointment as a lecturer on strategy in advanced professional education courses established for British naval officers. Today, Corbett is best known for his study *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Corbett, who drew heavily upon Clausewitz's *On War*, wanted to present a strategic analysis of how maritime powers fight and win their wars. Corbett maintained: "Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications." (*Some Principles*, p. 90) Corbett also wanted to show the importance of joint operations for generating important strategic effects. Unlike Mahan, who was notably concerned with the action of fleet against fleet, Corbett was interested in the integration of naval and land power that he described as

“maritime strategy.” Corbett argued that a maritime power, to win a war, must adopt a larger overall strategy to combine the strategies pursued by armed forces fighting in different operating environments. Naval operations must form a part of a larger grand strategy. In the British operations in the Iberian Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars, Corbett believed that he had an outstanding example of the successful execution of such a strategy.

Following Corbett’s lead, this module of the course also examines the overall strategic impact of operations that occur in the maritime environment. The Battle of Trafalgar, fought on October 21, 1805, has achieved mythic status as an example of a decisive naval victory. A British fleet, commanded by the celebrated naval hero Admiral Lord Nelson, inflicted crushing losses on a combined force of French and Spanish battleships. What strategic effects, however, did Britain derive from Trafalgar? How did this battle contribute to the final defeat of Napoleon? The study of Britain in its struggles against France permits a close examination of the strategic effects generated by naval power in determining the outcome of a struggle between adversaries with asymmetric capabilities.

Finally, this module examines the role of coalitions in strategic success. Britain fought a coalition of naval powers in France, Spain, and the Netherlands during the War for American Independence. France provided considerable support to the Americans in their struggle for independence. This support tied Britain down in a costly conflict in North America. Faced by this powerful coalition, and mired in fighting against the Americans, Britain found it difficult to seize the strategic initiative. In the later wars against the French Republic and Napoleon, Britain’s grand strategy included repeated attempts to find coalition partners who would fight on the ground. Britain’s effort and burden sharing became key issues in the strategic success of the coalitions fighting France. British strategic leaders exploited a war in the Iberian Peninsula to inflict heavy losses on Napoleon’s army and puncture his aura of invincibility. British forces in Portugal and Spain, so ably led in joint and combined operations by the Duke of Wellington, maintained a major front in the war against Napoleon. Britain, benefiting from the economic growth that accrued to it from pioneering the Industrial Revolution, provided substantial financial assistance, arms, and supplies to their coalition partners. Without those partners, it seems unlikely that the British could have overthrown the Napoleonic regime and created a durable peace.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How well did Great Britain exploit its strengths and compensate for its weaknesses in its wars with France in 1778-1783, 1793-1802, and 1803-1815?
2. Why did Great Britain find it difficult to crush the rebellion in the American colonies?

3. Alfred Thayer Mahan argued: “The ultimate crushing of the Americans . . . not by direct military effort but by exhaustion, was probable, if England were left unmolested to strangle their commerce and industry with her overwhelming naval strength.” (*Influence of Sea Power*, p. 524) Do you agree with Mahan’s assessment of the potential effectiveness of economic warfare?

4. How strategically effective was the British navy in carrying out the missions assigned to it during the wars examined in this module?

5. Assessing risk versus reward is a difficult strategic problem. Alfred Thayer Mahan maintained that Great Britain’s leaders should have run greater risks in using their naval forces during the War for American Independence. Do you agree that British leaders should have adopted a more aggressive stance for employing their fleet in 1778-1781, much as Britain would later do when it fought against the French Republic and Napoleon?

6. Was the Battle of Trafalgar decisive?

7. How much did Great Britain’s efforts in the Peninsula War (1807-1814) contribute to the defeat of Napoleon?

8. How strategically effective were operations in secondary theaters for determining the outcome of the wars examined in this module?

9. Sun Tzu urged a strategist to defeat the enemy’s strategy. Why did France’s leaders find this strategic advice difficult to follow in their wars against Great Britain?

10. Why did the French navy prove more strategically effective in the War for American Independence than in the Napoleonic Wars?

11. The American and French campaign that culminated in the victory at Yorktown (1781) and the British campaigns with their Portuguese and Spanish coalition partners in the Iberian Peninsula (1807-1814) provide important historical examples of successful joint and combined efforts. What common strategic features account for the success of these campaigns?

12. What do the wars between Great Britain and France examined in this module show makes for a strategically effective coalition?

13. Evaluate the key strategic concepts and analytical frameworks presented by Alfred Thayer Mahan for understanding the outcome of the wars covered by this module.

14. Evaluate the key strategic concepts and analytical frameworks presented by Sir Julian Corbett for understanding the outcome of the wars covered by this module.

15. Evaluate the key strategic concepts and analytical frameworks presented by Clausewitz in Book Six, Chapter 26 (entitled “The People in Arms”) of *On War* for understanding the outcome of the wars covered by this module.

C. Required Readings:

1. Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Oxford History of the American People*. New York: Meridian paperback edition, 1994. Chapters 14-17.

[The famous historian and US Navy admiral Samuel Eliot Morison offers a well-written narrative of the political, diplomatic, economic, social, and military dimensions of the War for American Independence. This study provides essential background for exploring why Britain lost the struggle to crush the American bid for independence.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Chapters 1-2.

[The late Russell Weigley, one of the United States’ foremost military historians, considers American strategy during the War for Independence from both conventional and irregular warfare perspectives, suggesting that there was a synergistic relationship between the two.]

3. Ross, Steven T. *European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815: France Against Europe*. Malabar: Krieger, 1981. Pages 215-386.

[Professor Ross of the Strategy and Policy Department provides a clear account of the complicated diplomatic maneuvers and military operations of the Napoleonic Wars in 1803-1815. Britain confronted in Napoleonic France a most dangerous adversary. Professor Ross shows how Napoleon’s victories on the battlefield established an empire that dominated Europe. In addition, this study examines how Napoleon, despite his undoubted skills in the realm of conventional ground operations, contributed to his own defeat and the overthrow of his regime. Napoleon failed “to comprehend that any [other great] power or alliance could defeat him and [he] constantly subordinated diplomacy to strategy, continuing to seek to impose battlefield techniques upon diplomatic strategy long after purely military solutions were out of the question.” (p. 383)]

4. Rodger, N. A. M. *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*. London: Allen Lane, 2004. Chapters 21-22, 28, 30, 34-36, Conclusion.

[Nicholas Rodger is one of the world’s leading historians on Britain’s Royal Navy during the age of the fighting sail. In this acclaimed history, he provides an overview of British naval strategy and operations during the wars against France.]

5. Mahan, A[lfred]. T[hayer]. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Dover paperback edition, 1987. Preface, Introductory, Chapters 1 and 14.

[This classic study, by a former professor and President of the Naval War College, examines the elements of sea power and the principles of naval strategy. Mahan's history of the wars between Britain and France is valuable for thinking about risk in the use of naval forces. Mahan saw the key to victory in gaining command of the sea by concentration of force and offensive operations to win battles or to blockade enemy naval forces. Strategic effectiveness in wartime depended critically upon governments making adequate prewar preparations in building up naval forces and bases of operations. Despite the passage of time, Mahan's study remains an essential text for understanding both grand strategy and the employment of naval forces in wartime.]

6. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longmans, 1911. Introduction; Part I, Chapters 1-5; Part II, Chapter 1.

[Julian Corbett wrote this important study on strategy before the First World War. Corbett admired and sought to build on Clausewitz's *On War*, adapting it to offer strategic guidance for maritime powers. In particular, he wanted to show the effects that a maritime power might generate from a "joint" strategy for the employment of its army and navy. His analysis of maritime strategy drew heavily upon Britain's experience in fighting France during the Napoleonic Wars.]

7. Gates, David. *The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815*. London: Arnold, 1997. Chapter 8. (Selected Readings)

[Gates provides a succinct account of the fighting in the Iberian Peninsula—the so-called Peninsular War—that proved a turning point in the long struggle between Great Britain and Napoleonic France. The British army in Portugal and Spain was commanded by the famous Duke of Wellington. Wellington's strategy denied Napoleon's forces a quick victory, forcing them to fight a grisly, protracted war of attrition. The fighting in the Iberian Peninsula was marked not only by battles between conventional forces but widespread irregular warfare. Napoleon's inability to pacify the Spanish countryside overstretched his forces. The French army also suffered heavy casualties. Sir Julian Corbett would use the British experience in the Peninsula War to develop and illustrate his strategic theories about joint warfare.]

8. Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. London: Ashfield Press, paperback edition, 1983. Chapters 4-6.

[Paul Kennedy examines the role of British sea power during the wars against France. In particular, he explores the interrelationship between Great Britain's naval power and economy. In Chapter 6, he describes Britain's use of its naval dominance to shape the international environment in the aftermath of the victory over Napoleon.]

9. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Book 1, Chapter 6 (intelligence in war), pp. 117-8; Book 2, Chapter 5 (critical analysis), pp. 156-69; Book 6, Chapter 26 (people in arms), pp. 479-83; Book 8, Chapter 4 (center of gravity), pp. 595-600; Book 8, Chapter 9 (Napoleon in Russia), pp. 617-33.

[These passages from *On War*, previously assigned in the opening module of the course, provide Clausewitz's insights into some of the key strategic features of the wars in his lifetime.]

IV. AT THE STRATEGIC CROSSROADS:³ THE RISE AND FALL OF A PEER COMPETITOR—IMPERIAL GERMANY FROM THE WARS OF UNIFICATION TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

A. General: This case study evaluates key concepts that provide a framework for undertaking critical analysis in policy and strategy. First, the concept of strategic crossroads, as presented in the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, is conspicuous in this examination of the violent rise and fall of imperial Germany. The readings and presentations in this module support an assessment of the international strategic environment and an appraisal of the extent to which other countries can shape the actions of a major power at a strategic crossroads and deter the onset of armed conflict. We shall consider why the leaders of a thriving, major industrial and trading power, which stood to gain economically and politically by adopting the role of a peaceful international stakeholder, choose instead to provoke wars in an attempt to dominate regional rivals and pursue global aspirations. Second, this module permits an assessment of transformations in warfare, especially in terms of their value and limitations for achieving strategic goals. German military leaders designed and built armed forces to fight short-duration, high-intensity conflicts. This module provides an analytical framework for assessing when transformation might produce a capability to win quick decisive victories. Third, this module examines the interaction among technological innovation, geostrategic position, naval strategy, and operational doctrines for waging warfare at sea. In particular, it highlights the use of deterrence, access-denial, and disruptive, asymmetric strategies adopted by a weaker naval power in an attempt to defeat a stronger maritime adversary. The German navy undertook a long-term transformation, changing from a coastal defense force to an interdiction force that could strike at a distance against critical shipping lanes. This transformation posed a serious security challenge to the world's leading naval power, undermining its ability to command the maritime commands. Fourth, this module emphasizes strategic concepts and analytical frameworks suitable for the formulation of a comprehensive, overall national strategy. An appraisal of the linkages between diplomacy and military operations, along with the critical role played by strategic leadership in pulling together these elements of national power, forms part of this week's work. In addition, this module highlights fundamental course themes in strategy and policy: the need for a close interrelationship between policy aims and strategy; the influence of strategic assessments and operational planning in decisions for war; the role of the geostrategic and geopolitical environment in shaping strategic choices and outcomes; the linkages between society, government, and armed forces in peace and war. Fifth, this module assesses the critical role played by civil-military relations in the making of strategy. Perhaps no case study in civil-military relations provides as sobering an example of the adverse strategic consequences that result from a breakdown in the proper relationship between statesman and soldier.

War marked the emergence of imperial Germany as a great power during the middle of the nineteenth century. The north German state of Prussia, with its capital in Berlin, fought three wars—the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866,

³ See “Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads” in *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, pp. 27-32.

and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1—to forge a united Germany under its rule. These so-called Wars of German Unification established a Germany so powerful that it looked poised to dominate the rest of Europe. Over the next two generations, imperial Germany grew even more powerful. After 1890, Germany became an economic powerhouse as its industry and foreign trade made impressive strides. Technological proficiency in the steel, chemical, electrical, machine tool, optics, and pharmaceutical industries spurred German economic growth. Germany already possessed the best army in Europe, and it now sought to acquire a powerful navy. Germany's rulers attempted to translate this growing strength in hard power into enhanced international standing and security. In this attempt, however, they miscalculated, putting at risk Germany's considerable achievements, bringing about a powerful coalition of adversaries intent on stopping their ambitious bid to establish a German hegemony over Europe. Germany in this era stood at a strategic crossroads, and the actions of its leaders would precipitate the onset of the First World War. Imperial Germany, less than fifty years after its foundation, suffered defeat and revolution at the end of the First World War. This module, by examining strategy and policy decision-making in these wars, seeks to illuminate what led to the triumphal emergence of imperial Germany and to its later devastating defeat.

This module evaluates the leadership skills in policy and strategy of the legendary statesman Otto von Bismarck. While serving as Prussia's Minister-President and later as chancellor of a united Germany, Bismarck orchestrated the Prussian victories during the Wars of German Unification. He showed himself a master at managing the delicate policy-strategy relationship in wars fought for limited aims. His goal was to make Prussia the dominant power in Germany. Bismarck understood that, to defeat Prussia's rivals in war, he needed to calibrate objectives, to integrate effectively military operations and diplomacy, and to balance the triangular relationship between the people, government, and army. Bismarck faced and took great risks in what he did. There was always the danger of defeat on the battlefield, protracted war, or escalation to a wider, general European conflict. Bismarck sought to control the escalatory dangers of ever more ambitious war aims and great-power intervention against Prussia. The study of Bismarck, this master of wars fought for limited aims, provides insights into the making of policy and strategy by a country that seeks to challenge the international status quo without provoking a wider, general war.

Early success sometimes breeds later failure. The story of Germany's policy and strategy after Bismarck left office in 1890 is a cautionary tale of how a great power can come to ruin by provoking a strong, determined coalition of encircling enemies. For a period of some twenty years after the Franco-Prussian War, while Bismarck still held the reins of power, Germany acted as a satiated power on the international stage, trying to preserve the peace and consolidate the gains won in the Wars of German Unification. Germany under Bismarck's policy direction sought security through a skillful diplomacy that accorded it a leading role within the framework of Europe's balance of power. Whereas Bismarck sought to keep his country's goals limited, trying to avoid a general war, a later generation of German leaders pushed for greater aims. When the German government provoked war in 1914, Germany fought to overthrow the balance of power

within Europe. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German chancellor, stated openly in a speech before the Reichstag that a new set of power relationships must govern European affairs, with Germany exerting its leadership by coming out of the conflict stronger than any combination of rivals. “A new order must arise!” Bethmann Hollweg declared. “If Europe is ever to live in peace, then this can come about only through the emergence of a strong and invincible Germany. . . . the balance of power must disappear, for it is . . . the breeding ground for [new] wars. . . . Germany must create such a position for itself, must establish and strengthen itself to such an extent that the other powers lose all inclination to repeat their policy of encirclement.” Meanwhile, propagandists in Germany portrayed the war as a deep-rooted cultural clash, with a heroic German warrior nation engaged in a desperate struggle against adversaries that represented, on the one hand, the tawdry commercial values prevailing in the democracies of the West and, on the other, Russian despotism in the East. Germany’s aims in the First World War came to reflect all too accurately the ambitions of nationalist extremists who sought to impose a German hegemony on Europe. This dramatic escalation of German aims only galvanized Germany’s enemies to fight all the harder, resulting in a war fought for high stakes and with very high casualties.

An examination of Germany’s naval challenge to Britain and the United States is instructive for understanding the limits of both coercion and deterrence in the grand strategies of great powers. At the end of the nineteenth century, Germany’s leaders decided that attaining their foreign policy and security ambitions required the buildup of a powerful battle fleet to pose a direct threat to the very center of British power. Germany wanted to coerce Britain’s leaders from joining any hostile coalition of great powers. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the German secretary of the navy, devised the strategic blueprint for this strategy. Meanwhile, Britain sought to deter Germany’s rulers from embarking on an aggressive war to establish a German hegemony over Europe. Both countries failed in their aims. During the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson sought to dissuade Germany from embarking on a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson’s diplomacy could not counteract the internal political dynamics that resulted in the German strategic decision to seek a decisive victory over its enemies by using submarines in an aggressive way even if it meant provoking war with the United States. This module, then, provides an opportunity to examine how major powers interact with each other in the international system and why it is so difficult to devise a strategy that can successfully shape the actions of emerging competitors at strategic crossroads.

We shall also examine German attempts at producing disruptive strategic effects by pursuing military and naval transformation. The military professionalism of Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian and later German general staff, made possible the victories achieved in the Wars of German Unification. The development of a modern general-staff concept by Moltke proved a key ingredient in Prussia’s ability to defeat swiftly its adversaries in the Wars of German Unification. Railways, the telegraph, rapid-fire rifles, and longer-range artillery were bringing about a transformation in the conduct of operations and increasing the lethality of the battlefield. The Prussian army capitalized on these developments to gain a military edge on its adversaries and achieve rapid

victories. Military historians and strategic analysts consider the transformation of the Prussian army during the mid-nineteenth century as an important example of a revolution in military affairs. Moltke's successes led to a diffusion of this revolution, as other countries sought to emulate what Prussia had done and to close the gap that had emerged during the Wars of German Unification. Germany's military and naval leaders also sought to undertake further transformations in warfare during the First World War. In a bold bid to bring about the swift defeat of Britain, Germany adopted a disruptive strategy by employing submarines as a weapon of commerce destruction, striking at British and neutral merchant shipping. Instead of defeating Britain, however, this attempt at transformation failed. To combat the German submarine menace, Britain moved to adopt convoys for the protection of merchant shipping. This adaptation by Germany's enemies blunted the damage inflicted by the German submarine offensive. In addition, this attempt to win the war quickly at sea backfired, contributing to Germany's downfall, by provoking the intervention of the United States in the fighting. The study of Germany highlights that military transformation is no substitute for strategic wisdom.

This module also affords an opportunity to examine the strategy and policy trade-offs associated with planning and fighting multi-front wars. Before the First World War, Germany's military leaders faced the demanding strategic problem of preparing for a two-front war against France and Russia. Under the direction of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the younger (a nephew of the victor of the Wars of German Unification), the general staff devised an audacious strategy to launch the bulk of the German army onto the offensive against France, while fighting a holding action against Russia. The goal was to gain decisive strategic effects by seizing the initiative through a combination of speed, maneuver, and superior warfighting skills, defeating swiftly one adversary on the Western Front, and then redeploying forces to conduct a follow-on campaign on the Eastern Front. When this plan failed to bring about the collapse of French resistance, Germany found itself fighting a protracted war of attrition against a powerful coalition of enemies. This case shows how the swift defeat of adversaries depends critically on policy objectives, the availability of forces, the ability of foes to adapt, and the determination of the enemy people and leadership to resist.

Finally, civil-military relations and the social dimensions of strategy are key issues to explore in this module. Bismarck used war as a way to outmaneuver his domestic political enemies, who wanted to control government policies by asserting the power of the Prussian parliament and the primacy of the rule of law. By defeating Denmark, Austria, and France on the battlefield, the Prussian army gave Bismarck the political leverage he needed to thwart internal political opponents to the regime. At the same time that Bismarck gained an ascendancy over the regime's internal foes, he faced a stiff challenge to his authority on matters of war and peace from the Prussian military establishment. The disagreements between Bismarck and Moltke during the wars against Austria and France are legendary. These disagreements, by upsetting Bismarck's political calculations, threatened to impair Prussia's strategic effectiveness. Later, during the First World War, deep disputes wracked the German political and military leadership. These disagreements pitted the chancellor against the army's chief of staff and the navy's leadership, as well as military commanders at the front against those in the High

Command. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff emerged as popular national heroes, owing to their battlefield victories on the Eastern Front against Russia. They used their popularity to establish by the middle of the war what practically amounted to a military dictatorship. An examination of Germany underscores the way that war can transform the interrelationship between a country's people, government, and armed forces with disastrous consequences.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions

1. Some strategic analysts argue that Bismarck's success was largely the product of his own skill. Others argue that the keys to his success were a permissive domestic and international environment, "cooperative" adversaries, and good luck. Which argument has the most validity?

2. Why did Germany find itself bogged down in a protracted war of attrition from 1914 on, in stark contrast to the quick victories in the Wars of German Unification?

3. Bismarck generally succeeded in isolating Prussia's enemies before going to war against them. In 1914, however, Germany fought against a powerful coalition of enemy countries. What accounts for the difference between Germany fighting a coalition of major powers during the First World War and Bismarck's success in isolating adversaries?

4. Assess the relative strategic effectiveness of Germany's attempts to bring about a transformation of warfare during the Wars of German Unification and the First World War.

5. Who better understood the proper relationship between political and military authorities during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, Bismarck or Moltke?

6. Why did Germany find it so difficult to bring the fighting in France to an end in 1870-71 even though German forces won major victories over the French army during the initial stages of the Franco-Prussian War?

7. How well did military and naval leaders understand and manage the innovations in technology that were changing modern warfare?

8. Admiral Tirpitz developed a strategic plan against Great Britain that required building a powerful battle fleet, concentrating it in the North Sea, and preparing it to fight defensive actions in Germany's littoral waters. Did Germany possess any superior alternative course of action in developing a maritime strategy other than that advocated by Admiral Tirpitz?

9. Imperial Germany provides a famous example of an emerging major power at a strategic crossroads. Why did Great Britain prove unable to manage Germany's actions

in the international strategic environment so that the two countries could avoid war with each other?

10. Did Germany's decision for war in 1914 make sound strategic sense?

11. Germany launched major offensives on the Western Front in 1914, 1916, and 1918. Were these offensives strategic blunders?

12. Imperial Germany during the First World War provides a glaring example of the breakdown in the proper relationship between political and military leaders in the making of policy and strategy. Why did this breakdown occur and what were its strategic consequences?

13. Germany launched a major ground offensive on the Western Front—the so-called Schlieffen Plan—at the beginning of the First World War. Was the German plan a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

14. In January 1917, did Germany have any realistic alternative strategic courses of action to a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare?

15. Both Germany and Great Britain made efforts to damage their adversary's economy during the First World War. How effective were these efforts? How effective, too, were Germany and Britain in minimizing the damage that the other side sought to inflict on their economies?

16. "Mahan's strategic theories were becoming irrelevant even as he developed them." Do you agree?

17. Assess the rewards, risks, and feasibility of the alternative maritime strategies open to Germany and Great Britain for the employment of their navies during the First World War.

18. Was the failure of the major powers to negotiate an end to the fighting during the First World War irrational from a Clausewitzian perspective?

C. Required Readings

1. Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Chapters 5, 7-8.

[Henry Kissinger provides a valuable assessment of the famous German statesman Bismarck and the challenge posed by imperial Germany's ambitions to the peace of Europe in the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the First World War. In this account, Kissinger assesses the role played by strategic leadership in shaping the international environment in both peace and war.]

2. Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, paperback edition, 1964. Chapters 4-5, 8.

[This landmark study on civil-military relations examines the relationship between soldier and statesman. The institution of the general staff, pioneered by Prussia during the nineteenth century, gave the Prussian army an important strategic edge in planning for war and controlling operations once the fighting began. Prussia's operational successes during the Wars of German Unification owed much to the general staff's ability to generate a formidable pulse of military power by carrying out a rapid deployment of Prussian forces to the frontiers at the outset of war; it also owed much to the skill at maneuver warfare showed by its chief, Helmuth von Moltke. This study examines why Bismarck found it difficult to subordinate operations to policy during the Wars of German Unification even as Prussia won on the battlefield. It also illuminates the disastrous consequences for Germany in the First World War when its leaders substituted operational considerations for strategic wisdom.]

3. Wawro, Geoffrey. *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Chapters 1-2. (NWC Reprint)

[This study provides a useful background examination of the operational military environment and the diplomacy that preceded the outbreak of the Wars of German Unification.]

4. Badsey, Stephen. *The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871*. New York: Osprey, 2003. Pages 7-54, 59-76, 81-86.

[This concise history offers an overview of the operations that occurred during the Franco-Prussian War.]

5. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Chapters 2, 4-10.

[Hew Strachan, a professor at Oxford University and one of the world's leading authorities on the First World War, presents a lucid account of this hideous conflict. The information he provides about the war is essential for evaluating Germany's policy and strategy.]

6. Rothenburg, Gunther. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, paperback edition, 1986. Chapter 11.

[Rothenburg examines the strategic thought, operational doctrine, and war plans of Prussia-Germany's military leadership, from the Wars of German Unification down to the outbreak of the First World War.]

7. Showalter, Dennis. *The Wars of German Unification*. London: Arnold, 2004. Chapters 8-9, and Epilogue.

[In this book, a leading military historian presents a detailed examination of the “stability” operations that German forces needed to undertake to defeat France after they defeated the main French armies in the opening battles along the frontiers. Showalter argues that Prussia’s victory was not a foregone conclusion; the outcome was often in doubt. Moltke’s skills as an operational planner and field commander, in Showalter’s judgment, proved crucial in deciding the hard-fought contests that led to the unification of Germany under Prussia’s leadership.]

8. Kennedy, Paul M, ed. *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979. Chapters 3 and 8.

[These articles, by the noted historian Paul Kennedy, provide astute analyses of the international strategic environment at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the first essay, he explores the strategic advantages that Great Britain derived from its dominance of the international system of cable communications and its ability to control information. The second essay examines the prewar strategic calculations and operational planning of the German navy with regard to Britain. Germany faced an extraordinarily difficult geostrategic problem in having to plan and prepare for a war with Britain. The strategy and forces developed by Germany’s leaders, however, contributed to the growing Anglo-German antagonism.]

9. ———. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. London: Ashfield Press, paperback edition, 1987. Chapters 8-9.

[These chapters from Paul Kennedy’s important study of British sea power examine Great Britain’s response to the growing threats it faced in the maritime environment at the beginning of the twentieth century. In particular, he appraises Britain’s efforts to stay ahead of the challenge posed by the German naval buildup engineered by Tirpitz. This reading thus dovetails with the previous one about Germany’s naval strategy and planning before the First World War.]

10. Steffen, Dirk. “Document of Note: The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany’s Declaration of Unrestricted U-boat Warfare.” *The Journal of Military History* (January 2004), pp. 215-224. (Selected Readings)

[In this important strategic assessment, the Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, argued for a submarine offensive to defeat Britain even if it meant provoking American intervention in the war against Germany. The decision of Germany’s rulers to follow Holtzendorff’s strategy proved a turning point in the First World War. The German submarine offensive, despite initial successes in sinking merchant shipping, failed to knock out Britain from the war. Further, by bringing the United States into the fighting, Germany contributed to its own defeat.]

11. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, paperback edition, 1991. Chapters 1, 3-5, 24. (NWC Reprint)

[What are the strategic effects of economic warfare on an adversary's people, armed forces, and government? How is the civilian population of an enemy state "victimized" by restrictions on supply in wartime? This provocative study examines the impact of blockade on the German economy and home front during the First World War. In addition, Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

V. LOSING GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: CONFRONTING CONVENTIONAL, IRREGULAR, CATASTROPHIC, AND DISRUPTIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES—GREAT BRITAIN BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

A. General: “Victory in the First World War brought the British Empire to its zenith: with the addition of the territories it had occupied in the Middle East and elsewhere, it had become larger than it—or any other empire—had ever been before.” (Fromkin, *Peace to End All Peace*, p. 383) The expansion of the British Empire after the First World War presented Great Britain’s leaders with new international responsibilities and strategic problems. The so-called Great War gave rise to a new international strategic environment, one that British decision makers needed to contend with and at the same time shape. Defending and policing an enlarged empire proved an extraordinarily difficult task, embroiling Britain in a number of conflicts around the globe as it attempted to enforce the peace. While determined to ensure that the British Empire (in the words of General Ian Smuts, the prime minister of the Union of South Africa) remained “the greatest power in the world,” Britain’s leaders were also conscious of the need to avoid imposing further heavy burdens on a war-weary people. Britain paid a fearful price to defeat Germany and its allies: over 700,000 Britons lost their lives during the First World War. The question facing Britain’s leaders was whether their country, after having sacrificed so much to win the war, might lose the peace.

An assessment of Great Britain’s experience between the two world wars provides an opportunity to examine strategic challenges—conventional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive—such as those that the most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* identifies as confronting the United States today. Britain’s armed forces, while constrained by political and fiscal realities, faced the challenge of meeting strategic goals across a range of military operations. In the Middle East, South Asia, and Ireland, the British armed forces fought against insurgents who employed terrorist and other irregular methods of warfare. The study of British counterinsurgency operations enables an evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of armed services (including special operations forces) in achieving strategic objectives. Conventional threats also re-emerged during this period as great-power rivals developed new operational capabilities. The disruptive effects derived from the transformation then taking place in warfare almost brought about Britain’s defeat during the initial stages of the Second World War. An increasing danger from the threat of catastrophic attacks on the homeland posed an especially demanding security challenge. Homeland defense against the pre-1945 forerunner of what we today call WMD/E preoccupied policy makers and defense planners throughout this era. Britain even embarked on what amounted to a strategic defense initiative—the development of the first integrated air defense system, along with a pioneering effort in civil defenses—to protect the homeland in case deterrence failed. Another aspect of this module is its emphasis on information operations and strategic communication. Targeted at domestic public opinion, the enemy leadership, and international audiences, such efforts proved critical in countering the effects of air attacks on the British homeland and in bolstering Britain’s strategic position. In addition, in this module, students will apply the course’s framework for analysis that incorporates the role played by geopolitics, geostrategy, culture, and religion in achieving successful strategy

and policy outcomes. And not least, this module looks at the role played by naval forces in meeting security challenges and at the strategic effects of transformation in naval warfare.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain faced a colossal task in controlling a vast area that stretched from the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, across the Middle East, to South Asia. The Ottoman Empire had dominated the Middle East for centuries. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was a failing state, known as the “sick man” to contemporary observers. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, a power vacuum emerged in the Middle East that Britain attempted to fill. When British forces captured Baghdad in 1917, their commanding officer, General F. S. Maude, proclaimed: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.” Britain’s attempt to impose a post-war settlement on the Middle East, however, led to clashes with local nationalist movements—most notably an uprising in Iraq during 1920. In these conflicts, Britain used air power in innovative ways to help keep the costs of controlling the region from outrunning available resources. Britain employed air power as part of campaigns in Aden, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Somaliland (present-day northern Somalia). In the 1919 war with Afghanistan, the bombing of Kabul, in the opinion of the commander-in-chief of Britain’s Indian Army, played a crucial role “in producing a desire for peace at the headquarters of the Afghan Government.” But boots on the ground remained important. Indeed, in Palestine during the late 1930s, Britain needed to deploy a large ground force to suppress communal violence between Arabs and Jewish settlers. Maintaining the so-called *Pax Britannica*—that is, the British peace—entailed that Britain take on the burden of fighting campaigns throughout the Middle East and South Asia between the two world wars.

Meanwhile, in Britain’s own backyard, British leaders faced a bitter struggle in Ireland. Irish nationalists fought to end British rule of their country. The low level of violence in this struggle (when compared to the immense casualties and destruction of the First World War) should not obscure the difficulties Britain faced in Ireland and the important stakes at risk for both sides. David Lloyd George, Britain’s prime minister, maintained: “we ought not to stint anything that is necessary in order to crush the rebellion.” This attempt to destroy the nationalist opposition and restore order in Ireland severely taxed the British army and police forces. The unrest in Ireland also tested all of Lloyd George’s considerable skills as a politician. In an attempt to end the violence, he turned to direct negotiations with Irish nationalist leaders. These negotiations produced a treaty at the end of 1921 that concluded the so-called Anglo-Irish War. This settlement, however, did not end the violence in Ireland. In the immediate aftermath of the treaty, the nationalists fought a bloody civil war amongst themselves over whether they should support the settlement. The partition of Ireland, of course, remains a source of violent unrest down to the present day.

In facing international challenges and intra-empire disturbances, Britain’s decision-makers were constrained by economic circumstances. After a short-lived post-war boom, the British economy went into a deep economic slump, followed by sluggish

economic growth throughout the 1920s. The worst was yet to come, with the onset at the end of the decade of the Great Depression, which Britain, like most of the world, endured well into the 1930s. The economic orthodoxy of the time called for sharp cuts in military spending as a way of holding down government expenditures and balancing the budget. This drive for economy in the armed services' budgets forced Britain's leaders to face some awkward policy and strategy trade-offs. For example, the armed services needed to find money for force modernization even as British decision-makers expected them to carry out policing roles and to maintain a strong forward presence. To rein in the spending of Britain's armed services, the government issued a guideline for defense planning in the summer of 1919 that stated "the British empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years." This defense planning guidance—the so-called Ten-Year Rule—is indicative of how Britain's leaders did not consider another war against a peer competitor likely in the near future. This module thus affords an opportunity to examine the impact of severe economic constraints on the making of policy and strategy.

The British experience between the two world wars also provides insight into the difficulties that military organizations face in carrying out successful innovation in peacetime. Britain's armed services pioneered a transformation of war that began during the closing stages of the First World War. The British army was putting together an effective combined arms team of tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support. The Royal Navy was developing the capability to launch massed air strikes from aircraft carriers against targets afloat and ashore. A new, independent Royal Air Force was also taking steps to carry out long-range bombing and defend the homeland against aerial attack. Over the course of the next twenty years, however, Britain was to lose some of the operational advantages that its armed forces derived from wartime innovations in doctrine, weaponry, and force structure. During the initial stages of the Second World War, the armed forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan inflicted stunning defeats on Britain and other Western democracies. To understand why the British armed forces began to lag behind great-power rivals in some critical operational capabilities requires us to make an analytical comparison of what happened in Britain with what occurred in other countries between the two world wars. This module thus brings to the fore the issue of transformation. By examining the concept of transformation—the obstacles to carrying it out and the factors that promote it—we can deepen our understanding of military innovation and its potential strategic effects.

Beyond the challenges posed by insurgencies, economic stagnation, and military transformation, Britain was buffeted by a "perfect storm" in the international strategic environment of the 1930s: the gathering of simultaneous threats in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the Pacific. By the summer of 1940, Britain fought alone against a coalition of enemies, facing the danger of imminent invasion, with its homeland under attack from the air and its sea-lanes threatened. Yet, despite this bleak strategic picture, Britain refused to negotiate with Nazi Germany, and rallied instead to Prime Minister Winston Churchill's call for continued resistance. By choosing to fight on, Britain became the foundation stone of the Grand Alliance that would ultimately defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan during the Second World War. Thus, we

have here an example of how the determination of a government, people, and armed forces in a democracy can stave off defeat and point the way to ultimate victory.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What is strategic overextension, and to what extent did Great Britain suffer from it between the two world wars?
2. How effectively did Britain deal with the problems that it confronted in the Middle East between the two world wars?
3. Britain fought several insurgencies during the interwar period. What strategy and policy mistakes did British decision makers commit in fighting these conflicts?
4. Britain's underlying source of strength for two centuries had been its financial staying power in war. In an effort to sustain this source of strength in the future, British leaders constricted defense spending in the 1920s and 1930s. In the process, did they manage risks and make tradeoffs wisely?
5. Did British military planners in the interwar era draw appropriate "lessons" from the First World War?
6. How effective were the British armed services in undertaking a transformation of their forces between the two world wars?
7. How effectively did Great Britain respond to the challenges and threats that emerged between the world wars to its maritime security?
8. Did the rise of air power as an instrument of war present more of a strategic opportunity than a strategic threat to Britain in the period from 1919 to 1940? If so, how? If not, why not?
9. Homeland defense loomed increasingly large in British defense planning between the wars and during the initial stages of the Second World War. British leaders feared above all that massive air attacks on the homeland, producing what we today call WMD/E, would result in large numbers of civilian casualties. How effectively did Great Britain prepare for this growing threat to its security?
10. A prominent defense analyst holds the view that military services typically "prepare for problems they prefer to solve than those that a cunning adversary might pose." Was that the case with Great Britain's armed services between the wars?
11. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of Great Britain in conducting information operations across the range of conflicts it faced during this era.

12. Should Britain have opted for preventive war against Nazi Germany before 1939?

13. How did changes in the international strategic environment and in naval warfare gravely threaten Great Britain's command of the maritime commons?

14. Were Alfred Thayer Mahan's views about sea power still relevant as strategic guidance for Great Britain's leaders in the era of the two world wars?

15. What strategy and policy lessons does Great Britain's experience in the Middle East in the era between the world wars hold for American decision-makers at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

C. Required Readings:

1. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987. Chapter 6.

[The noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy explores in this best-selling book the interrelationship between a country's international position and its economic power. He writes: "[T]he historical record suggests that there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual Great Power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world power)." (p. xxii) The assigned chapter examines the period between the two world wars, providing background information for understanding Britain's increasingly desperate strategic predicament.]

2. Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace*. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. Pages 383-567.

[The First World War ushered into being the modern Middle East. In this acclaimed study, David Fromkin presents a well-written survey of Britain's strategic predicament in the Middle East and South Asia after the First World War. Britain faced a wide range of problems in trying to impose its control on the region. Fromkin examines Britain's interests in the region, the problems that it needed to overcome, and the efforts of British leaders to reconcile the two. Close study of the Middle East in this bygone era provides insights into current-day problems in the region.]

3. Jacobsen, Mark. "'Only by the Sword': British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (August 1991), pp. 323-363. (Selected Readings)

[In trying to bring about a settlement of the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Britain faced a major uprising in Iraq. This article analyzes the British campaign to defeat the insurgency in Iraq during 1920.]

4. Rayburn, Joel. "The Last Exit from Iraq." *Foreign Affair* (March/April 2006), pp. 29-40. (Selected Readings)

[This short article by a US Army officer picks up where the accounts by Fromkin and Jacobsen end. Rayburn describes the political and security problems that confronted Great Britain in trying to bring stability to Iraq between the two world wars. British leaders faced an extraordinarily difficult task in their effort to establish a pro-British government that could govern in Iraq. The upshot was that, early in the Second World War, Britain had to invade and reoccupy the country so that it did not become a base for Nazi operations in the Middle East.]

5. Kee, Robert. *The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism*. New York: Penguin Books, 1972. Pages 548-587, 629-752.

[Kee provides a sparkling but saddening account of the Anglo-Irish War and its aftermath. He casts light on the multi-faceted strategic leadership of Michael Collins, who masterminded a terrorist insurgency campaign and then negotiated a settlement of the bitter struggle in the face of opposition from many of his radical compatriots. Students should take note of how strategic communication and intelligence shaped the outcome of this conflict.]

6. "Irish Declaration of Independence," January 21, 1919; "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland," signed December 6, 1921. (Selected Readings)

[These two important documents mark major turning points in the Anglo-Irish War. The first document presents the grievances and aspirations of the Irish nationalists opposed to British rule in Ireland. Meanwhile, the "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland" gives the terms of the settlement hammered out in intense negotiations between both sides' leaders. This settlement represented a compromise agreement that pleased neither ardent Irish nationalists nor British imperialists.]

7. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights, New Jersey: The Ashfield Press edition, 1987. Chapter 10.

[This insightful account examines the challenges Britain faced in maintaining its position of naval leadership between the two world wars. As other countries built up their navies during the 1930s, the burden of providing for Britain's naval security grew dramatically heavier. Kennedy examines how difficult it was for Britain to provide for its naval security in this deteriorating international environment.]

8. Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Chapters 1, 3, and 10.

[This major study, supported by the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment, examines how the armed forces of the major powers developed the doctrine, force structure, and weapons that they would employ during the Second World War. Studying

military transformation from a comparative perspective provides insight into how the British armed services fell behind between the wars.]

9. Townshend, Charles. "Civilization and 'Frightfulness': Air Control in the Middle East Between the Wars," in Chris Wrigley, ed., *Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986. (Selected Readings)

[This article explores British views about air power as an instrument for policing the empire. Britain pioneered in the use of air power, which appeared to offer a cheaper way of controlling territory than large numbers of ground forces. This article also explores some of the limitations of air power as an instrument of imperial control, not least the moral issues raised by its use.]

10. Parker, R. A. C. *Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Chapters 2-3.

[This history presents a lucid account of the major defeats suffered by Britain and its coalition partners during the initial campaigns of the Second World War. These defeats came about in part because of the inadequacy of Britain's prewar preparations. Despite these defeats, Britain under the leadership of Winston Churchill did not make peace but continued to fight until a new coalition came into being to defeat Nazi Germany.]

NOTE: You may receive the 1989 edition of this book OR the 1997 or 2001 edition entitled "The Second World War: A Short History."

11. Townshend, Charles. "The Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Security, 1936-1939." *The English Historical Review* (October 1988), pp. 917-949. (Selected Readings)

[Great Britain faced escalating violence in Palestine during the late 1930s that proved difficult to quell. This violence involved Arabs, Jewish settlers, and British authorities in Palestine. Even before this struggle, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, one British official reported about Palestine: "The chief characteristic (indeed, the only characteristic worth taking into serious account) of the situation is, not only that no single section of the population accord the Government any appreciable measure of sympathy and support, but also that the vast majority regard it with increasing hostility, aversion and distrust." (p. 948) Stability operations in Palestine required a large commitment of British ground forces at a time when Britain faced a growing menace closer to home in Nazi Germany. From this time on, Palestine has remained a notoriously troubled region.]

VI. THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES IN WORLD WAR II AND THE EARLY COLD WAR

A. General: A series of global conflicts—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—wreaked havoc in the twentieth century. The outcome of each war helped to generate the origins of the next one. Each successive war grew larger in geographical scope. Within this pattern, there were radical changes in the character of war. As with other epochal changes in the history of warfare (including the Long War in the early twenty-first century), new forms of political organization and new forms of military technology created these changes.

The new forms of political organization that shaped the nature of World War II and the Cold War grew in part out of World War I and its aftermath. Totalitarian regimes emerged, both in fascist and communist variants. Externally, the ideologies of these regimes encouraged grandiose expansionist objectives in the world. Internally, these regimes sought to control their societies in ways that seemed to make them well-suited to wage total war against their external adversaries. For the United States and its allies, World War II was a struggle against the fascist variants of the new totalitarian forms of political organization. The Cold War was a struggle against the communist variants.

All the while, technological change was generating new means and ways of waging war. After the first important use of tanks, aircraft, and submarines in World War I, armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier-aviation strikes, and unrestricted submarine warfare became the main forms of military action in World War II. Germany and Japan made disruptive use of the new technology to achieve remarkable operational success in 1940-1942, but that early advantage did not last long. By the end of World War II, the United States and its allies had exploited their material superiority and their mobilization of scientific expertise to gain qualitative as well as quantitative advantages in all major weaponry except for jet aircraft and missiles. Of even greater importance for the future, the United States had developed the first nuclear capability and had ended the war against Japan by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as often happens after technological breakthroughs, the American nuclear monopoly proved to be short-lived. Four years after the end of World War II, the Soviets had developed a nuclear capability, too. The conditions for a protracted Cold War arose not only from the ideological conflict between radically different forms of political organization, but also from the weapons of mass destruction on both sides that the technological application of modern science to war made possible.

Against this backdrop of global political conflict fuelled by new forms of political organization and new forms of military technology, this case study focuses on the key strategic issues involved in the emergence of the United States as a global power. After World War I, the United States had largely withdrawn from serious strategic engagement with the world beyond the western hemisphere. The dramatic events of 1940 called into question the wisdom of such “isolationism.” That spring and summer, Germany defeated France in a stunning Blitzkrieg and then attacked the British homeland in the first major strategic-bombing operations against a great European power in the history of warfare.

Japan, having already been at war against China for three years, now started to expand into Southeast Asia as well, threatening the Western colonial empires in that region. Germany, Japan, and Italy came together in a formal Axis alliance that American policymakers perceived as a conspiracy to conquer the world. The political and military leaders of the United States suddenly faced the challenge of making their nation a global power to meet a global threat.

The United States had meager capabilities in place in 1940 to meet such a global challenge. Militarily, there was relatively little American power in being. The United States Army was about the size of the Dutch Army that the Wehrmacht had defeated in a matter of days, and it had as yet virtually no capability for armored warfare. There were ambitious American plans to manufacture thousands of strategic bombers and other aircraft, but numbers on paper and activity in factories had not yet produced much of an air force. Though the United States Navy had benefited from some rearmament in the 1930s, only in mid-1940 did Congress authorize funding on a scale large enough to construct the naval forces necessary to achieve command of both the Atlantic and the Pacific. That new two-ocean fleet would not come to fruition until 1943. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the United States Navy was inferior to the Imperial Japanese Navy both quantitatively and qualitatively in the early stages of World War II.

Politically, the outlook was equally grim. The United States had no great-power allies. German forces occupied much of France, while the rump Vichy regime in southern France embarked on a policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany. Japanese forces had occupied the most important areas of China, destroyed the best military forces of the Chinese government, pushed Chiang Kai-shek's regime into remote southwestern China, and established its own puppet regime. Before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin's anti-Western policy involved substantial Soviet material assistance to Hitler's war machine. In 1940, only Britain loomed as a possible American ally of great strategic importance. Even with respect to Britain, there was much uncertainty. Though Prime Minister Winston Churchill was eager to form an Anglo-American alliance, domestic opinion that feared "entangling alliances" constrained President Roosevelt, and American military leaders strongly doubted that Britain could survive German attack.

Whereas the year 1940 is the starting point for this case study, the year 1951 is the ending point. The intervening eleven years produced a remarkable transformation in the American position in the world. Thanks to Japanese and German strategic decisions, the United States and the Soviet Union joined Britain in a Grand Alliance that achieved the complete defeat of the Axis powers by 1945. After the Grand Alliance broke down and the Soviets threatened the hard-won security of the Western democracies, the United States and Britain put together a new coalition to contain the Soviet Union that included their erstwhile German and Japanese adversaries. With the emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the formation of a multinational communist coalition in East Asia in 1950, the Cold War, like World War II before it, expanded in geographical scope. Surprised by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the United States intervened in a regional war within the larger Cold War and, in a further

surprise, soon found itself fighting not only the Soviet client state of North Korea but also the newest and most important Soviet ally, Mao Tse-tung's China. The policy of containment of communism spread from Europe to East Asia. To support it with greater military power, the United States reversed the post-World War II downsizing of its conventional military forces; in the early 1950s, half the product of this surge of rearmament went to Western Europe and half to East Asia. In an atmosphere of Western fear that the war in Korea presaged Soviet aggression in Europe, NATO became in 1951 a full-fledged military alliance under American leadership. The United States desired to bring the recently constituted and soon-to-be rearmed Federal Republic of Germany into this alliance. Germany's former Axis partner Japan also became a formal ally of the United States. Thus, by 1951 isolationism had become but an historical memory for the United States. The American government, military, and people had met, twice in a decade, the challenge of global conflict and had made a long-term strategic commitment to remain a global power.

In meeting the challenge of global conflict, the United States along with its allies had to come to grips with a series of strategic tasks. Each of the remaining paragraphs of this introductory essay highlights a task. The key words describing each task are in italics.

Clausewitz had stressed that the first and foremost task of statesmen and commanders is to understand the nature of the war in which they are getting involved, while Sun Tzu had suggested that the necessary first step is to understand the enemy. *Assessment* of the threat posed by enemies in both World War II and the Cold War was no easy task. Radically new forms of political organization, cultural "blindness," and changes in military technology made it quite difficult to anticipate the dynamics of interaction between adversaries in 1940-1951. Early in World War II, the individual (and sometimes idiosyncratic) judgments of political leaders, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, dominated the process of assessment. In the Cold War, there developed a more elaborate institutional process of net assessment in Washington, D.C. Early on, an individual Foreign Service Officer, George Kennan, produced an assessment of the Soviet Union that still stands as the most remarkable and influential work of this sort ever done by anyone in the United States government.

A good assessment of the enemy should lead to the *formulation of a strategic concept* for waging the war. In a global war, that, too, is no simple matter. Yet this task was one that American strategists, despite the tradition of isolationism, handled quite well. The first good strategic concept was the work of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. His "Plan Dog" memorandum of November 1940 stands out as perhaps the most important essay on strategy and policy ever written by an American military leader. In the early Cold War, Kennan developed the strategic concept of "containment" from his assessment of the Soviet Union; it provided a theory of victory for bringing about the breakup or mellowing of the Stalinist regime. In 1950, just before the Korean War and just after the Soviet Union had demonstrated a nuclear capability, Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State

Department, circulated NSC-68, a document that made the case for a more muscular military posture in support of containment.

These strategic concepts all required American political and military leaders to come to grips with the issue of *geostrategic priorities*. No matter how great the potential power of the United States, it could not be strong everywhere in the world. Following the lead first of Stark and then of George Marshall, in both World War II and the early Cold War American strategists adhered to the principle that Europe should have top geostrategic priority. But in practice the United States decided to open or contest new theaters outside Europe in both World War II and the Cold War. In the Pacific theater of World War II the American decision to contest Japan's opening of a new theater in the southwest Pacific entailed a major diversion of strategic assets away from Europe, but it proved to be of great strategic importance to the ultimate victory over Japan. In the Cold War, when the North Koreans, Soviets, and Chinese decided to open a new theater in Korea, the American decision to intervene militarily also represented a major diversion from Europe. It, too, proved to be of crucial strategic significance in the larger Cold War.

As we have already seen in other high-stakes, multi-theater wars between great powers, a key determinant of strategic success is the ability to *create and sustain cohesive multinational coalitions*. In wrestling with this task from 1940 to 1951, the United States had to overcome major political obstacles. In World War II, the Grand Alliance had to keep together Western democratic regimes and the Soviet totalitarian regime. The Axis alliance was comprised of regimes with greater ideological affinity and fewer conflicts of national interest. Yet the Grand Alliance proved to be more strategically cohesive than the Axis. In the Cold War, the American-led coalition against the Soviet Union had to bring together nations that had been bitter adversaries in World War II. It is striking that both Germany and Japan emerged as allies of the United States after military occupations of those defeated countries. In the early Cold War as in World War II, formidable threats to national survival made the formation of coalitions possible. But the United States had to make heavy use of the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to maintain its Cold War coalitions, just as it had done with the Grand Alliance in World War II.

Along with coalition cohesion enhanced by non-military instruments of power, the ability to *develop and integrate different forms of military power* is another key to strategic success in global wars. As always, troops on the ground were vital to achieving and sustaining such strategic success in 1940-1951. But naval power made it possible for the United States to open or contest new theaters around the globe and to support ground forces in even the most distant theaters. The newest instrument, air power, became a source of crucial competitive advantage from 1940 on. Indeed, students should consider whether, without air power, the Grand Alliance could have achieved a total defeat of the Axis in World War II. In the early Cold War, air power loomed even larger as a potential source of competitive advantage. Before the development in the 1950s of long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, only aircraft could deliver nuclear weapons against the enemy homeland. But as the Korean War demonstrated, conventional warfare with ground and naval forces supported by tactical aviation in joint operations remained

very important in the Cold War. Yet another instrument of potentially critical advantage concerned the information domain. The success of the British and American cryptanalysts in breaking German codes, it has been argued, may well have shortened World War II in Europe by several years. American prowess in breaking Japanese codes made possible the pivotal American naval success at Midway in June 1942, which accelerated the path to ultimate victory against Japan in the Pacific. Early in the Cold War, the United States had a similar code-breaking advantage against the Soviet Union, but Soviet espionage blunted that edge. Human intelligence, especially directed against the American nuclear program, allowed the Soviet Union to become a much more formidable competitor against the United States.

Given the importance of making sound estimates about new types of enemies, of joining together the new ways and means of waging war, and of integrating military power and non-military instruments in an era of truly global conflict, political and military leaders in Washington, D.C., came to appreciate the need to *reform the institutional dimension of American strategy-making*. New institutions, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and joint and combined theater commands, began to emerge in World War II, usually based on British counterparts and unanchored to statutory authority. The National Security Act of 1947 and amendments to it in 1949 provided a legislative basis for a wide range of new institutions. They added to an enhanced Joint Chiefs of Staff such enduring institutions as a Secretary of Defense, a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and an Armed Forces Security Agency (which became the National Security Agency in 1952). This new national-security establishment was supposed to facilitate greater jointness in force planning as well as in operational planning, to enhance civil-military relations and interagency coordination of policy and strategy, and to improve the collection and assessment of intelligence. The new institutions faced their first test of “hot” war in Korea in 1950.

While the period 1940-1951 was an era of remarkable achievement for American policy and strategy, some important strategic shortcomings appeared that have plagued the United States ever since. The *transitions* from peace to war in 1941 and in 1950 were marked by enemy surprise attacks that, initially, put the United States at a severe disadvantage. American war-termination strategies in World War II and the Korean War were inadequate in bringing about favorable transitions from war to peace. American political and military leaders did not find it easy to make a flexible transition from one type of war to another—from a global hot war to a global cold war and then to a limited regional war in Korea. The United States continues to wrestle with such problems of strategic transition in the twenty-first century.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In 1940-1951 the United States was caught by surprise in attacks by three Asian adversaries: by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, and by the Chinese military

intervention in Korea in October-November 1950. What lessons might usefully be drawn from this pattern of strategic surprise?

2. General George Marshall wrote to General Dwight Eisenhower in March 1945: “Making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses.” In World War II what strategic advantages did the United States gain and what strategic disadvantages did it suffer from having a democratic political system?

3. Were American policy and strategy in World War II determined too much by short-term military necessity or expediency and too little by long-term political goals or principles?

4. The historian William O’Neill calls air power “the democratic delusion.” Is that assessment justified by the evidence of World War II?

5. What good lessons could current theorists of effects-based operations learn from a close study of the use of the air instrument in World War II?

6. The first major, postwar, “revisionist” history of World War II in Europe made the mordant assessment that the Western democracies, for all their efforts from 1939 to 1945, had only succeeded in pushing back totalitarianism from the Rhine River to the Elbe River in Germany. Was there any operationally feasible and strategically rational course of action that the United States and Britain could have undertaken from 1943 to 1945 that would have tilted the postwar balance of power in Europe more in favor of freedom?

7. In global wars such as World War II and the Cold War, a decision to open or contest a new theater may prove to be of great strategic consequence. In the period 1940-1951, identify one such decision that brought major, positive consequences and another such decision that did not have positive consequences. Why were the strategic consequences different in the two cases?

8. Did American military operations in the Pacific theater(s) in 1942-1944 undercut the Europe-first geostrategic priority of the Grand Alliance?

9. What difference did the existence of nuclear weapons make for the policy and strategy of the United States and its Communist adversaries from 1945 to 1951?

10. How well did American political and military leaders make the transition from fighting World War II to waging a Cold War?

11. General Douglas MacArthur knew little about Japanese culture and, if anything, General Lucius Clay knew less about German culture. How, then, could they have been effective as leaders of the military occupations of Japan and Germany after World War II?

12. What lessons can one draw from the period 1940-1951 about the elements that make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?
13. Compare and evaluate the strategic assessments and guidance provided by George Kennan's X article in 1947 and Paul Nitze's NSC-68 in 1950.
14. Does American policy and strategy in 1947-1950 represent a good example of the importance of interagency coordination and a good model for the integration of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power?
15. The new or reformed national-security institutions of the American government reflected the lessons of World War II. Were they well-suited to waging a Cold War?
16. In the period 1940-1951 there were several major episodes of American civil-military conflict, or at least intense disagreement between political leaders and military leaders on strategic issues. What lessons would you draw from those episodes?
17. Had the Soviet Union improved its long-term strategic position in the world from 1945 to 1951? If so, how? If not, why not?
18. In the period 1940-1951, which American theater commander was best and which was worst at knowing when to take risks and how to manage risks?

C. Required Readings:

1. Weigley, Russell. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 269-359, 363-398.

[Weigley's book is perhaps the best known military history of the United States ever published. The first two chapters assigned here provide an overview of the American role in World War II from the perspective of theater strategy. The next two chapters offer a critical examination of how well the American military services made the transition from World War II to the early Cold War and then to the Korean War.]

2. Pearlman, Michael D. *Warming and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Pages 221-279. (Selected Readings)

[Pearlman, a longtime faculty member at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, is interested in how the United States's democratic form of government has affected American "strategic culture." The chapter assigned complements the Weigley reading by bringing to the forefront the political background of American strategy in World War II. Pearlman is especially illuminating on the complexity of American policy and the impact of domestic politics and public opinion on American strategy. He also has

much to offer on civil-military relations, coalition management, strategic communication, and operational risk-aversion.]

3. Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 146-180.

[In this award-winning book, Professor Baer, formerly Chairman of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, examines the interplay between U.S. Navy strategic leaders and President Franklin Roosevelt on issues of policy, strategy, and naval operations in the American transition from peace to war in 1940-1941. Students should take special note of Professor Baer's analysis of the Plan Dog essay written in November 1940 by Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.]

4. O'Neill, William. *A Democracy at War: America's Fight at Home and Abroad in World War II*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 10-14, 301-319. (Selected Readings)

[O'Neill, like Pearlman, is interested in the relationship between American democracy and American strategy. In the first, brief excerpt, he shows how traditional balance-of-power considerations and geostrategic thinking that, arguably, should have had more influence on American policy and strategy in World War II did not have much appeal for Americans at the time. In the second, longer selection, O'Neill argues that aversion to casualties in a democratic political system led Americans to put misguided hope in air power as a hi-tech, low-cost way to victory in World War II. In the event, according to O'Neill, strategic bombing was both inefficient and unethical.]

5. O'Brien, Phillips P. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 2000), pages. 89-111. (Selected Readings)

[Providing a new look at the elements of strategic success in a total war such as World War II, O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland. This article can be read as a counter-argument to O'Neill's thesis about strategic bombing and as a useful source of instruction to theorists of effects-based operations in our era.]

6. Wilson, Theodore A. *et al.* "Coalition: Strategy, Structure, and Statecraft," in David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball, and A.O. Chubarian, eds. *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Pages 79-104. (Selected Readings)

[In this book of essays about the Grand Alliance in World War II, Wilson's contribution stands out for its careful analysis of the complex mixture of conflict and cooperation among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Wilson covers relations between political leaders, efforts by military leaders to achieve strategic and operational

coordination, arrangements at the theater level for combined and joint warfare, and the important role played by intelligence and information operations in the defeat of Germany.]

7. Weinberg, Gerhard L. “Global Conflict: The interaction between the European and Pacific theaters of war in World War II” and “D-Day after fifty years: Assessments of costs and benefits,” both in Weinberg, *Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pages 205-216, 254-273. (Selected Readings)

[Weinberg, the most distinguished American historian of World War II in our era, wrote these essays while preparing his monumental tome *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. The first essay assigned shows how strategic developments in different theaters were inter-related in a way that made World War II a truly global conflict, and it highlights the deficiencies of the Axis as a coalition for fighting such a global war. The second essay focuses on the strategic problem that was most important for the cohesion of the Grand Alliance: whether and when the United States and Britain should open a new theater in France. Students should note how Weinberg relates the invasion of France in 1944 to the issue of war termination in the European theater.]

8. Frank, Richard B. “Ending the Pacific War: ‘No alternative to annihilation,’” in Daniel Marston, ed. *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*. Oxford, U.K.: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Pages 227-245.

[Frank is one of a number of non-academic historians who in recent years have shed brilliant new light on the Pacific War. This article summarizes some of the main points that he developed in great detail in his remarkable book on war termination in 1945, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*. Frank does an especially good job of evaluating the use of the atomic bombs in relation both to alternative American war-termination strategies and to decision-making in the Japanese political system.]

9. Spector, Ronald H. “After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan’s Empire, 1945-1947,” in *Journal of Military History* (October 2005), pages 1121-1136. (Selected Readings)

[Spector, author of one of the best histories of the Pacific War, here carries the story of war termination into the postwar situation in East Asia. American and other Western ground forces were largely absent from the East Asian mainland when Japan surrendered in 1945. A power vacuum and indigenous turmoil developed in Korea, China, Indochina, and elsewhere that not only posed formidable problems for hastily improvised stability operations by occupation forces, but also pointed toward future wars in East Asia that we shall study in the next two modules in this course.]

10. Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pages 4-129.

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy faculty at the Naval War College and the preeminent American historian of the Cold War, provides the main treatment of the early Cold War for this case study. Published after the end of the Cold War, this reading reconsiders the period from the mid-1940s to the early 1950s in light of newly available information on Communist policy and strategy. Gaddis is especially strong, for both sides of the Cold War, on the role of ideology as well as security considerations in the development of policy and strategy; on the formation of coalitions; and on the impact of nuclear weapons on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.]

11. Smith Tony. "Democratizing Japan and Germany," in Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pages 146-176. (Selected Readings)

[Smith, a political scientist at Tufts University, views the American military occupations of Japan and part of Germany after World War II as pivotal experiences in the longer-term American effort to spread forms of democratic government around the world. At first sight, the cultural terrain of Germany and Japan posed formidable obstacles for achievement of American political purposes. Smith highlights the American actions that overcame these obstacles, while perhaps giving too little emphasis to the role that the Germans and Japanese themselves--not to speak of the looming Communist threat--played in bringing about favorable outcomes in the context of the Cold War.]

12. Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005. Pages 86-99, 197-225. (Selected Readings)

[In this highly acclaimed study of Europe since World War II, Judt, a British historian who teaches at New York University, provides insights into American use of the economic and informational elements of national power in the early Cold War. The first excerpt presents a judicious appraisal of the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. The second excerpt takes a skeptical look at American attempts to shape a cultural environment in postwar Europe that was heavily influenced by intellectuals who, for the most part, were more inclined to look to the Soviet Union than to the United States for political inspiration.]

13. Etzold, Thomas H. "American Organization for National Security 1945-50," in Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Pages 1-23. (Selected Readings)

[Etzold, who wrote this piece while a member of the Strategy faculty at the Naval War College, looks at the institutional dimension of American strategy making in the 1940s, tracing an evolution that began in World War II and culminated during the early Cold War with the establishment of the national-security organizations that are still with us in the twenty-first century: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council. Etzold notes that war is "the great arbiter of

institutions....” Accordingly, students should consider not only how well-suited the new institutions for intelligence, civil-military relations, jointness, and interagency coordination were to the demands of the Cold War, but also how well they met the test of the Korean War.]

14. James, D. Clayton. “Prologue: The Last War Revisited” and “MacArthur: The Flawed Military Genius,” both in James, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Pages 1-8, 29-52. (Selected Readings)

[James, an historian best known for his three-volume biography of General Douglas MacArthur, considers MacArthur’s strengths and weakness as a strategic leader as that celebrated general officer made the transition from being a theater commander in World War II to the Supreme Commander of the postwar occupation of Japan and, finally, to being a theater commander in the first year of the Korean War. James highlights the problems that MacArthur had in coming to grips with the political fact that the Korean War was a different type of war than World War II.]

D. Primary Documents: The following primary documents not only serve the purpose of providing material for seminar discussion and essays, but also may be useful models or sources of inspiration for students who have to write strategic memoranda or engage in strategic communication later in their careers.

1. Plan Dog memorandum: CNO Admiral Harold Stark to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, 12 November 1940.

2. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, “The Atlantic Charter,” issued 14 August 1941.

3. Fireside Chat by President Franklin Roosevelt: nationwide and worldwide radio address, 23 February 1942.

4. Truman Doctrine: address of President Truman to a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947.

5. George Kennan’s pseudonymous article on containment: X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947), pages 566-582; reprinted in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1987).

6. Paul Nitze’s NSC-68 report to the National Security Council: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” 14 April 1950, reprinted in *Naval War College Review* (May-June 1975), pages 51-108.

VII. THE RISE OF CHINA: THE TRANSFORMATION FROM NON-STATE ACTOR TO REGIONAL POWER DURING THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, KOREAN WAR, AND TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

A. General: In the 21st century, the United States faces dangerous, globally networked non-state actors. In the 20th century, it also faced non-state actors—insurgencies intent upon seizing power in diverse locations throughout the globe and linked through a transnational network bent on overturning the international legal and economic order, namely international communism. One such insurgency, that of the Chinese communists led by Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), seized power in the world's most populous nation after a protracted civil war and soon extended China's regional influence by tipping the balance in neighboring civil wars, first in Korea, then in Vietnam.

Several modules in this course have already revealed how formidable players can emerge, or re-emerge, to prominence in the international environment of strategy with remarkable rapidity. But no such rise was more surprising than that of China in the mid-20th century, precisely because in that case the Communist Party that propelled the ascent started as a small and vulnerable non-state actor in the 1920s and suffered some major setbacks in its progression from nothing to (nearly) everything by the 1950s. The first round of the Chinese civil war of the second quarter of the twentieth century was won not by the Communist Party but by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, which broke an alliance of convenience with the communists on its way to the establishment of a new "National" government in 1928. By the eve of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Kuomintang regime had brought about a monumental retreat of severely diminished communist forces and followers to a remote refuge in northwest China. But Mao was able to develop an effective theory of revolutionary war in 1936-1938 and take better advantage than the Kuomintang regime of intervention by external powers—first the Japanese invasion and occupation of large parts of China in 1937-1945 and then the Soviet defeat of Japanese forces in Manchuria in 1945. The new Manchurian theater became the crucial theater of military operations in the final stage of the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1949. Soon after Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, he signed a formal treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, and he joined Stalin in supporting the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. When the multinational forces under General Douglas MacArthur's command rolled the North Koreans back and advanced toward the Yalu River, Mao threw his army into the fight. The result in the winter of 1950-1951 was the worst operational defeat in American military history. That was the highest "red tide" of Mao's strategic leadership.

The purpose of this module is only secondarily to learn some history about where the People's Republic of China we see now in the 21st century originally came from in the 20th century. The primary purpose is to learn more about strategy by looking at a period when war began to take forms to which the United States had much trouble adapting. This module highlights seven major learning areas: first, Mao's theories of protracted revolutionary warfare; second, Mao as a political and military leader; third, the cultural barriers to net assessment; fourth, the difficulties, especially in terms of civil-military relations, in making a jump from one type of war to another; fifth, the problems

of war termination, particularly in situations where fighting and negotiating have to be closely coordinated; sixth, the effects of foreign intervention in civil wars; and seventh, coalition dynamics as illuminated by the emergence and demise of the Sino-Soviet alliance. In exploring these learning areas, we shall see the extent to which the United States did not understand Chinese culture or Chinese communist ideology; did not understand the process or the potential of Mao's type of revolutionary war; was surprised by the overwhelming communist success in the Chinese Civil War; was slow to grasp how tight a multinational communist coalition emerged in East Asia in 1950; was surprised both by the outbreak of the Korean War and by Chinese intervention in it; was blinkered in its assessment of Chinese military capabilities as well as of Chinese political intentions; was surprised in truce negotiations in 1951-1953 by how hard it was to get the Chinese to agree to terminate the war; and, after the Korean War, was puzzled by the PRC's actions in Taiwan Strait crises.

Mao has a strong historical claim to being the leading strategic theorist, and perhaps the most successful practitioner, of war waged by non-state actors. While initially he argued that his theories of revolutionary "people's war" were tailored to the Chinese environment, subsequently they were adapted by insurgents elsewhere in Asia, and ultimately around the world, for their own revolutions. Whereas Sun Tzu (Sunzi) had warned that no state ever benefited from a protracted war, Mao saw that a non-state actor would need protraction to achieve ambitious aims. His theory can be seen in terms of the construction of a "Clausewitzian triangle" over an extended time. Building a people "leg" required cultivating popular support, through a struggle for hearts and minds. Mobilizing the people, especially the peasantry, would enable the communists to create a mass political party, overcome deficiencies in the material dimension of strategy, and develop information superiority at the local level. As supporters were converted into soldiers, the people leg would in turn help build up the military leg, first in the form of a guerrilla force engaged in irregular warfare and then in a conventional army capable of defeating the regular forces of the existing government. For the government leg, Mao drew on the Leninist political model, designed for a party vanguard to be the dominant political authority. The people and government legs were connected by cadres; the government and military legs were connected by commissars. This model proved potent in faction-ridden failing states where the bulk of the population remained in the countryside. In such failing states, the communist message of social equality, land redistribution, and prosecution of class enemies had special appeal, particularly in the period of decolonization following World War II. Mao's theory highlighted instruments of power accessible even to the poorest countries, like China of the 1930s and 1940s.

The United States had great difficulty countering the appeal of the Communist ideology in the developing world and the continental coalition of the growing Soviet bloc. Mao's greatest success was evident in the area of the United States' greatest weakness in developing countries, in the social dimension of strategy, where Mao appeared to win hearts and minds in the countryside, but U.S. strategies seemed often to alienate them. Reluctant to throw its own military forces into a potential Chinese quagmire, the United States found that major efforts to use other instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—made no difference in the outcome of the

Chinese Civil War. Intervening militarily in Korea on a scale that it had avoided in China, the United States was able to stem the expansion of communism in Northeast Asia in the early 1950s, but at quite a high cost. In the Korean case, fortunately for the United States, neither the indigenous dictator Kim Il-sung nor the foreign intervener Mao Tse-tung was particularly adept at winning the hearts and minds of the Korean people.

Mao's success as a strategic leader required not just theoretical creativity and ideological appeal, but also practical adaptability in the face of changing circumstances. During the Chinese Civil War, he struggled with the following problems: When should the Communists transition from political cooperation with the Nationalists (Kuomintang) to civil war? When should his forces transition from guerrilla operations to conventional warfare? During the Korean War, he faced other critical challenges: How should he adapt an effective civil war strategy against a weak government to a regional war against a superpower? How could he and his forces overcome or outmaneuver the superior firepower and other material advantages of American forces? When should he transition from offensive operations to war termination? After the Korean War, he faced more difficult decisions: When should he transition from apparent ally of the Soviet Union and recipient of Soviet assistance to defender of Chinese interests against Soviet predations? How should he transition from a head of state to the leader of the international communist movement? Costly setbacks caused Mao to make reassessments that, in the end, proved sufficient for victory in a twenty-two year civil war and achievement of his minimum objectives in the Korean War. Mao's reunification of China in combination with his success in Korea cemented his position at home. As with Stalin in World War II, victory in war made Mao a far more popular and powerful domestic leader.

American leaders, too, faced challenges of adaptation that required culturally informed assessments and strategically minded reassessments. Having been allied with Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, the United States had to decide whether to stand by him or to mediate between him and Mao as the civil war in China escalated after 1945. Having lost China by 1949, American leaders had to decide how closely to commit themselves to the support of Syngman Rhee's regime in South Korea in 1950. Accustomed to fighting for unlimited objectives in a global war from 1941 to 1945, American strategists had to adapt themselves to a more limited regional war in Korea. Having grappled with the problem of assessing the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union in the early Cold War, American leaders now had to face the even more difficult task of understanding a new Chinese communist regime that seemed ideologically similar to, but culturally quite different from, the Soviet regime.

The Korean War, on both sides, highlights the dangers of allowing early and easy military success to drive policy objectives beyond prudent limits. Once that happened, there developed, on both sides, deep civil-military tensions. There was a major difference, however, in these tensions on the American side and the Chinese side. The US and UN theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur, wanted to expand American objectives and, when the PRC intervened in Korea, to open a new theater by attacking the Chinese homeland. American civilian leaders wished to restrain him from waging a wider war. On the other side, Mao drove his theater commander, Marshal Peng

Te-huai (Peng Dehuai), to attain unlimited objectives. Peng sought to restrain his political master. The ultimate outcome of these intense civil-military conflicts speaks volumes about the differences between American constitutional principles and Chinese communist political practices. President Truman cashiered General MacArthur in 1951. Mao had Marshal Peng arrested and tortured to death during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). By then Peng's criticisms of Mao had extended beyond military strategy in Korea to the economic strategies of the Great Leap Forward (1958). There is a curious nuclear backdrop to Truman's restraint and Mao's recklessness. In the early 1950s the United States had a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. The Soviets had just tested their first nuclear device. China did not develop a nuclear capability until 1964. Yet in the Korean War it was the Truman Administration that showed the most sensitivity to the possibility of nuclear war.

China and the United States had great difficulty terminating the Korean War. When the United States halted its counter-offensive to open peace talks in July of 1951, the fighting stalemated near the 38th parallel but the ground and air war continued to exact enormous casualties and economic costs. War termination did not occur until shortly after Stalin's death in 1953. The two-year stalemate had been grueling for all sides, with none achieving any significant objectives beyond what could have been achieved in 1951.

Foreign intervention greatly influenced events in Asia, but in unanticipated and often perverse ways. The Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States intervened to different degrees in the Chinese Civil War. The combined effect helped produce a unified Communist China eventually hostile to them all. Japan intervened, in 1931 in Manchuria and in 1937 in the rest of China, partly to contain communism, but in the process decimated the Nationalists, the only viable Chinese alternative to communism. The U.S. intervention in China (1945-1948) stopped short of large-scale military involvement and failed to produce the desired outcome. Close U.S. collaboration with the defeated Nationalists left the U.S. little diplomatic leverage over the Chinese Communists. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had created the Chinese Communist Party (1921) and helped to prevent its defeat during the Manchurian phase of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1948). But Mao ignored Stalin's instructions to halt at the Yangzi River (Yangtze River), so that Stalin wound up, not with a weak and divided China but with a unified power soon capable of redressing long outstanding grievances, such as the Soviet railway concessions and military bases in Manchuria whose return China demanded immediately after the Korean War (1953-1955).

Foreign intervention in Korea also produced unexpected outcomes. Although the United States attained its most basic political objective in Korea, it did so at a cost far higher than originally anticipated. China's intervention in Korea resulted in its forfeiting the opportunity to retake Taiwan, while the Soviet intervention produced a much stronger Western alliance system and increasingly strained relations with China. Finally, China's decision to touch off the Taiwan Strait Crisis after the Korean War had the unexpected outcome of unraveling the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance provides a cautionary tale about the perils of aiding potentially hostile forces. It is doubtful that the Chinese Communist Party could have survived without critical Soviet aid especially in the 1920s and the 1940s. Although Mao used the Sino-Soviet alliance to rise to power, he discarded the alliance once he had consolidated his position at home, and he then attempted to usurp Soviet leadership of the international communist movement. These escalating tensions ultimately created a dangerous security threat on the long Sino-Soviet border, where the demographic asymmetry created equally asymmetrical costs for border defense that the Soviet Union was ill-prepared to shoulder in the long run. Meanwhile, when Mao set off the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, partly in order to mobilize domestic support for his harebrained Great Leap Forward economic program, he ended up killing the Sino-Soviet alliance and losing valuable economic and technical aid. China had thus risen far, but had then reached too far--to a point that left Mao's regime in a potentially perilous position of strategic isolation in the international arena and in a chaotic economic situation in its domestic arena.

B. Essay Questions

1. Why were non-communist governments able to survive in South Korea and Taiwan, but not in mainland China?
2. From 1945 to 1958, which power was the most successful in the East Asia at securing its long-term objectives—China, the United States, or the Soviet Union?
3. Despite qualitatively and quantitatively inferior equipment, Communist forces took control of most of northeast Asia from 1945 to 1953. Why?
4. To what extent did actual communist strategy in the Chinese Civil War follow Mao's theoretical model of revolutionary war?
5. Who won the Korean War?
6. Do the reasons for tensions in civil-military relations differ in communist and non-communist countries?
7. A critical issue of theater strategy concerns not going beyond the culminating point of attack or of victory, yet over-extension plagued the Kuomintang regime in China, and both the United States and the People's Republic of China in Korea. Why did such overextension happen, and how might it have been avoided?
8. Evaluate the United States' decisions to intervene militarily in Korea but not in China. Did both decisions represent good policy and strategy?

9. Two key questions of war termination are how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. Compare how well the United States and China handled these two questions in the Korean War.

10. Evaluate Mao as a strategic leader from 1945 to 1958. What were his greatest strengths and his greatest deficiencies?

11. Between 1945 and 1958, which factor was the most important in causing tensions between the United States and the People's Republic of China, differences in ideology, culture, domestic politics, or national interest?

12. How important were information operations to the outcomes of the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis?

13. In both the American Revolution and the Chinese Civil War, insurgents were able to transition to conventional offensive warfare. What factors enabled this successful transition?

14. Which country was better able to adapt to the regional war in Korea, the People's Republic of China or the United States?

15. If the policy objective of the United States was to prevent or undermine the Sino-Soviet alliance, what was the best course of action for doing so in East Asia from 1945 to 1958?

16. Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages for the communists and for the Kuomintang regime of opening, and contesting against each other in the Chinese Civil War, a new theater in Manchuria.

17. In what ways does Mao's theory of war resemble the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and where does it add something genuinely new and important?

C. Required Readings

1. Griffith, Samuel B. "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung," in Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. Pages 45-56.

[Griffith emphasizes the elements of Sun Tzu most prominent in Mao's military strategy.]

2. Snow, Edgar. *Red Star Over China*. New York: Grove Press, 1968. Pages 272-277. (Selected Readings)

[In 1936, American journalist Edgar Snow interviewed Peng Dehuai, who would later serve as supreme commander of Chinese forces in Korea. Snow found Peng in Yan'an,

where the communists had fled in the Long March (1934-1935) after nearly being annihilated in Chiang Kai-shek's fifth encirclement campaign (1933-1934). Peng summarized Maoist military methods in a manner that raises the question of whether he, not just Mao, shaped the Chinese Communists' way of war. Snow's book became a key information operation for the communists since his sympathetic account of their activities popularized their cause in the West.]

3. Mao Tse-tung. "Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971. Pages 23-39. (Selected Readings)

[Mao's report indicates his early recognition of the role the peasantry might play in a revolutionary war.]

4. ———. *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967. Pages 206-263, 345-352. (NWC Reprint and Selected Readings)

[In "On Protracted War," Mao outlines a three-stage strategy for a non-state actor to overthrow the incumbent government and seize power. What allowed Mao to transition from one stage to another? In "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," Mao elaborates on his principles of operation.]

5. Dreyer, Edward L. *China at War 1901-1949*. London: Longman, 1995. Pages 312-361. (On Library Reserve Shelf—to be read in Library—not to be removed from Library.)

[Dreyer summarizes the major campaigns of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) and discusses the relative importance of conventional and non-conventional operations in the communist victory.]

6. Levine, Steven I. "Mobilizing for War: Rural Revolution in Manchuria as an Instrument for War," in Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, eds., *Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. Pages 151-176. (Selected Readings)

[Levine provides the best description anywhere of the cultivation of loyalty in the countryside by insurgents in order to create military forces capable of seizing power in a major country. The reading is short but difficult. Pay particular attention to Levine's description of the exchange relationship between the communists and the local population. What did each offer the other? Also pay particular attention to Levine's discussion of the local coercive balance. Did the communists achieve loyalty primarily through positive or negative incentives? This and the next reading both focus on the Manchurian theater.]

7. Tanner, Harold M. "Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947," *Journal of Military History* (October 2003), pp. 1177-1222. (Selected Readings)

[Tanner focuses on military operations in Manchuria, the decisive theater of the Chinese Civil War.]

8. Waldron, Arthur. "China without Tears," in Robert Crowley, ed., *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been*. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1999. Pages 377-392. (Selected Readings)

[Waldron provides a counter-factual analysis of the Manchurian campaign, arguing that Chiang Kai-shek could have won the Chinese Civil War.]

9. Westad, Odd Arne. *Cold War and Revolution: Sino-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Pages 165-181. (Selected Readings)

[Westad summarizes U.S. and Soviet diplomacy in China through the Marshall Mission (1945-1947).]

10. Ernest R. May. *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975. Pages 5-33. (NWC Reprint)

[May highlights interagency issues in the U.S. decision not to intervene in China.]

11. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 61-193, 213-232.

[Stueck provides an overview of the origins of the war, foreign intervention, war termination, and the impact on the Cold War alliances.]

12. Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112.

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]

13. Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: Random House, 1991. Pages 165-195. (Selected Readings)

[Cohen and Gooch analyze why some U.S. forces had more difficulty than others in coping with the Chinese intervention.]

14. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1992), pp. 465-475. (Selected Readings)

[This extract from Hunt's article highlights the leadership differences between Truman and Mao.]

15. Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pages 203-225. (Selected Readings)

[*Uncertain Partners* summarizes the Sino-Soviet diplomacy that culminated in Chinese intervention in the Korean War.]

16. Zhang, Shu Guang. "The Limits of Technology: Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, 1950-1953." (Selected Readings)

[Zhang highlights the economic and technological dimensions of strategy, the instruments of national power, and civil-military relations in his analysis of Chinese military strategy in the Korean War.]

17. Crane, Conrad C. "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 2000), pp. 72-88. (Selected Readings)

[Crane discusses the evolving U.S. plans to employ nuclear weapons in the Korean War and the efficacy of U.S. threats to do so.]

18. Chen, Jian. *Mao's China & the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Pages 153-204. (Selected Readings)

[Chen analyzes the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.]

VIII: LESSONS LEARNED? INSURGENCY, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, AND EXTERNAL POWERS: THE VIETNAM WAR IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CULTURAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, 1945-1975

A. General: The twentieth century, as this course shows, was a century of extraordinarily violent warfare. Every area of the Eurasian landmass and its seaborne approaches became a cockpit of conflict for extended periods. From 1945 to 1975 Southeast Asia stood out as the most violent region of the world. Though some of its warfare featured states fighting states, the predominant form of war in Southeast Asia took place within political systems. Every country in the region except Singapore (established in 1965) was convulsed by internal wars, most more than once. There were violent uprisings against Western colonial systems (Vietnam and Indonesia), there were Communist insurgencies (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia), there was organized violence arising from ethnic and religious divisions (Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos), there were coups and counter-coups (Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, and Cambodia), there was massive repression of an attempted coup or incipient insurgency (in Indonesia in 1965, where several hundred thousand Communists and ethnic Chinese died), there were chemical attacks by a Communist regime against an ethnic minority (Laos), and there was genocidal slaughter by a Communist regime of its own people (in Cambodia, where more than one-fifth of the population died).

It is important for strategic leaders to have the historical, cultural, and geostrategic knowledge necessary to understand, and the awareness to anticipate, why and when a region may become convulsed by violence. In the case of Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975, a number of factors converged to generate massive and violent instability. Well before the twentieth century, Southeast Asia had been a meeting ground for conquerors, traders, missionaries, and migrants from other regions and other civilizations. As a result, by the twentieth century, the area south of China and east of India had become a remarkably complex mosaic of different civilizational influences, ethnic and tribal groups, languages, religions (especially Buddhism, Islam, and Roman Catholicism), cultural traditions (such as Confucianism), and political ideas. Before World War II, the whole region except Thailand was under Western colonial rule, though nationalist and Communist movements were beginning to manifest themselves with sporadic episodes of violence. The Japanese invasion and occupation of almost all of Southeast Asia in 1941-1942 had the effect of throwing up for grabs the political future of the region. It not only shattered Western colonial regimes and the aura of Western military invincibility, but also, as Japan headed for defeat in 1945, opened up political opportunities for indigenous successor movements. After World War II, when the British, French, and Dutch (though not the United States in the Philippines) tried to reassert their colonial authority, they encountered political resistance everywhere and violent insurgencies in some places. From 1946 to 1957, independent states emerged all over Southeast Asia.

Decolonization did not bring an end to the violence, for nearly every new regime had to face ideological or ethnic insurgencies (or a combination of both). Some of the Communist insurgencies, notably in Indochina, became part of the Cold War, which had

started in Europe, spread to Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia, and finally in the 1950s made its way to Southeast Asia as well. The Vietnam War, in which the United States intervened on a large scale in the 1960s, became a “war within a war within a war.” There was a Communist insurgency in South Vietnam that triggered a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam over the fate of South Vietnam, which became embedded in the Cold War as the United States sought to contain the expansion of Communism and as the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China gave massive material support to North Vietnam.

The chronological scope of this module covers the entire period from 1945 to 1975. Within the period, the main focus is on cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines. Most of our attention will go to the phase of heavy American military involvement, from 1965-1973, in the Vietnam War. But to provide a comparative backdrop that may serve to sharpen strategic analysis of why the United States failed to achieve its most basic political objective in Vietnam, we shall consider how the cultural, geo-strategic, and other features of the environment in Vietnam differed from the environments in Malaya and the Philippines in ways that affected the outcome of the wars; we shall compare the nature of the insurgents, the strengths and weaknesses of their strategies, and the availability of external support in the different cases; and we shall look for patterns of success and failure in the counterinsurgencies waged by the British against the Malayan Communist Party and its Malayan Races Liberation Army, by the Filipino government (with American advisers and aid) against the Huks in the Philippines, by the French against the Viet Minh in Indochina, and by the United States and its South Vietnamese allies against the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong and North Vietnam.

What stands out in such a comparative perspective is that only in Indochina did Communist insurgencies (or indeed violent mass insurgencies of any kind) actually succeed in Southeast Asia after the immediate post-World War II era ended. Thinking through why that was so should help students assess the prospects for success or failure of external powers in insurgencies in other regions and future periods. American strategic leaders in the Vietnam War had, but did not make effective use of, opportunities to learn from past experience. American strategic leaders after the Vietnam War were content to take away from that unhappy experience only the most simplistic lessons. The opportunity remains open to us in the twenty-first century to develop and ponder more profound lessons from the rich strategic stories laid out in this module.

One set of lessons has to do with what strategies have a reasonable probability of working, and what strategies do not, in insurgency and counterinsurgency. For this lesson, the offerings of the Strategy and Policy Department and the Joint Military Operations Department complement each other well. Exposure to multiple cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency gives students ample opportunity to see patterns of success and failure from the past that may have predictive value in the twenty-first century. The more cases one draws into the patterns, the more confidence one can have in the inferences drawn from them.

The cases in this module, along with the previous case of the Maoist insurgency in China, allow us to see the ways in which insurgents might put together an effective strategy from different types of military operations, political struggle, organizational forms, information operations, communications media, and diplomatic tactics. They suggest that deviations from, or variations on, the Maoist model may be either promising or perilous for insurgents outside China. They show how insurgents can exploit foreign intervention and also benefit from external support, if there is access to it. The cases also highlight the typical mistakes of insurgent strategy. A premature “phase transition” to major conventional operations may deliver victory, but it is most likely to deal hard blows to an insurgent movement. Terrorism, too, can be a double-edged sword for an insurgency that resorts to it—as most indeed do.

Equally, the cases in this module reveal where the counterinsurgent side can go wrong. A typical mistake is for an indigenous government or an intervening power to make a hasty resort to excessive military force or get into the habit of using indiscriminate violence. They must avoid being provoked or induced into military overreaction or overextension. They may be well-advised to attack the enemy’s strategy rather than the enemy’s forces. Counterinsurgents, like insurgents, must combine kinetic and non-kinetic means adroitly and coherently. This course shows how politics permeates all types of wars, but modules like this one that feature insurgency and counterinsurgency show extraordinary political complexity. Strategists must consider every counterinsurgent course of action in light of its likely political effects on different audiences—local, national, and international. Intervening powers must be careful not to undercut whatever legitimacy their indigenous political partners have. And they must consider whether and how, by diplomatic or military means, they can deny access by the insurgency to external support. All that amounts to a demanding set of tasks and considerations.

A second lesson, which earlier S&P cases of insurgency have affirmed and which this module reaffirms, is that at the political core of a war of insurgency and counterinsurgency lies a struggle for the allegiance of the people caught between the two sides. Much of this political struggle takes place at the local level. The two sides usually follow a different political trajectory in relation to each other. Insurgents typically start at the local level, in villages in the countryside, and work their way up to the national center of power. The government resides at the national center and has to reach down to the local level to counter the insurgents. The outcomes of a myriad of local struggles for political allegiance turn on the coercive balance, relative political organization, competing economic programs, and information operations at the local level. An intervening external power can be effective only in so far as the indigenous government that it is supporting can be effective in local struggles. Without a lot of friendly locals, counterinsurgent strategy is doomed to frustration.

A third lesson that stands out in the cases of this module is the crucial importance of strategic leadership. That lesson should prompt students to look for the attributes that characterize good leadership of counterinsurgency strategy. Because most military leaders and political leaders are not intellectually well-prepared to deal with insurgencies

when they first encounter them, the ability to learn quickly, adapt flexibly, assess or reassess enemies and environments incisively, combine different players and instruments cohesively, and communicate with different audiences persuasively are all at a premium. In the Philippines case Ramon Magsaysay (with his sidekick from the US Air Force, Edward Lansdale) and in the Malayan case General Sir Gerald Templer (with the help of a plan conceived by General Sir Harold Briggs) represent impressive examples of effective strategic leadership. By contrast, good examples of strategic leadership are conspicuous by their absence on the counterinsurgent side of the Vietnam War. In the American case, no one either in Washington or in the theater seemed capable of providing a unifying vision of how to win the war, a compelling explanation of why victory was important in Vietnam, or a powerful acceleration of the sluggish process of adaptation. The combatant commander in the theater, General William Westmoreland, showed little interest in adapting and even less in considering alternative strategies proposed by others in 1965-1968.

Even the best strategies and the best strategic leaders will not necessarily succeed in all circumstances. A fourth lesson of great importance in this module has to do with crucial role of the environment in shaping the ultimate outcome of any insurgency. What works well in one environment may not work well in another environment. The mechanical or mindless translation of lessons from one war to another may be counterproductive. Strategists must pay close attention to the factors and circumstances that characterize any given environment and that differentiate it from other environments with which they may be more familiar. Relevant factors to assess may be cultural, religious, social, economic, topographical, geo-strategic, and—not least—political. Key circumstances may reflect the weight of history, the way in which past events or developments have given legitimacy to insurgent groups or have damaged the credibility of counterinsurgent leaders or even have created a failed state. Thinking carefully about all this before one intervenes militarily in an environment may save one's nation from stumbling or plunging into a potentially tragic disaster. A serious analysis of the Vietnam environment as of 1965 would surely have shown it to be an extraordinarily difficult environment for counterinsurgency in many significant respects.

A fifth lesson highlights the geo-strategic distinctiveness of Vietnam in the larger international environment. Malaya and the Philippines had nothing equivalent to North Vietnam next to them, and neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China had the easy physical access that would have enabled them to provide material support to the Malayan or Filipino insurgents as they did to the Vietnamese Communists. The fact that the United States, by contesting Vietnam as a new Cold War theater, ended up in "a war within a war within a war" complicated its strategic tasks enormously. American strategists had to worry about an interlocking set of difficult problems: the insurgency in South Vietnam, plus extensive North Vietnamese involvement, plus massive Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam. American courses of action that might help solve one problem might make another problem worse. Ideally, the actions taken in one war should have favorable effects in the other wars. Pondering how to achieve such well-aligned "spillover effects" is especially important now for American students and practitioners of strategy, because in the Long War of the twenty-first century the United

States has again become involved in wars within a larger war (as the introduction to the penultimate module of the course explains).

A sixth lesson, also of major relevance to the Long War, brings us face to face with JIM (joint, interagency, and multinational) in search of DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). In an environment as difficult as Vietnam, the odds of intervening successfully can improve only if and when all players and all instruments are brought to bear in a unified way. The British succeeded in Malaya both because it was a less difficult environment and because under Templer's leadership they orchestrated players and instruments quite well. The Americans in Vietnam had instruments that were potentially better, but American strategic leaders did not orchestrate the players well. Civil-military relations in Washington seemed reasonably harmonious on the surface, but were discordant beneath the surface. The chain of command extending from Washington to Saigon had plenty of snags. In the theater each military service tended to go its own way. Civilian agencies, too, were wont to execute their own bureaucratic repertoires. There was haphazard coordination and collaboration between the American military and the South Vietnamese military. American diplomats had only intermittent success in influencing the Saigon government and cajoling its leaders to broaden their political base across the religious and ideological fissures of South Vietnam. Information campaigns of the United States lost all credibility at home and abroad, while Communist propaganda increasingly found receptive audiences. When South Vietnam had its greatest need of American economic aid, in 1973-1975, Congress drastically reduced the flow. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had remarkable diplomatic success in improving American relations with the Soviet Union and cultivating new relations with Communist China, but could not induce either of them to abandon their support of North Vietnam. NATO allies, meanwhile, simply sat on their hands and watched the United States fail.

Some of these JIM and DIME problems diminished over time in Vietnam, especially in 1969-1971. A few of these problems are no longer in evidence in Iraq and Afghanistan in the twenty-first century. But most of these problems live on, to the detriment of American strategic effectiveness. The Vietnam War provides an object lesson in the potential consequences of not fixing them in a timely manner.

From the Southeast Asian maelstrom in 1945-1975, students and practitioners of strategy can take away not only some lessons, but also, perhaps, some hope. Such hope arises from looking at the region as it emerged from the 1970s. It passed on to Southwest Asia the unhappy status of being the most violently unstable region in the world. Much of Southeast Asia became much more politically stable and much more economically dynamic in the 1980s. The main laggard in this story of regional progress was Vietnam and the fallen "dominoes" of Cambodia (Kampuchea) and Laos. For the victorious Vietnamese Communists, failure followed success. For the United States, bitter defeat in Vietnam was followed by surprising success both in the region and later, with the demise of the Soviet Union, in much of the world.

B. Essay Questions:

1. What lessons might US strategic leaders learn from this Southeast Asian module of the course about which environmental factors to analyze, and how to assess their importance, before intervening as an external power in an insurgency?
2. What does Southeast Asian experience suggest are the most important mistakes that governing regimes and coalitions may make in countering an insurgency, and how can insurgents most effectively capitalize upon them?
3. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine conventional, guerrilla, terrorist, and information operations?
4. Did the United States effectively integrate all the instruments of state power at its disposal in the Vietnam War? Why or why not?
5. How important was the US strategic decision-making process, especially the relationship between President Lyndon Johnson and his military advisers, in determining the success or failure of the American war effort in Vietnam?
6. Did it make strategic sense for the United States to extend the policy of containment to Vietnam and make it a major new military theater in the larger Cold War?
7. General Westmoreland believed that, given the political restraints placed on his ground operations, there were no good alternatives to the strategy of attrition that he pursued from 1965 to 1968. Was he right?
8. Could the United States have used air power more effectively in the Vietnam War? If so, how? If not, why not?
9. Do the cases in this module suggest an important role for sea power in counterinsurgency strategy? If so, how and under what circumstances? If not, why not?
10. Some have argued that the Tet offensive in 1968 was a major strategic mistake by the Communists that the United States and South Vietnam did not exploit effectively. Do you agree?
11. Did the massive American effort in Vietnam help or hinder the South Vietnamese government in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people?
12. Which theorist—Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao—provides the best insight into why Communist strategy in Vietnam was successful?

13. Was the Communist victory in Vietnam due mostly to the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy, the inherent weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government, or the strategic mistakes of the United States?

14. United States achieved its basic political objective in the Korean War. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation in Vietnam, did the United States fail to achieve its basic political objective there, despite a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?

15. Why was the “Clausewitzian triangle” of the United States fragile in its government/military and government/people “legs” during the Vietnam War?

16. On the basis of the wars of insurgency covered in this module of the course, what attributes of strategic leadership would you judge to be most important on the counterinsurgent side?

C. Required Readings:

1. Lomperis, Timothy J. *From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Pages xi – xii, 30-47, 55-74, 85-130, 173-195, 198-221.

[This reading provides general accounts of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It features a good deal of cultural and historical background on those countries and a theory of political legitimacy that seeks to explain why some governments facing an insurgency are able to gain widespread popular support and others are not.]

2. Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pages 42– 222.

[This book provides an evenhanded overview of the period from 1965, when the Johnson Administration intervened militarily in Vietnam on a large scale, to 1975, when the Vietnamese Communists conquered South Vietnam. Lewy covers both high-level decision-making in Washington and the execution of theater strategy in South Vietnam.]

3. Herring, George C. “In Cold Blood: LBJ’s Conduct of Limited War in Vietnam.” *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History*. Lecture No. 33. Colorado Springs: U. S. Air Force Academy, 1990. Pages 1-24.

[Herring, a leading American historian of the Vietnam War, examines problems in the “Clausewitzian triangle” of the United States in 1965-1968, first by showing how poorly the civil-military relationship between President Johnson and his military advisers functioned and then by showing how inadequate Johnson’s efforts to engage in strategic communication with the American people were.]

4. Komer, R. W. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. – GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1972. Pages 1- 53, 60-126.

[In this think-tank report written before the Vietnam War ended, Komer, who in 1966-1968 had served first as a special assistant to President Johnson and then as Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, drew on his experience to analyze major impediments to the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. He is particularly insightful on problems with the government of South Vietnam (GVN) and on problems of institutional adaptation in the US interagency and US-GVN multinational efforts at pacification.]

5. Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pages 174 – 210.

[Pape, formerly a faculty member in the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base and now a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, provides a provocative analysis of which American uses of the air instrument in the Vietnam War were strategically effective and which were not.]

6. Goscha, Christopher E. “The Maritime Nature of the Wars for Vietnam (1945 – 1975): A Geo-Historical Reflection.” *War & Society* (November 2005). Pages 70 – 92.

[The maritime dimension of the Vietnam War has received relatively little attention from historians, but deserves attention from students of strategy at the Naval War College. Goscha, a Southeast Asian regional expert able to read untranslated Vietnamese Communist sources, shows interaction and adaptation at work in North Vietnam’s effort to supply Communist forces in South Vietnam by sea and the United States’ efforts to interdict seaborne supplies.]

7. Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Pages xi – xvi, 24-30, 191 – 208.

[Nagl, a US Army officer with a Ph.D. from Oxford University, explores how and why the US Army in Vietnam was more sluggish than the British Army in Malaya in adapting to counterinsurgency missions, especially with regard to the need to integrate different forms of power into a coherent strategy. In this exploration, he highlights both the flexible institutional culture of the British Army and the adroit strategic leadership exercised in Malaya by General Sir Gerald Templer, who gave the phrase “winning hearts and minds” the currency that it has had ever since. In a preface written after a tour of duty in Iraq as a battalion operations officer, Nagl reflects on just how hard it is for a foreign force to gain and maintain the support of the indigenous people.]

8. Fall, Bernard B. *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis*. Second Revised Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Pages 338-352.

[Fall, a French journalist with a profound knowledge of Indochina, wrote these pages during the Vietnam War, in which he lost his life. He highlights the ways in which the environment in Vietnam differed from the environment in Malaya, emphasizes the importance of political factors in determining the outcome of insurgencies, and notes how short-sighted the United States was to ignore the French experience with counterinsurgency.]

9. Pike, Douglas. *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966. Pages 85-108, 119-132, 240-252.

[Pike, who was as knowledgeable as any American about Vietnamese Communism in the 1960s, examines in these excerpts different elements of early Viet Cong insurgency strategy in South Vietnam. From the perspective of the twenty-first century, Pike's discussion of the Viet Cong's use of information operations and terrorist tactics for political purposes is of special interest. His extensive quotations from Communist documents give readers a good sense of Viet Cong strategic culture and of the extent to which it may have deviated from the Maoist model.]

10. Elliott, David W. P. "Hanoi's Strategy in the Second Indochina War." In Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds. *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993. Pages 66 – 92.

[Elliott, an area-studies specialist who has intensively studied the Vietnam War, presents here a revisionist interpretation of Communist strategy based on Vietnamese-language sources. While acknowledging that the Viet Minh followed the Maoist model in the 1946-1954 war against France, he argues that American strategic leaders in the 1960s, and American analysts subsequently, were wrong to assume that the Vietnamese Communists continued to adhere to the Maoist model in the war against the United States. Instead, Elliott seeks to demonstrate (without referring to Sun Tzu), North Vietnam attacked American strategies from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Students should develop their own assessment of Communist strategy by considering how this reading relates to Required Readings 9 and 11.]

11. Brigham, Robert K. *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pages 94 – 125.

[This excerpt from a study by an American historian looks at the final two phases (1970-1975) of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese Communist leadership (both in the National Liberation Front and in the North Vietnamese regime). The first chapter assigned shows how the Communists used the peace negotiations as a forum from which to launch information operations to undercut the Thieu government in Saigon and the Nixon administration in Washington. The second assigned chapter illuminates debates and decision-making in the Vietnamese Communist leadership about what strategy to follow in South Vietnam after the peace agreement of 1973.]

IX. PREVAILING IN THE COLD WAR: THE US AND USSR 1975-1991

A. General: Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been involved in what has been described as the “Long War” against violent Islamist fundamentalism. Ironically, less than a decade before another U.S. “Long War” had come to its conclusion: the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The Cold War was the focus of U.S. foreign policy and military policy during the second half of the last century. It was a conflict unlike any other in which the United States had been engaged, and to succeed in it Washington needed to create new institutions and adopt new economic, diplomatic and military strategies. The Cold War was shaped by the competition between irreconcilable ideologies, by the existence of nuclear arsenals on both sides, by the formation of two hostile military blocs in Europe, by the opening of new theaters of superpower confrontation in (often surprising) locations in the developing world, and by the alternation of periods of heightened and relaxed tension. In this environment, strategies that were both flexible and adaptive had the greatest chance of success more often than not. But the Cold War also required considerable patience and stamina. The American people, for instance, had to accustom themselves in peacetime to the maintenance of large standing armed forces as well as to the burden of sizeable military budgets. Nonetheless, prevailing in the Cold War encompassed more than military strategy and military posture, for it made heavy demands on the non-military elements of the nation’s power, including diplomacy, economic resources and information operations. As the current “Long War” is analogous to the Cold War in several respects, a study of the Cold War and the end of the Cold War in particular can be of great value for U.S. policy-makers and military officers today.

An earlier module of the Strategy and Policy Course dealt with the inception of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War. This week we will consider the circumstances under which the Cold War came to its end. Those circumstances were dramatic in the extreme, for the sudden disintegration of the USSR at the end of 1991 came as a surprise to almost everyone. This module focuses attention on two important facets of the collapse of Soviet communism. First, we will use the paradigm of DIME to consider the steps taken by the United States and its allies that may have accelerated the dissolution of Soviet power. But we will also examine what the Soviet Union did to defeat itself, for the USSR was also undone by a series of profound crises, crises that to a significant extent were of domestic origin. Washington deserves no credit for the fact that Soviet governmental, military and economic institutions proved in the end to be neither efficient nor capable of adapting to change. Equally, although the United States was the eventual beneficiary of an entire series of misconceived Soviet strategic and political choices, it bore no responsibility for them.

One great irony of the last phase of the Cold War was that it featured a stunning reversal in the apparent geopolitical fortunes of the United States and its Soviet rival. In the mid-1970s US foreign policy was in disarray, and the nation’s domestic problems were both complex and severe. In 1975 the Saigon regime fell to the armies of North Vietnam, thereby bringing America’s lengthy military involvement in Indo-China to an

ignominious conclusion. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam discredited the notion that the United States should intervene militarily abroad to thwart the spread of Communism, and gave rise to that powerful inhibition against taking any military action at all that became known as the “Vietnam syndrome.” At the same time, the oil price shock of the beginning of the decade as well as the rise in interest rates, high unemployment figures and “stagflation” that then ensued left millions of Americans anxious and insecure. Then, too, the Nixon administration’s tawdry Watergate scandal, which climaxed with the first resignation of a U.S. president in American history, further shook the confidence of the American people in the probity and competence of their government.

By contrast, Moscow’s self-assurance, power and international influence seemed to be ever increasing. Détente with the United States lessened the risk of nuclear confrontation, enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union, and resulted in the official acceptance by the West in 1975 of the inviolability of the borders of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe—a long standing Soviet foreign policy goal. Détente also led to a welcome increase in trade between the USSR and the West and the provision of generous loans to the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe by Western banks. But Moscow sought geostrategic advantages, no less than economic, ones from détente, for the leadership of the USSR viewed the era of détente as extraordinarily propitious for the realization of its global objectives. Under détente, observed a Foreign Ministry report to the ruling Politburo “it is easier to broaden and consolidate the Soviet Union’s positions in the world.” In particular, the Soviet Union exploited what it perceived as US weakness abroad in the aftermath of Vietnam to develop tight bonds with revolutionary or radical regimes in Mozambique, Angola, Yemen, Ethiopia and Nicaragua. By the end of the 1970s authoritative articles were appearing in the Soviet press, some under the signature of Boris Ponomarev, head of the Central Committee’s International Department, which asserted that the global correlation of forces had finally and irrevocably shifted in favor of the socialist camp. As Moscow saw it, with one country in the developing world after another embracing communism, the USSR’s eventual victory in the Cold War was coming into sight.

The contrast with the situation scarcely ten years later could not have been more extreme. By the second half of the 1980s it was evident that the United States, which had recovered from the malaise of the ‘70s, was once again in the ascendant and that the Soviet Union was now unmistakably in precipitous decline. The USSR’s international reputation was in tatters, its stagnant economy had shown itself impervious to reform, and Moscow seemed unable to extricate itself from the quagmire of the war in Afghanistan. Seeking better relations with the West and hoping to scale back the USSR’s international commitments to its satellites and client states, M.S. Gorbachev adopted conciliatory positions in arms control talks with the United States. He also announced the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and unilateral cuts in Soviet troop strength in Eastern Europe. When in 1989 popular protests and unrest shook the Eastern European communist regimes to their foundations, Gorbachev renounced the use of force that alone might have kept them in power. As a result, Eastern European communism vanished in a matter of weeks, and barely twenty months later, the failure of the coup of

August 1991 would set events in motion that would result in the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself by the end of the year.

Why the Cold War ended and why the Soviet Union fell apart at the precise moment and in the precise manner it did are controversial questions that have elicited many competing answers. To some, the USSR's defeat in the Cold War represented a triumph, at least in part, of American strategy and policy. Others, while recognizing that, as in any conflict, the interaction of the sides helped shape the end of the cold war, nonetheless maintain that self-inflicted wounds were more consequential for the death of the Soviet Union than anything the United States or its allies did.

Even those who are prepared to ascribe Washington's victory in the Cold War to the success of its policies and strategies often disagree about the specific policies and strategies that were most effective. One school of thought holds that the Cold War turned out as it did because the United States more or less consistently applied George Kennan's strategy of containment throughout almost half a century of its dealings with the Soviets. After all, in his famous "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* (see Module VI), Kennan had argued that containment would eventually produce a situation in which the Soviet Union either mellowed or collapsed, and in the final analysis both the "mellowing" and the "collapse" came to pass. Another view maintains that the Cold War ended chiefly because Washington eventually transcended containment and adopted the conciliatory approach toward Moscow embodied by détente. Détente reassured the Soviets about the benignity of U.S. intentions, reduced the threat of thermonuclear war, and simultaneously exposed the peoples of both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Western influences and Western "soft power". A diametrically opposed interpretation insists that it was only with the repudiation of détente and the renewal of a confrontational approach to the Soviet Union, first in the late Carter administration but particularly under Ronald Reagan, that Washington found the correct formula for victory in the Cold War.

All three of these arguments are open to challenge. First, since détente was an approach to managing relations with the USSR, not a strategy for winning the Cold War as containment was, during the détente era Washington was not actively "containing" the Soviet Union but trying to develop a stable partnership with Moscow. It follows that the collapse of communism could not have been the result of fifty years of uninterrupted containment. Second, if détente was supposed both to moderate Soviet international behavior and to bring about the "mellowing" of the USSR, it was singularly unsuccessful in accomplishing either. Aggression rather than moderation characterized Moscow's foreign policy during the détente era. And third, although the Reagan administration did develop a strategy to put pressure on the Soviet Union (see NSDD-75, Reading 5 below), critics have charged that political discord and bureaucratic turf wars at the highest levels of the American government thwarted that strategy's effective implementation.

One way to evaluate these and other arguments about the end of the Cold War is to consider how and with what effects the United States employed each of the instruments of its national power in dealing with the USSR from the middle of the 1970s until 1991. With regard to American diplomacy, it is worthwhile keeping in mind both

U.S. diplomatic interaction with its allies and its interaction with the countries of the Soviet bloc. In the final analysis, the United States was more effective at managing and maintaining its own system of alliances than the Soviets were. NATO, in particular, evidenced remarkable cohesion, despite such serious Soviet efforts to split or neutralize it as the introduction of SS-20 missiles into Eastern Europe. As for Washington's diplomatic relations with Moscow, while the influence of arms control negotiations on the course and eventual outcome of the Cold War deserves consideration, two accomplishments of American statecraft in this period were especially outstanding. The first of these, although it was not recognized as such at the time, was the negotiation of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) accords in Helsinki in 1975. "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Accords included provisions requiring the signatories to respect basic human rights. Moscow accepted this language, over the objections of some of its shrewdest diplomats, evidently in the belief that it was harmless nonsense. As the years went by, however, the USSR realized the extent of its mistake, since the Helsinki Final Act encouraged the spread of dissent within the Soviet bloc and legitimized Western attacks on Soviet human rights abuses. The second great triumph of US diplomacy came at the very end of the Cold War in 1991, when the Bush administration persuaded Gorbachev to accede to the reunification of Germany. Countenancing West Germany's annexation of the German Democratic Republic was an unequivocal act of surrender in the Cold War on Moscow's part. Moreover, the fact that the newly enlarged Germany would continue to be a member of NATO effectively guaranteed that the West's victory in the Cold War would be durable.

American information operations also had an important role to play in the final stage of the Cold War. The détente era had seen a remarkable softening of Washington's official criticism of the USSR. This trend should probably be regarded as culminating in October 1976 when President Gerald Ford weirdly insisted that there was "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe" during a nationally televised debate. Jimmy Carter defeated Ford in the presidential election the following month, and the Carter administration was committed to making human rights a US foreign policy priority. Indeed, in the early years of his presidency Carter badgered the Soviet Union so frequently about its odious human rights record that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko rebuked him for engaging "in campaigns of ideological subversion." Ronald Reagan, who succeeded Carter in the White House in 1981, employed even harsher anti-Soviet rhetoric. In such speeches as his famous address to the British Parliament in June 1982, Reagan emphasized that the Cold War was not merely a confrontation between incompatible ideologies, but a veritable struggle between good and evil. While political opponents dismissed Reagan's interpretation of US/Soviet relations as hopelessly naïve, it made a significant impression behind the Iron Curtain, particularly in dissident circles. Nor was this all. Reagan greatly enhanced the status and the budget of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Munich-based agency responsible for short-wave broadcasts in the languages of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It has been estimated that by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was spending the equivalent of over \$750 million a year on an imperfect program to jam the frequencies used by RFE/RL and analogous stations operated by other Western governments—a telling indicator of Moscow's fear of western information warfare.

U.S. military budgets, military aid and military strategy were also enlisted to ratchet up the strain on the Soviets during the Cold War's last phase. Jimmy Carter had proposed upping the defense budget for 1981 by \$26 billion, a sum that the incoming Reagan administration augmented by \$32 billion. Such increased outlays were supposed to restore American military capabilities, which had decayed in the aftermath of Vietnam, thereby permitting Washington to conduct any future negotiations with the Soviets from a position of strength. In addition growing US defense budgets challenged the Soviets to respond by appropriating more money for their own armed forces, something they might find it difficult to do given the precarious state of their economy. Whether intended or not, Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative—a program of research to develop a reliable system of protection against ICBMs—drove the Soviets into a paroxysm of emulative spending they could ill afford. At the same time military assistance to rebels fighting the Soviets or Soviet proxies in the developing world was designed to exploit the USSR's geopolitical overextension by raising the price Moscow would have to pay for its imperialism. Certain actions taken under this policy, which became known as the Reagan Doctrine—particularly funding the Contras in Nicaragua—provoked considerable domestic political controversy. Assistance to the mujahideen resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, however, garnered broad bipartisan support. Finally, it is worth reflecting on the strategic, operational, and technological innovations adopted by the U.S. uniformed services that the Soviets may have perceived as endangering their military advantage in conventional land power in Europe, thus altering the “global correlation of forces” in a manner unfavorable to them. For example, the U.S. Army's FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack) concept, as well as its AirLand Battle doctrine may have made the prospect for a quick victorious Soviet invasion of Western Europe remote at the same time that it reduced the credibility of any Soviet threat to invade in the service of political intimidation. And the Navy's Maritime Strategy posited that the Soviet Navy's entire submarine fleet could be immobilized or destroyed at the very beginning of any global war, and that U.S. amphibious landings on the Kola Peninsula would divert tens of thousands of Soviet troops away from the Central Front, thus changing the terms of battle there.

What of the United States' use of economic instruments against the USSR in this period? President Carter responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by suspending the sale of grain to Moscow. Yet this embargo was more symbolic than substantive, as there were other countries that were eager to sell the Soviets their wheat. The same might be said of the embargo President Reagan placed on trade with both the Soviet Union and Poland after the imposition of martial law in Warsaw (December 1981). Since most of Washington's European allies declined to participate in the embargo, the amount of economic pain it could inflict was limited, since the volume of US/Soviet trade was low in any case. Yet two additional components of the Reagan administration strategy for economic warfare against the Soviet Union merit attention. The first of these was the bid to cut off Moscow's access to sophisticated western technology. There were several facets to this effort, including the stiffening of export controls as well as a disinformation campaign that involved palming off fake technological and industrial “secrets” on Soviet agents. The second was an attempt to restrict Soviet access to the hard currency it needed

to meet the bill for essential foreign imports. In the summer of 1981, for instance, Washington evidently succeeded in maneuvering the Soviet government into intervening to bail out its bankrupt Polish satellite, which was being pressed hard by Western banks for partial repayment of the enormous debt it had incurred abroad. Soviet hard currency reserves are supposed to have been depleted by over \$2 billion as a result. Then there was the sharp downturn in world oil prices at the beginning of the 1980s that deprived the Soviet Union of approximately one half of its foreign earnings overnight. It has been argued by some (and disputed by others) that the Reagan administration took a hand in this matter by persuading Saudi Arabia to step up its oil production, so as to glut the market, depress prices, and cripple the Soviet economy.

Regardless of one's assessment of the contribution of U.S. strategy and policy to the end of the Cold War, it deserves emphasis that the Soviets themselves participated in contriving their own defeat. If some of the United States' diplomatic, informational, military and economic strategies weakened the Soviet Union, so too did some of the Soviet Union's diplomatic, informational, military and economic strategies. Consider the USSR's economic system. By 1980 it was obvious the Soviet economy was in serious trouble. Growth rates were falling. Industrial plant was increasingly antiquated; a 1985 estimate maintained that one-third of the country's industrial plants and machinery were simply worn out. The quality of output was also poor. For example, Soviet television sets manifested an alarming propensity to combust spontaneously; over two thousand episodes of such television fires were being reported annually in Moscow alone by 1980. Despite massive levels of investment in the 1970s, the productivity of the agricultural sector remained low. Owing to execrable land management, over-cropping, and salination, Soviet irrigation programs did not augment the quantity of available arable land but merely kept it stable. Due to inadequate storage facilities and poor transportation (only a fifth of the country's roads were paved) 50 percent of the country's potato crop and 20 percent of the grain crop rotted in the field or spoiled before it could ever be brought to market. Shortages of foodstuffs and consumer products were epidemic. Outside Moscow and Leningrad, meat and sugar rationing were becoming increasingly common. Consumption levels were less than one-half the Western European norm. When M.S. Gorbachev took over as General Secretary of the Communist Party in the spring of 1985, he was determined to reverse the USSR's economic decline and to elevate the quality of Soviet industrial output to world standards within five years. But perversely, Gorbachev's reforms did not ameliorate the economic crisis but instead exacerbated it. By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was plagued with high deficits, inflation, and shrinking rates of net fixed investment. In 1990 and 1991 the country's GNP would actually contract.

There were many reasons for the USSR's economic woes, but one clearly was the crushing burden of military expenditure. According to Gorbachev, when he took office military outlays regularly consumed at least two fifths of the state budget, and may have amounted to over 20 percent of the country's annual GNP. Although he was aware that military spending eventually had to be curtailed for economic reform to have a hope of success, Gorbachev's initial budget plan for 1986-1990 actually endorsed an increase in funding for the Soviet armed forces. Part of the problem was the fact that the prestige of

the regime was intertwined with (and sustained by) the prestige of its military power. Unfortunately for Moscow, its military prestige had been in decay ever since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Despite its best efforts, including the enormous 1985-86 offensive authorized by Gorbachev himself, the Soviet army seemed incapable of defeating the Afghan mujahideen.

This brings us to the question of information strategies. Throughout its existence the USSR conducted numerous information operations against its adversaries, often of extraordinary complexity and sophistication. Yet in the final phase of the Cold War an entire series of public relations fiascos vitiated Soviet efforts to influence opinion in “enemy” countries, unaligned countries, and even at home. The “bleeding wound” of the war in Afghanistan was a case in point, for it outraged the entire world and did irreparable damage to Moscow’s standing among Muslims both inside and outside the Soviet Union. The shoot-down of Korean Air Flight 007 in August 1983 and the explosion at the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in April 1986 also sullied the Soviet Union’s image abroad. Destroying a civilian air liner without warning impressed many as an act of barbarism, while Moscow’s silence in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe was taken as proof of the Soviet regime’s callous, if not depraved, unconcern for the health and safety of millions of civilians. Official Soviet explanations and excuses in connection with these (as well as other) discreditable incidents in the 1980s inspired little belief.

Finally, there remains the question of Soviet diplomacy. Some in the West have hailed M.S. Gorbachev as a brilliant statesman whose “new political thinking” transformed Soviet foreign policy by rebuilding it on the principles of non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty. Others have argued that Gorbachev’s diplomacy no less than his domestic policy was driven by improvisation rather than a coherent vision, and have further called attention to his failure substantively to advance his country’s interests. In any event, it is beyond doubt that Gorbachev’s reform program, his bold diplomatic demarches, and his rhetoric helped destabilize the nations of the Warsaw Pact. In the end, Russia would be deprived of its security buffer in Eastern Europe as well as most of the important territorial gains it had made in both Europe and Asia since the beginning of the seventeenth century.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Speaking of Mikhail Gorbachev in the fall of 1989, Henry Kissinger asked, “If you were setting out to destroy the Soviet Union would you do it any differently?” Which was more important to the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev’s leadership or the unintended consequences of his policies?
2. How well did U.S. strategy cope with Soviet strengths and exploit Soviet weaknesses from 1979 to 1991?

3. The Cold War was a struggle between competing coalitions. Why did the coalition led by the United States hold together in the last phase of the Cold War while the Soviet alliance system disintegrated?

4. The United States faced a serious domestic political crisis and suffered a humiliating defeat in Vietnam during the mid-1970s. Meanwhile, during the Brezhnev era the Soviet Union greatly strengthened its armed forces. Why did the combination of these domestic and international shocks to the United States, along with the buildup of Soviet military power, fail to produce a more favorable political outcome for the USSR?

5. Some foreign policy and strategic analysts argue that the success of the Reagan and Bush administrations in ending the Cold War was largely the product of their own skill. Others argue that the keys to American success in the late 1980s and early 1990s were a permissive domestic and international environment, a “cooperative adversary”, and good luck. Which argument do you think is more valid?

6. To what extent and in what ways did communist ideology contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union?

7. Arguably Soviet intelligence concerning U.S. capabilities and intentions was superior to American intelligence concerning the capabilities and intentions of Moscow. Why did this intelligence superiority not prove to be a decisive strategic benefit for Moscow?

8. How well did the military posture and military strategies of the United States support Washington’s diplomacy in the last phase of the Cold War?

9. Writing in 1982 two prominent American Sovietologists insisted that: “The Soviet Union is not now nor will it be in the next decade in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts enormous unused reserves of political and social stability that suffice to endure the deepest difficulties. The Soviet economy, like any gigantic economy administered by intelligent and trained professionals, will not go bankrupt. It may become less effective, it may stagnate, it may even experience an absolute decline for a year or two; but, like the political system, it will not collapse.” Why was it that few, if any, observers in the late 1970s and early 1980s either in the East or in the West understood that the Cold War would end in a matter of a few years?

10. Sun Tzu wrote that knowing oneself and knowing one’s enemy is an essential element of victory. A case could be made that during the Cold War neither the USSR nor the United States performed particularly well in either of these regards. Which was more important in shaping the end of the Cold War, American misunderstanding of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union’s misconceptions about the United States?

11. What role did Ronald Reagan play, whether for better or for worse, in bringing the Cold War to its conclusion?

12. How plausible is it to describe the end of the Cold War as the logical outcome of a series of steps the Soviet leadership took to solve a purely domestic economic crisis?

13. Assuming that an important Soviet political objective was the dissolution of NATO, was there any strategy drawing on all elements of DIME that might have permitted Moscow to achieve this goal by 1991 without going to war?

14. Why were Soviet strategy and policy less adaptive and flexible than American strategy and policy during the last phase of the Cold War?

15. What role, if any, did nuclear weapons play in the eventual outcome of the Cold War?

16. Between 1975 and 1991 was there any point at which the Soviet Union could have improved its position by going to war in Europe?

17. Some Soviet conservatives believe that the USSR would still exist today if Gorbachev had been willing to use force to save the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. Do you agree?

C. Required Readings

1. Nichols, Thomas M. *Winning the World. Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War.* Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Pages 109-247.

[The chapters assigned from Nichols' book analyze the last phase of the Cold War. Nichols places great emphasis on the Cold War as an ideological struggle. While he criticizes détente and praises the turn toward renewed confrontation with Moscow first under Jimmy Carter and then under Ronald Reagan, Nichols also points out that, as implemented in the first half of the 1980s, the confrontational approach to the Cold War was attended by significant risks.]

2. Suny, Ronald Grigor. *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pages 421-446. (Selected Readings)

[The assigned pages in Suny's book provide background on Soviet domestic and foreign policies in the Brezhnev era, which ended in 1982.]

3. Sakwa, Richard. *Russian Politics and Society.* Third edition. London: Routledge, 2002. Pages 1-42. (Selected Readings)

[Sakwa's main focus in this excerpt from his text is the Soviet political endgame in the Cold War.]

4. Friedman, Norman. *The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Pages 344-489.

[Friedman anatomizes the elements of what he describes as the U.S. “counterattack” against an increasingly assertive Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While he deals with such subjects as diplomacy, information operations and economic warfare, he also discusses the problems that such innovations in U.S. military doctrine as the Navy’s Maritime Strategy and the Army’s AirLand Battle may have created for the Soviets.]

5. Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pages 394-444.

[This prize-winning study examines how the U.S. Navy adapted its strategy, doctrine, operations and force structure in response to the threats that emerged in the last twenty years of the Cold War. Of particular interest is Baer’s discussion of USN assessments of Soviet naval capabilities, as well as his analysis and critique of the Maritime Strategy.]

6. “National Security Decision Directive 75.” McFarlane, Robert C., and Smardz Zofia. *Special Trust*. New York: Caddell and Davies, 1994. Pages 372-80. (Selected Readings)

[National Security Decision Directive 75, adopted in January 1983, codified the strategy of the Reagan administration for dealing with the Soviet Union. This strategic blueprint sought to capitalize on the economic and technological strengths of the United States, while exploiting Soviet weaknesses. An appraisal of the Reagan administration’s strategy is essential for an examination of the end of the Cold War.]

7. Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. “Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” *International Security* (Winter 2000/2001), pages 14-53. (Selected Readings)

[Brooks and Wohlforth are interested in using the end of the Cold War to make a contribution to international relations theory; for this reason, the first part of their article is not assigned. In the assigned portion, they provide an excellent capsule discussion of the relative economic decline of the Soviet Union as well as an imaginative reconstruction of the probable effects of perceptions of that decline on the choices of Soviet policy-makers. One of their key findings is degree to which Soviet leaders felt disadvantaged by economic globalization.]

8. Reuveny, Rafaul, and Aseem Prakash. “The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union,” *Review of International Studie* (1999), pages 693-708. (Selected Readings)

[Reuveny and Prakash make the controversial argument that the contribution of the war in Afghanistan to Soviet collapse has been underestimated. In their view, the Afghan war

thoroughly discredited the Soviet armed forces, and by extension, the entire Soviet system. They imply that the Afghan war should therefore not be compared with the U.S. War in Vietnam, but rather with tsarist Russia's Crimean War, which resulted in an analogous discrediting of the militarism and reactionary autocracy of Nicholas I.]

9. Odom, William E. *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Pages 65-117; 388-404. (Selected Readings)

[Odom, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and a former director of the National Security Agency, deals with the Soviet response to doctrinal and technological innovation by the U.S. armed forces in the 1970s and 1980s. He also provides a succinct description of Soviet nuclear and conventional strategy on the eve of Gorbachev's accession to power, and offers his views on the evolution of Gorbachev's thinking about economic and military reform thereafter. The conclusion summarizes the thesis of his book: that the Soviet Union disintegrated because the Soviet military collapsed, and that the Soviet military collapsed because Gorbachev "undermined it with his policies, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unwittingly."]

10. Nichols, Tom. Commentary on Mark Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union", Parts I-III, *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Fall 2003, Fall 2004, and Winter 2005). H-Diplo Article Commentary, 11 May, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[In this piece, Nichols summarizes and analyzes three extremely important articles by Professor Mark Kramer of Harvard University. As Nichols shows, Kramer's work illuminates how Soviet policies helped destabilize the countries of the Warsaw pact in the second half of the 1980s. Kramer also makes some insightful points about the reunification of Germany and additionally casts light on the phenomenon of "blowback"—the relationship between the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later.]

11. Suri, Jeremi. "Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Fall 2002), pages 60-92. (Selected Readings)

[Suri, a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, summarizes and comments on many of the important books and articles on the end of the Cold War that have appeared since 1991. In his opinion, neither adroit U.S. strategy nor intractable Soviet economic decline was the principal cause of the end of the Cold War. Rather, that conflict was brought to an end through negotiations. These were made possible by Gorbachev's repudiation of traditional communist ideology and simultaneous embrace of what has been described as "new thinking" in international affairs. As Suri sees it, Gorbachev found a reliable negotiating partner in Ronald Reagan, who had become convinced in 1983 that a diplomatic solution to the threat of nuclear war had to be found. It should be noted that Suri is not an expert on Russia or the Soviet Union. Consequently, certain of the propositions he advances in this article—concerning the

influence of academics and intellectuals on Soviet policy-making, for example—deserve to be treated skeptically.]

12. Dallin, Alexander. “Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* (October-December 1992), pages 279-302. (Selected Readings)

[Dallin is of the opinion that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not foreordained. His explanation for that event takes into account economic decline, the fading appeal of Communist ideology, the “spread of skepticism and widespread cynicism” in Soviet society, and the rebirth of nationalism, but stresses the centrality of Gorbachev’s policies to the delegitimization and consequently the demise of Soviet power.]

13. President Ronald Reagan. “Address to the Members of the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982; and “Defense and National Security,” March 23, 1983. (Selected Readings)

[In these two famous speeches, President Reagan set out the vision of his administration for dealing with the challenges posed by the Cold War.]

X. LIMITED WAR, COERCIVE CONTAINMENT, AND REGIME CHANGE: THE GULF WARS, 1990-2007

A. General: During the 1990-2007 period, the United States and a shifting coalition of allies waged a protracted conflict in the Persian Gulf. Taken as a whole, the conflict with Iraq from 1990 to 2007 covers a number of the types of war and stability operations examined in the Strategy and Policy syllabus. This module begins with a regional coalition war (1990-91), which resulted in containment (1991-2003), the breakdown of which led to another regional coalition war (2003), the aftermath of which has been an occupation and nation-building exercise marked by an escalating local insurgency (2003-2007).

Iraq in 1990-1991, like Germany in 1917, Japan in 1941, North Korea and its Soviet patrons in 1950, and North Vietnam in 1964, misjudged how the United States would react to aggression. On the other side of the conflict, the American political leadership deftly handled most of the political problems of a limited war. American military planners had to hastily improvise operational plans for waging joint/combined air and ground operations against the Iraqis. The interplay between civilian and military leaders was critical in the reassessment of the initial plans. The reworked plans proved stunningly successful in practice, routing Iraq's army and quickly liberating Kuwait, but questions remain whether the performance left room for improvement in execution or if the Coalition should have pursued more ambitious objectives.

In considering the key war-termination issues of how far to go militarily and what to demand politically in 1991, one should again give special attention to the interaction between American civilian and military leaders as well as between the United States and multinational coalition members. One should also consider whether or not the calculations of American strategic leaders--including President George H.W. Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft--gave too much weight to the short-term costs of going farther militarily and demanding more politically at the end of the war, and too little weight to possible longer-term costs of a cautious war-termination strategy.

Saddam Hussein proved to be an adaptive and determined opponent after the 1990-1991 war. His continued political survival and halting compliance with the cease-fire agreement rendered the ultimate political result of the First Gulf War more ambiguous than many expected. Since U.S. and Coalition objectives in Desert Storm were explicitly limited, the United States countered with a post-war policy of "containment" featuring a combination of sanctions, international inspections, and limited but increasingly frequent use of air power (Operations Southern and Northern Watch).

The containment of Iraq gradually eroded, however, and international efforts to verify, monitor and destroy Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs broke down. At the same time, a postwar policy of containment required a continued American military presence in Saudi Arabia. As a result, the alternative to containment - overthrow of the regime - became more appealing politically, and U.S. objectives became

unlimited by the late 1990s. After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, U.S. policy makers committed themselves to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein through the use of conventional military force--a decision that led to Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.

Much of the debate over abandoning the policy of containment and going to war in 2003 continues to hinge upon the vital issue of intelligence. The selections from the *Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD* offer a rare glimpse into the complex raw material upon which policy decisions had to be based. As in Desert Storm, planning for conventional military operations was creative, if contentious, and Coalition forces achieved remarkable success. Operation Iraqi Freedom, launched in March 2003, decisively defeated Iraq's conventional military forces and overthrew the Ba'athist regime – but the restoration of political order and the creation of a new democratic regime were complicated by an emerging Iraqi insurgency. The Bush administration, which had made the need to eliminate Iraqi WMD the central political issue in its justification for war, paid a heavy political price both domestically and internationally after inspectors failed to find evidence of active weapons of mass destruction programs.

Planning for military operations in 2002-2003 reflected significant changes in both U.S. military capability and in civil-military relations over the previous decade. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had entered office committed to an ambitious program of military transformation to make U.S. forces lighter and more flexible. Civilian leadership pushed military planners to operate with the smallest forces possible, based on the experience of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as on accurate intelligence about Iraq's conventional military capabilities.

Operation Iraqi Freedom reflected fundamental changes in the U.S. perception of the international environment. The second Bush administration pursued a very different coalition-building approach than its predecessor, emphasizing a “coalition of the willing” and putting less emphasis on strong consensus for military action at the United Nations – while still apparently relying on international and coalition support for post-war stability and reconstruction efforts. The administration's vision for the future of the region focused on creating democratic alternatives in Iraq and elsewhere--a policy which risked short-term instability in the region and perhaps the collapse of friendly regimes. In practice, however, the prospects for democracy were adversely affected by a lack of security and order, and by decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and purge Iraqi elites shortly after the conventional conflict ended. The result was the collapse of Iraqi political and social order, which forced Coalition troops to assume the role of an occupation force and set the stage for a complex and vicious insurgency, on top of which has emerged an incipient civil war as well.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was containment of Iraq after 1991 a viable policy? Why or why not?

2. Would Iraqi possession of nuclear weapons in 1990-91 have fundamentally changed US strategy in the region? Why or why not?
3. Would Iraqi possession of nuclear weapons in 2003 have fundamentally changed US strategy in the region? Why or why not?
4. Considering the US experience in Iraq along with other relevant modules of this course, analyze the political and military conditions necessary to achieve a quick, decisive victory.
5. Some might argue that in both wars with Iraq, the United States won the battle but lost the peace. Do you agree? Why or why not?
6. On the basis of what happened in Desert Storm and OIF, analyze the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions.
7. OIF was based on “lessons learned” from the previous decade of conflict with Iraq. On balance, how successful were planning efforts at implementing those lessons, and how might future efforts be improved?
8. Sun Tzu says that knowing oneself and the enemy is the key to success. How well did the United States know its Iraqi enemy, and how did that level of knowledge affect coalition success or failure?
9. Sun Tzu suggests that knowledge of oneself may be as important a key to success as knowledge of the enemy. How well did US strategic leaders and operational planners understand American capabilities and the implications of the American position in the international environment?
10. Are coalitions more important before, during, or after a conflict? Why? Support your argument with examples from the conflict with Iraq.
11. Evaluate US planning for the post-conflict environment in Desert Storm and OIF.
12. Were US planning and execution significantly more “joint” in OIF than in Desert Storm?
13. Would the provision of larger ground forces in OIF in 2003 have prevented the Iraqi insurgency of 2003-2007? Why or why not?
14. Under what circumstances do joint operations most effectively substitute for overwhelming numbers?

15. In Reading 7 (below), Kenneth Pollack distinguishes between a “pragmatic approach” and a “reconstruction approach” to rebuilding Iraq after the end of conventional operations. Which approach did the United States follow? Which approach should the United States have followed?

C. Required Readings:

1. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages 75-101, 123-158, 413-461, 476-477.

[This reading provides an opportunity to assess civil-military relations and the national command structure, interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers, the strengths and limitations of the high-tech RMA pioneered by the American armed forces, the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war, the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and war termination.]

2. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 432-433, 450-492.

[President George Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote an illuminating account of foreign policy decision-making during their time in office. Portions of their account rely on a revealing diary kept by President Bush. The sections of this book dealing with the Gulf War are especially good for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the importance of society, culture, and religion in formulating strategy and policy, and the president's role as commander-in-chief.]

3. Baram, Amatzia. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Baghdad,” in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. *Iraq's Road to War*. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. Pages 5-28. (Selected Readings)

[This reading examines Saddam Hussein's rationale for attacking Kuwait, the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT SHIELD, and Saddam's early options for DESERT STORM. It is particularly valuable for its examination of his domestic motives and its counter-factual analysis of Saddam's “other options.”]

4. *NSD-54* (January 15, 1991). (Selected Readings)

[This declassified document lays out the primary and secondary objectives of the United States in Operation DESERT STORM.]

5. President George W. Bush, “Freedom and the Future,” Speech at the American Enterprise Institute’s annual dinner, February 26, 2003. (Selected Readings)

[This speech, given shortly before the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, provides the President’s vision of US war aims in 2003.]

6. Rosen, Stephen Peter, “Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations,” in Victor A. Utgoff, ed. *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Pages 131-151. (Selected Readings)

[What if Saddam had possessed nuclear weapons in 1990-91? Stephen Rosen, a professor at Harvard and a former S&P faculty member, explores this frightening counterfactual question as a way of thinking about the nature of a conflict involving the United States and an enemy armed with nuclear weapons. Students should consider these issues from the perspective not only of a policy maker but also of a theater commander.]

7. Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002. Pages 46-108, 243-280, 387-396.

[Kenneth Pollack, an official in the first Bush and Clinton administrations, lays out a careful case for overthrowing Saddam Hussein in a book published after 9/11 but before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pollack’s case for invasion is based on the failure of the containment policy of the 1990s and on Iraq’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. This reading discusses internal risings in Iraq before and after Desert Storm; the establishment of containment—including the “no-fly zones”—and the international inspections regime from 1991 to 1998; and the gradual erosion of that regime in the late 1990s.]

8. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (excerpts are Key Findings (Regime Strategic Intent, Regime Finance and Procurement, Delivery Systems, Nuclear, Chemical, Biological) from the original Fall 2004 report; and Prewar Movement of WMD out of Iraq, Iraqi Detainees: Value to Investigation of Iraq WMD and Current Status, and Residual Proliferation Risks: People from the 2005 Addenda) at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/ (Selected Readings)

[This selection is drawn from the final report on the status of Iraq’s WMD programs. The key findings include the fact that Saddam wanted to end sanctions while retaining some capacity to reconstitute his WMD program; indications that Iraq’s efforts to maintain some WMD capacity focused on chemical weapons and ballistic missiles; evidence that Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability was essentially destroyed in 1991; and the conclusion that no meaningful WMD capability was deployed or available in 2003.]

9. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Pages 24-163, 457-496.

[This reading, from Gordon and Trainor's second book on U.S. military efforts in Iraq, focuses on decisions in the run-up to the conflict and also provides a brief discussion of the situation after Baghdad fell.]

10. Bensahel, Nora. "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 2006). Pages 453-473. (Selected Readings)

[Bensahel, an analyst at RAND Corporation, discusses the shortcomings in planning and providing for stability and post-war reconstruction operations in Iraq.]

11. Baram, Amatzia. "Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq." Special Report 134. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 2005. (Selected Readings)

[Baram, one of the leading experts on internal politics in Iraq throughout the 1990-2007 period, examines the speeches and writings of various insurgent groups in an effort to understand their objectives and, potentially, their vulnerabilities.]

12. Macris, Jeffrey R. "Between the Storms: How Desert Storm Shaped the U.S. Navy of Operation Iraqi Freedom." White House Studies, Spring 2004.. <http://www.uhh.hawaii.edu/~whs/> (University of Hawaii) (Selected Readings)

[The author examines lessons learned from Desert Storm and their impact on US Navy planning and operations in OIF.]

13. West, Bing. "American Military Performance in Iraq." *Proceedings* (July 2006). (Selected Readings)

[The author--a former professor at the Naval War College--briefly assesses the successes and failures of the post-OIF occupation and suggests key trends and indicators for evaluating future efforts.]

14. Woods, Kevin A., with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*. Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2006. Pages 123 – 150. (Selected Readings)

[Based on interviews with leading survivors of the Ba'athist regime, this reading explores the last days of Saddam's rule and the total collapse of Iraqi political and military organization. Coalition operations are described from an Iraqi perspective, including the shattering of the Republican Guard force south of Baghdad.]

15. Diamond, Larry. "Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned," *Current History* (January 2006). Pages 34-39. (Selected Readings).

[Diamond, an outspoken advocate of democratization and a supporter of the Bush administration's policy objectives, explains the policy's short-term failure and lays out lessons learned for future efforts.]

16. Biddle, Stephen. "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2006). Pages 2-14. (Selected Readings).

[Playing up how the Iraq War is different from the Vietnam War, Biddle argues that a civil war in Iraq had eclipsed the insurgency by 2006 and that American counterinsurgency strategy, especially the effort to stand up Iraqi forces to fight the insurgents, had the effect of making the communal violence worse. He examines various alternative policies and strategies that the United States might adopt.]

17. Hendrickson, David and Robert Tucker. *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. Pages 1-28. (Selected Readings).

[The authors raise the discomfoting possibility that the United States simply lacked the military resources to carry out its ambitious policy objectives, arguing that even significant numbers of additional troops would not have been sufficient to prevent an Iraqi insurgency and political turmoil.]

XI. STOPPING THE UNTHINKABLE: THE STRATEGY AND POLICY OF PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WMD

A. General. Samuel Huntington, in his provocative study *The Clash of Civilizations*, argued that the United States faces a dramatically different kind of arms race dynamic than what it faced during the Cold War. “In the post-Cold War world the central arms competition is of a different sort. The West’s antagonists are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the West is attempting to prevent them from doing so. It is not a case of buildup versus buildup [as occurred during the Cold War] but rather of buildup versus hold-down. . . . The outcome of a race between buildup and hold-down is . . . predictable. The hold-down efforts of the West may slow the weapons buildup of other societies, but they will not stop it.”⁴ Huntington’s pessimistic assessment forms a core element of this module of the course. Will the United States, by working with other members of the international community, prove successful in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction from reaching state and non-state actors likely to use them? By examining four key case studies, this module grapples with some of the most vexing and potentially catastrophic security challenges that will face the United States during the twenty-first century.

Nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles became weapons of war during the 1940s. Indeed, the Second World War witnessed an intense arms competition amongst the major powers to acquire these weapons. Before the war had ended, both nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles demonstrated their awesome power to inflict casualties. Put together, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons promised to revolutionize warfare and hence the meaning of strategy. Countries without these weapons faced the prospect of suffering catastrophic attacks on their homeland and crushing defeat. Acquiring these weapons, then, would prove a strategic imperative for any country that aspired to a commanding role in world affairs or wanted to stand up to the United States. Stalin was determined to break the American monopoly on nuclear weapons. In turn, the robust ballistic missile programs developed by the Soviet Union posed a longstanding security threat to the United States and its allies. The history of the Cold War, as examined in modules VI, VII, and IX of the Strategy and Policy Course, was marked by the nuclear and missile competition of the two superpowers. It was not just the superpowers, however, that had strategic incentives to invest heavily in nuclear capabilities. Other major powers also believed that their security depended on the possession of nuclear weapons and the credible capability to use them in attacking adversaries. The leaders of Great Britain and France believed that independent nuclear forces were necessary because the United States’ nuclear umbrella was not altogether credible once the Soviet Union acquired the ability to target the American homeland. The history of the Cold War provides a cautionary tale of how both enemies and coalition partners of the United States possess strong strategic incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 190.

China under Mao's leadership was the second communist power to pursue a nuclear capability. As examined in module VII, China fought the United States in a major regional war over Korea. The division of China along the Taiwan Strait since the late 1940s has provided another tinderbox for a Sino-American conflict. During the 1950s, the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons in confrontations and conflicts with communist China. Mao wanted nuclear weapons in case of another war with the United States. With initial assistance from his Soviet allies, Mao embarked on a nuclear weapons program. That a state motivated by an extremist ideology such as that of Mao would acquire nuclear weapons posed a frightening prospect for American planners. China, it was widely feared, would not show the same restraint or prudence as had other nuclear powers. As China moved closer and closer to acquiring nuclear weapons during the early 1960s, decision makers and planners in the United States undertook an agonizing interagency debate about what course of action to take in response. The fear of a wider war with China provided a strategic backdrop for the American involvement in Vietnam, as we examined in module VIII of the Strategy and Policy Course. In these assessments and evaluations of alternative courses of strategic action, American leaders considered preventive strikes and ballistic-missile defenses. Both of these options possessed serious strategic disadvantages, which decision makers and planners frankly addressed in their assessments. Defenses against ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons held out the prospect of finding a technological answer to the problem. The Johnson administration during the mid-1960s found itself embroiled in a contentious internal debate about the effectiveness and strategic rationale for deploying defenses against ballistic missiles. This historical case, then, provides an important opportunity to analyze the range of policy, strategy, and technological options that are open to the United States in confronting a hostile major regional power determined to acquire nuclear weapons.

At the same time that the United States' decision makers wrestled with how to respond to China, Soviet leaders came to view the Chinese nuclear program as a grave threat to their security and their standing as the world's dominant communist power. Armed with nuclear weapons, Mao challenged the Soviets as well as the United States. The Soviet leadership even sought regime change in Beijing, trying to find a way to topple Mao and replace him with a leader more to the Kremlin's liking. China's nuclear program thus provided a WMD strategic underpinning for breaking with Moscow's leadership of the international communist movement. The Soviet Union, faced by what its leaders saw as a provocative challenge, considered preventive war to weaken China and disarm it of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons proved a critical component in the breakdown of the communist coalition and international movement. In the Soviet deliberations about preventive war, the Kremlin did not find in the United States a willing partner. An examination of China's emergence as a nuclear great power shows the unintended consequences and second- and third-order effects inherent in the proliferation of WMD.

The recent nuclear test by the North Korean regime has highlighted the immense danger that exists in the troubled and strategically critical region of Northeast Asia.

Perhaps no better case study exists for an in-depth examination of the interagency process for strategic decision-making than that of American actions in response to the challenge posed by the nuclear WMD program of North Korea. North Korea's nuclear ambitions have severely tested the Clinton and Bush administrations. Conflict with North Korea has stood as a real possibility. The challenge posed by North Korea is a longstanding one. As we studied in module VII, North Korea's aggression against South Korea brought on a horrendously costly regional war. This case study presents a particularly valuable opportunity to examine the crucial role of theater commanders and their staffs in facing the daunting strategic problems posed by the threat of nuclear WMD. In most accounts, General Gary Luck, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, played a key role in dissuading the Clinton administration from launching a military strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities during the unfolding crisis. A strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities, if it resulted in a communist conventional offensive against South Korea, would lead to heavy loss of life and massive destruction of property. Even without a proven nuclear-weapons capability, then, North Korea has deterred the United States and its coalition partners from taking military action to impede Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. Meanwhile, North Korea's nuclear program has tested the United States' alliances with Japan and South Korea. In addition, North Korea's actions have shown the limits of cooperation for the United States with China and Russia. The prospect of state failure in North Korea, which has done so poorly in providing for the welfare of its people, looms as one of the most frightening scenarios facing American decision makers and coalition partners. In module IX of the Strategy and Policy Course, we examined the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether a state failure in North Korea can take place without a major war involving the use of nuclear weapons poses a daunting question for the United States. Further, American decision makers and planners must face the frightening problem of whether a failing regime in North Korea will seek to bolster itself by selling or transferring nuclear weapons or material to other adversaries of the United States; and, if so, how to respond to that threat.

The security challenge confronting the United States from nuclear WMD is no longer confined to the actions and threats posed by state actors. As we have seen in module X, Iraq created a formidable WMD capability during the 1980s. The material for this capability was acquired through commercial markets, from private suppliers willing to ignore or undercut existing laws and treaties in return for lucrative Iraqi contracts. The level and scope of the Iraqi program, which included multinational cooperation on ballistic missiles and a hidden nuclear capability far more sophisticated than any intelligence service had discerned, raised serious concerns about gaps in the control system for international technology transfer.

These gaps were further demonstrated by the massive and covert supply network for nuclear technology established by Pakistan's Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan, widely (if inaccurately) known as "the father of Pakistan's bomb," stole uranium enrichment technology from Western Europe and applied it to Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program during the late 1970s. He established illegal commercial linkages with European suppliers, who provided some of the necessary materials for the Pakistani uranium enrichment complex. Connections with China provided additional technology

and assistance. By the late 1980s, Pakistan was widely suspected of having a covert nuclear weapons capability—one which was finally revealed in nuclear tests in May 1998.

During the late 1980s, Khan began a new phase in his nuclear operations. Rather than importing nuclear technology, he was exporting it to interested buyers around the globe. Although it seems incredible that such transfers could take place without support and cooperation from the Pakistani government and military leadership, the nature of that support remains unproven. Khan provided uranium enrichment to China, Pakistan's most important arms supplier, and to Iran in the late 1980s at a time when Pakistan's military leadership showed interest in developing a Pakistan-Iran alliance. Khan offered nuclear assistance to Saddam Hussein in October 1990. He provided enrichment technology to North Korea during the 1990s, when Pyongyang began supplying ballistic missiles to Pakistan. He provided technologies and designs to Libya that, if completed, would have allowed it to separate enough uranium for at least ten nuclear weapons. He included a pre-tested Chinese nuclear weapon design as part of the package.

The impact of the Khan network on current international security problems cannot be overestimated. Khan's uranium enrichment technology allowed North Korea to bypass the constraints of the Agreed Framework, leading to the current nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia. Khan's technology and equipment supplies to Iran's uranium enrichment program are the basis for the emerging nuclear crisis in the Middle East. Libya's willingness to cooperate with the United States, the United Kingdom, and international authorities led not only to the disbanding of the Libyan nuclear program, but to the rounding up as well of a number of Khan's contacts in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the network has been completely uncovered. Although Khan made a public confession in early 2004, and remains under house arrest, there are compelling reasons to believe that he has not made a free and full disclosure of all his secret operations.

Contacts between Khan's organization and al Qaeda—and also between scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and al Qaeda—are a matter of the utmost concern. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have heightened the specter of nuclear terrorism. Non-state actors seek nuclear weapons to menace the United States and its coalition partners. How and why terrorists might employ nuclear weapons raise fundamental questions in strategy and policy about the relationship between cost, risk, and the value of the object. Isolating the terrorists from state sponsors or agents who might supply them with nuclear weapons or materials is critical for success in preventing the ultimate form of terrorist attack. Reducing the possibility of nuclear terrorism is, arguably, the most important task for American decision makers and planners engaged in the Long War, which we shall study in the next module of the course..

This module also lays out some of the critical policy and strategy issues facing the United States in relation to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran, like other states studied in this module, is on the path to acquire nuclear weapons. Tehran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would be fraught with great peril for the politically volatile Middle East region.

Strategic concepts of the Cold War—such as mutual deterrence and containment—might prove inappropriate and indeed dangerous for managing a state whose leaders are motivated by a messianic world view. The readings presented in this module provide a starting point for undertaking an analysis of the strategic challenge that Iran poses for American efforts to promote a more moderate Middle East. Whether the United States will prove successful in forming a coalition that can induce Tehran to give up its nuclear program and its support for terrorist groups in the Middle East is one of the most serious challenges confronting American and allied decision makers.

This module, then, provides an opportunity to understand the problems that stand in the way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, it explores the difficulties inherent in taking coordinated international diplomatic action, imposing multi-national economic sanctions, and forming coalitions to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by regimes that see the United States as an enemy. The case studies examined in this module also allow us to assess strategies of preemptive attack in the face of an imminent danger and preventive war to foreclose an adversary's nuclear options. These cases put into stark relief how past decision makers and strategic planners have evaluated these and other courses of action for stemming the proliferation of WMD. Intelligence, deception, and strategic communication play a major role as well in these case studies, which show how states employ Fabian strategies to delay and deter outside interference, gaining time for the development of their programs to produce weapons. Throughout this module, the challenge posed by nuclear WMD is explored from the policy and strategy perspective, within the context of dynamics at work in the international strategic environment that are driving the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. “The experience of the Cold War has little relevance for understanding the threat posed by nuclear WMD in the post-Cold War world.” Do you agree?
2. “Conventional military power plays only a secondary role in countering the proliferation of nuclear WMD. Other instruments of national power matter far more in devising a successful strategy.” Do you agree?
3. What are the principal problems in intelligence and assessment that hamper states seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear WMD?
4. What obstacles stand in the way of forming international coalitions to prevent nuclear proliferation?
5. What obstacles stand in the way of taking effective military action to prevent nuclear proliferation ?

6. Samuel Huntington has argued: “The West’s antagonists are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the West is attempting to prevent them from doing so. . . . The hold-down efforts of the West may slow the weapons buildup of other societies, but they will not stop it.” Do the case studies examined in this module support Huntington’s pessimistic assessment?

7. Evaluate the strategic assessments of American military leaders in the 1960s and 1990s about options to deal with Chinese and North Korean nuclear-weapons programs.

8. What were the principal geostrategic consequences of the diffusion of 1940s “legacy” systems of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles?

9. Graham Allison, in *Nuclear Terrorism*, presents a seven-point strategic roadmap for preventing the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Evaluate this strategy.

10. Do you agree with Graham Allison’s assessment that nuclear terrorism is preventable?

11. What major strategic problems face military planners in fighting a country armed with nuclear weapons?

12. What strategic risks and challenges face the United States in attempting to contain a nuclear-armed adversary by means short of war?

13. Does Libya’s decision to renounce its WMD program present an anomalous case that provides few lessons for American policy makers and strategists, or does it provide a useful model for the future?

14. What lessons would you draw from the case studies examined in this course for crafting a strategy to address Iran’s WMD challenge?

15. In light of the case studies examined in this course, what are the rewards, risks, costs, and feasibility of pursuing a WMD program against the opposition of the United States?

16. The ability to frustrate the enemy’s strategy is a key element in Sun Tzu’s strategic thought. How have states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons sought to frustrate the United States and its coalition partners from executing a timely, effective strategy to prevent their weapons buildup?

17. Why does American dominance of the air, maritime, and space commons not translate into the ability to stop the spread of nuclear WMD?

C. Required Readings:

1. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Pages 186-192.

[The noted Harvard professor Samuel Huntington examines the cultural, political, economic, and strategic undercurrents driving the diffusion of military power—and, in particular, WMD—within the international system. He underscores the danger to the United States and its coalition partners posed by the connections between states in the Middle East and East Asia in promoting the spread of WMD.]

2. Bracken, Paul. “The Second Nuclear Age.” *Foreign Affairs*, (January-February 2000), pages 146-156. (Selected Readings)

[Paul Bracken of Yale University provides a short account of the changing international geostrategic environment caused by the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles.]

3. Goldstein, Lyle J. *Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Survey*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. Chapters 4-5. (Selected Readings)

[The rise of China as a nuclear power posed a major challenge to the two superpowers during the Cold War. This historical case study is examined by Naval War College Professor Lyle Goldstein.]

4. Burr, William, and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64.” *International Security* (Winter 2000/1), pages 54-99. (Selected Readings)

[The Chinese nuclear program greatly worried successive American administrations during the 1960s. This essay details the planning undertaken by the Kennedy administration for diplomatic, economic, and military action against China.]

5. U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968: China*. Volume XXX. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Pages 39-40, 57-58, 144-148, 415-416, 593-594. (Selected Readings)

[These declassified documents provide assessments made by the United States government during the 1960s about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by communist China. This reading shows how the interagency system worked to confront this serious strategic challenge.]

6. U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968: National Security Policy*. Volume X. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2002. Pages 459-464, 474-476, 483-509, 526-533. (Selected Readings)

[These documents show the considerable debate that occurred among American policy makers and military leaders about whether to deploy ballistic-missile defenses.]

7. Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, paperback edition, 2005. Pages vii-x, 78-246, 355-370, 397-408.

[This detailed account by policy insiders provides essential background on the history of the crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. In particular, this account is valuable for understanding American interagency and military planning, as well as civil-military relations. The appendices (pages 409-428) contain a chronology of events and the joint statements and agreements reached in negotiations.]

8. Allison, Graham. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York: Owl Books, 2005. Pages 12-15, 19-42, 61-86, 140-205.

[Well-known Harvard scholar and former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans Graham Allison provides a lucid overview of the danger posed by nuclear terrorism. His strategic roadmap for preventing the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists provides a starting point for analysis.]

9. Clary, Christopher O. "The A. Q. Khan Network: Causes and Implications." Naval Postgraduate School, December 2005. (Selected Readings)

[The news of the A. Q. Khan network stunned the world. This reading provides a solid account of what happened and presents troubling findings about the prospects for controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons.]

10. Jentleson, Bruce W., and Christopher A. Whytock. "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy." *International Security* (Winter 2005/06), pages 47-86. (Selected Readings)

[This article provides an historical overview of Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programs. The Libyan case offers an instructive example for evaluating the effectiveness of strategies that seek to halt the proliferation of WMD.]

12. *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. December 2002. (Selected Readings)

[This official government policy statement is essential reading for understanding the position of the United States in meeting the strategic challenge posed by WMD.]

12. Kissinger, Henry A. "A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy." *Washington Post*, May 16, 2006. Page A17. (Selected Readings)

[Henry Kissinger gives his views about the role of diplomacy in preventing “the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national armament and wind up in terrorist hands.”]

13. Betts, Richard K. “The Osirak Fallacy.” *The National Interest* (Spring 2006), pages 22-25. (Selected Readings)

[Betts argues against the use of preventive strikes to meet the challenge of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Instead, Betts advocates that the United States “replicate the Cold War strategy of containment and deterrence until such time that the regime in Tehran mellows or is replaced from within.”]

14. Pollack, Kenneth M. “Iran: Three Alternatives.” *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* (June 2006), pages 73-83. (Selected Readings)

[This insightful analysis examines the effects of actions by the United States and the international community on the internal situation within Iran. Pollack speculates that “over the course of the next two to five years, the Iranian regime could easily face a series of economic, political, and diplomatic crises for which the regime is ill-prepared.”]

XII. THE LONG WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND THE JIHADISTS 1979-2007

A. General: The architecture of this Strategy and Policy course gives students a vantage point to take a long view of success in war and peace. No module covers less than a decade. Some cover more than half a century. All present either a long war or a sequence of wars. This educational design serves to prepare students for the current war in which the United States and its allies find themselves—what the Bush Administration has come to call the Long War.

The design of this course also prepares students for the Long War in another important way. It educates students to see a big and complex picture about war. Wars come in various sizes, shapes, types, and combinations. Military officers and government officials need intellectual preparation to be versatile and adaptable enough to handle this variety. Three basic types of war stand out in our syllabus: big wars fought for high stakes, between coalitions and in multiple theaters; regional wars fought within a single theater, typically for a shorter time than big wars, often for limited political objectives, and sometimes without a coalition on one side or the other; and insurgencies fought within a political system, against a failing, emerging, or well-established state, by a non-state movement that seeks to form a new political system. Every historical module of this course incorporates at least two of these basic types of war; some modules include all three types. They may appear in sequence, sometimes with an abrupt transition, sometimes with a longer interval separating them. Or different types may go on simultaneously, with one type overlapping with, or developing within or on top of, another. The Long War is an especially complex mixture of wars. Seen in broad perspective, it falls within the “big war” box. It is likely to be quite long, it certainly involves high political stakes, it already extends over multiple theaters, and it has coalitions on both sides. Within this big war, the United States has already fought two regional wars, the first in Afghanistan and the second in Iraq. In both cases, when conventional operations brought about regime collapse, there was a transition into the “insurgency” box. Thus, the three “boxes” of war featured in this course have reappeared in the Long War.

This course also reveals, however, that new cases of each basic type of war differ in significant respects from previous cases in a given “box.” There is a fundamental character to war and to its basic types that is virtually unchanging over time, but there are other characteristics that do change radically. A syllabus that takes students from the ancient Greeks to the twenty-first century allows them to see how and why some characteristics of war change from era to era. Two important sources of change are new forms of political organization and new forms of technology. Both figure prominently in this module of the course. The Long War differs from any previous big war that we have studied in that the principal adversary of the United States and its allies is not other states whose military capabilities are best suited to conventional operations, but rather a transnational network of non-state actors who engage in terrorist, guerrilla, and information operations. This new form of political organization would not be viable without changes in information technology, especially the Internet, that allow far-flung

cells and clusters of an increasingly loose and decentralized organization such as Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) to communicate around the globe. And without the diffusion beyond state control of the great destructive capacity enabled by technological development, small groups of terrorists could not pose the grave threat that they now do to the United States and its allies.

The “wars within the war” in this module--the regional wars and insurgencies fought in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Long War--also deviate in noteworthy respects from other cases of such wars in this course. Whereas the previous regional wars that we have studied featured, for the most part, limited political objectives, the American political objectives in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) involved the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Technology and forms of political organization were important here, too. Well-trained American forces were able to exploit advances in precision-strike and information technologies to inflict a remarkably quick defeat on adversaries operating in a more or less conventional mode. The impact on the Taliban and Iraqi armies of the dysfunctional political organization of the regimes of Mullah Omar and Saddam Hussein made them “cooperative adversaries” for the United States. OIF and OEF represent the most recent of numerous cases in this course of quick victories against isolated and incompetent adversaries in regional wars. Yet, as the course has also shown, a quick victory does not necessarily prove to be decisive or durable. In both Afghanistan and Iraq in the early twenty-first century, as in Spain in the early nineteenth century, a regional war “morphed” into an insurgency. Especially in Iraq (but recently in Afghanistan, too), there was variation from earlier cases in the insurgency “box” that complicated counterinsurgency efforts. As non-state actors without significant conventional capabilities, jihadists and other insurgents embraced the Al Qaeda model of relying on terrorism, especially suicide bombings, to generate incidents of mass slaughter on a scale beyond that of previous insurgent/terrorist groups. In addition, they showed more sophistication and agility than previous groups in exploiting new technological means of communication.

Patterns arising from a study of the modules in this Strategy and Policy course reveal two points to bear in mind as we deal with the complexity of the Long War. First, each different type of war has different keys to strategic success. It seems that American strategic leaders have learned well how to win regional wars but not so well how to defeat insurgencies. Furthermore, it is not yet clear whether they understand how to translate the general lessons of previous U.S. success in big wars to the specific circumstances of the Long War. Second, when there are wars within wars, strategies for fighting the regional wars and insurgencies must be oriented toward achieving strategic effects that contribute to success in the overarching “big war.” In OEF, it seems that a preoccupation with taking down the Taliban regime got in the way of opportunities to take out the Al Qaeda leadership. In the case of Iraq, it seems that American strategy has had the net effect, both within and beyond the theater, of creating more violent jihadists than American operations have killed, captured, or dissuaded. And though Iraq has become a major theater in the Long War, it has also distracted the United States from a more direct focus on its main enemy, AQAM.

So far this introduction points students toward what transpired after the terrorist strikes of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The first major attacks by foreigners on the continental United States since the War of 1812, these acts of terrorism by a non-state organization were a great shock to the American people, to American military leaders, and to all American civilian policymakers except those officials who had been following Al Qaeda most closely. Understandably, most Americans tend to regard 9/11 as the beginning of the Long War. But this module of the course adopts a longer perspective and reaches back to 1979 as its starting point. Two key events of that pivotal year in the Muslim world—the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—did much to produce the violent mix of religion and politics that has exploded into the “global jihadism” now confronting the United States and its allies.

The revolution in Iran brought to power a new theocratic regime. Its hostility to the United States expressed itself right away when Iranian revolutionaries seized the American Embassy in Teheran in November 1979 and held embassy personnel hostage until January 1981, with the approval of the clerical leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The new regime was also determined to spread its radical Islamist ideology throughout the Middle East, not least by sponsoring terrorism. Its main instrument for this purpose came to be Hezbollah (“Party of God”), a Lebanese Shiite group that sought to establish an Islamic Republic of Lebanon modeled after the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Hezbollah pioneered in the use of suicide bombing in the Muslim world. Suicide bombers attacked first the U.S. Embassy and then the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. These strikes had the effect of putting an end to American military intervention in the ongoing Lebanese civil war—something that Usama bin Laden later pointed to, along with the American withdrawal from Somalia in 1993, as evidence that the United States lacked the will to stand up to jihadists. Even after the United States withdrew its forces from Lebanon, Hezbollah carried on the Iranian tactic of taking Americans hostage. American intelligence detected Iran’s complicity in all of Hezbollah’s terrorist activities. Hezbollah also proceeded, along with the Iranians, to spread its operational reach outside the Middle East. It attacked Jewish and Israeli targets in Buenos Aires and London in 1994. It established cells in many countries around the world, including the United States, though unlike Al Qaeda it has not (yet) made terrorist strikes against the American homeland. Even after 9/11, some American officials regarded Hezbollah as more competent and in the long run more dangerous than Al Qaeda because of its Iranian connection.

While Iran and Hezbollah spearhead a Shiite variant of Islamist radicalism, Al Qaeda has been the vanguard of Sunni jihadism. It emerged from the playing out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, just after Khomeini’s revolution overturned the Shah’s regime in Iran. Though the Arab jihadists who formed Al Qaeda under Usama bin Laden’s initiative in the late 1980s had played only a marginal role in the Afghan resistance to the Soviets, they entertained the notion that their jihadism had brought about the demise of a superpower. In the early 1990s, after the United States sent forces to Saudi Arabia in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Usama bin Laden turned his thoughts to bringing down the United States as well. Despite the fact that the American

superpower had prevailed in the Cold War, bin Laden seemed to suppose that it would be a softer adversary than the Soviets had been. Notwithstanding Al Qaeda's involvement in Somalia, the Balkans, and elsewhere in the early and mid-1990s, the organization largely escaped the notice of American policymakers until the second half of the 1990s. By then it was hard to ignore. Bin Laden issued so-called *fatwas* in 1996 and 1998 calling first for attacks against Americans in Saudi Arabia and then for attacks against Americans and their allies everywhere. Al Qaeda operatives bombed the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the USS *Cole* in Yemen in 2000. By 2001 American officials who followed Al Qaeda closely were aware that the terrorist group had put together a substantial coalition of like-minded organizations and had cells in more than forty countries. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda's long planning process for the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland went undetected by U.S. intelligence. As of this writing there have been no new attacks on the American homeland since 2001. But AQAM has executed, sponsored, or inspired a series of major terrorist strikes in Tunisia, Indonesia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, Spain, Egypt, Qatar, the United Kingdom, and India. Many other plots and cells have been disrupted, including in Australia and Canada.

So far there has been no sustained, well-defined relationship between the Shiite and Sunni strands of jihadist violence. Instead there has been a patchy mixture of cooperation and conflict. Both types of jihadism share common enemies, above all the United States and Israel. Usama Bin Laden had a series of meetings with Hezbollah's most important operational planner, Imad Fayezi Mugniyah (reportedly an Iranian citizen), in the Sudan in the mid-1990s, and Al Qaeda operatives visited Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon, taking special interest in Hezbollah's tactics of suicide bombing and other terrorist tradecraft. Before 9/11, Iranian officials facilitated the movement of Al Qaeda operatives, including hijackers of the 9/11 aircraft, through Iran. Since 9/11, Iran has either "hosted" or had "custody" over large numbers of Al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan with the demise of the Taliban regime. But sectarian divisions, different national orientations, and rivalry for jihadist leadership have, so far, put limits on Shiite-Sunni collaboration in global jihadism. In the future, on the one hand, an intense civil war in Iraq might spill over into violent conflict between the larger movements of Shiite and Sunni jihadism. On the other hand, events such as an American attack on Iran might lead to strategic coalescence between the two movements.

The chronological sweep of this module reaches forward to the point at which the Strategy and Policy seminars will discuss the Long War in 2007. At the time that this introduction to the module took its final form in October 2006, no one could predict how a dynamic ongoing conflict would play out in the ensuing months. But some policy and strategy issues of this war are of such enduring importance that they can be identified well in advance as key agenda items in students' seminar preparation.

The *first and foremost issue*, as Clausewitz stressed long ago, is to understand the nature of the war. This issue has been a matter of intense controversy ever since 9/11. Drawing on arguments made by the eminent academics Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis in the 1990s, some see the Long War as a culturally or religiously driven "clash of

civilizations.” (That, indeed, is how Al Qaeda has been predisposed to portray the war.) Others, harking back to ideological struggles in the twentieth century, see the Long War as World War IV (with the Cold War having been World War III). Still others (including many observers in the Middle East as well as in the West) think that the Long War is best understood as a transnational insurgency within the Muslim world or as a series of mostly unrelated insurgencies in different countries where Muslims live. Finally, there are those (especially in Europe) who question whether the conflict against AQAM is indeed a war. They see it primarily as a law-enforcement “hunt” against a transnational terrorist network that has more in common with a criminal enterprise than a strategic entity. In mulling over this debate, which has critical implications for what the policy and strategy of the United States and its allies should be, students ought to bear in mind the commentary earlier in this introduction about how complex the Long War is. At the same time, students should recall from previous modules in this course how a war can change its nature as it unfolds. The nature of a war is not necessarily a singular and invariant essence.

A *second issue*, closely related to the first, arises from Sun Tzu’s injunction to know one’s enemy. The Bush Administration has added to its enemies’ list tyrannies and theocracies that pursue WMD and might transfer such capabilities to terrorist groups, but the primary enemy, five years after 9/11, remains AQAM. AQ (Al Qaeda) has changed in important ways since it lost its base of operations in Afghanistan, and AM (Associated Movements) have come to include “start-up” cells of terrorists who are inspired by Al Qaeda but may not be directly connected to it. While the nature of the organization has become more amorphous, the ideology that it has developed and communicated and the strategies that it has been following have come into much clearer focus. There has been much contentious debate over what semantic label to attach to the enemy—an important issue of strategic communications and information operations. But there need not any longer be much doubt about what the enemy stands for. It is also quite possible now to deepen our insight into AQAM’s “theory of victory.” We can understand all that from the enemy’s own words. Students will get the opportunity to ponder those words in Required Reading 16 for this module.

Understanding the nature of the war and knowing the enemy as well as oneself are of crucial importance for developing an effective strategy. Before the 9/11 attacks, when American administrations of both political parties did not understand the enemy and did not regard themselves at war with jihadist terrorist groups, there was no well-developed strategy, as we shall see from Required Readings 1-3. After 9/11, the Bush Administration formulated a strategy with a great sense of urgency, born not simply of the desire to respond to the horrific terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but also of palpable anxiety among policymakers that further attacks in the future—perhaps in the near future—might involve the use of nuclear or biological weapons against American cities. In reviewing the Bush Administration’s strategy as it unfolded, we must address a *third issue* on our agenda: the proper balance to strike between offensive actions and defensive measures. It seems that after 9/11 American policymakers did not have great confidence in the efficacy of defensive measures. Nevertheless, under political pressure to do something more to defend the United States,

the Bush Administration did undertake the biggest reforms in the institutional dimension of strategy since the late 1940s. The most notable of those reforms were the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the creation of a new layer of bureaucracy on top of the fragmented and fractious intelligence community. Still, embracing the old saw that the best defense is a good offense, policymakers put their main emphasis on taking the war to Al Qaeda and to states that had, or might have, some connection to those non-state terrorists. Especially given the perceived risk that the next terrorist strike might involve weapons of mass destruction, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were ready to resort to offensive action not only with alacrity but also with audacity.

The issue of offensive action leads to the *fourth item* on the seminar agenda for this module: when and where to open up new theaters. As we have seen this term, in most of our modules from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War, a decision to open or contest a new theater may change the whole course of a larger war and must take account of a complex mix of political and military considerations. After 9/11, Afghanistan was the obvious theater for offensive American military action, because it was there that Usama Bin Laden had reestablished his main base since 1996 and had developed a symbiotic relationship with the Taliban regime. What the next theater (if any) should be for an American military offensive was not so obvious. President Bush, in his State of the Union Address in January 2002, identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an Axis of Evil, because they all wanted nuclear weapons and were wont to sponsor or consort with terrorism. Subsequently (as can be retraced in Reading 11), the Bush Administration developed a case for going to war to prevent any possible eventuality in which terrorists might get weapons of mass destruction from tyrannical or theocratic regimes. The epithet “Axis of Evil” may primarily have been a rhetorical flourish for a domestic audience, but it does remind us (as does Reading 12) that launching OIF in 2003 was not the only option that the United States had for using military force to open a new theater after OEF. Indeed, if the most consequential risk of the Long War for the United States has been that terrorists could gain access to weapons of mass destruction to use in the American homeland, it is worth consideration that on the basis of intelligence available at the turn of 2002-2003 either Iran or North Korea was arguably more likely than Iraq to transfer WMD to terrorists with a global reach.

To be sure, that consideration is not the only one to ponder with regard to opening new theaters in the Long War. In light of patterns that we can derive from our earlier modules in which new theaters loomed large, students should review where the United States could be operationally effective at reasonable cost and manageable risk and where it could expect the most positive strategic “spillover” effects. Drawing on our recent module on nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation, students should also reconsider whether, and how, ways short of the use of force might be effective in deflecting, containing, or undermining Iranian and North Korean pursuit of a nuclear capability. Bearing in mind our previous module on Iraq, students should do counterfactual analysis of how interaction with Saddam Hussein might have played out in the context of the Long War, if the United States had not launched OIF in 2003. Finally, students should not lose sight of “opportunity cost.” Could the resources used for

offensive military action to open up a new theater find more strategically productive employment in more defensive measures?

In thinking beyond the theater level to the larger question of how to win the Long War, students would be well-advised to look for patterns in the keys to success in previous big wars. One key to success worth careful reflection is that the side that won each big war covered earlier in this course was the side with the most cohesive coalition. The coalition issue thus deserves a place as the *fifth item* on the agenda for this module. Even a moment's reflection is enough to suggest the value of coalitions for the main tasks of the Long War as it has unfolded so far: interdicting the jihadists' ability to operate globally and launch new attacks; preventing a nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction; stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq; averting or repairing state failure in other countries where terrorists might cluster; and winning the battle of ideas and information. Yet whereas in both World War II and the Cold War the United States was able to develop formal multinational alliances that were both extensive and cohesive, in the Long War the initial preference of American policymakers was simply to form ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." The upshot has been a disjointed array of collaborators along various lines of operation and in different theaters. There has been considerable multinational success in making it dangerous or difficult for AQAM operatives to communicate, travel, and transfer funds. There has been much less success with other critical tasks.

Important obstacles stand in the way of a more cohesive American-led coalition that embraces both longstanding European allies and Muslim partners willing to align with American political purposes and able to attract mass support within their own societies. One obstacle arose with the decision to open a new theater in Iraq. It put under great strain the United States' most remarkable political achievement of the twentieth century--the American-led alliances that formed the foundation for the construction of a new liberal international order from the 1940s to the 1990s. It also had the effect of setting back relationships with actual or potential partners in the Muslim world. The backlash from OIF has prompted the Bush administration to put a higher premium on the coalition issue. But there are persistent obstacles in the way of coalition cohesion that predate either the Bush Administration or OIF. They have their roots in changes both in the international environment and in societies and cultures in Europe and the Middle East since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War of 1991. Students should think about what these obstacles are and how to overcome them.

In addition to making one's own coalition more cohesive, a strategic leader should also, as Sun Tzu advised, adopt courses of action to make the enemy's coalition less cohesive. The modules this term reveal that in some wars one side defeats the other because it develops a good strategy and executes it well; but this course also reveals that the outcome of other wars stems from self-defeating actions by the side that ends up losing. In the Long War, the United States and its allies would risk defeating themselves if they adopt strategies that enable AQAM (and/or Iran and Hezbollah) to bring together the many disparate elements of the Muslim world in support of the jihadist cause. Conversely, the United States and its allies can greatly help their cause by adopting

strategies that induce the jihadists to engage in self-defeating actions that alienate actual or potential allies and supporters.

If coalition cohesion is one important key to success that stands out in the pattern of big wars that we have studied, another discernible key to success is the ability to develop and use in integrated ways different instruments of military power and non-military influence. Hence, the *sixth issue* on our agenda for this module is to reconsider which instruments to develop and use in the Long War, with what sort of adaptations from their customary use, in what combinations, and through what sort of interagency process. Even where offensive military action may be necessary, it is almost certain not to be sufficient to achieve large political purposes. All strategic instruments—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—have a role to play and need to be orchestrated by a coherent interagency effort. Surprised as it was by the 9/11 attacks, the United States was not intellectually, institutionally, or materially well-prepared in terms of instruments to deal with AQAM or handle all phases and dimensions of regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. Progress in the development, use, and coordination of different strategic instruments since 9/11 has been modest.

Consider, first of all, military instruments and institutions. An all-volunteer force may not be well-suited to a long war in multiple theaters, regardless of whether that war features conventional or counterinsurgency operations. After the end of the Cold War, moreover, there had been major downsizing of the force. By the time of OIF, a year and a half after 9/11, the number of Americans in the armed services was less than 30% of what it had been at the height of the Vietnam War—the last time that the United States had become heavily involved in “a war within a war.” Of that diminished number, as Williamson Murray and General Robert Scales have pointed out, less than four percent were infantry, even though “grunts” on the ground are most essential in the stability operations that follow regime change. Many units were not well-prepared for counterinsurgency operations. Doctrine, training, and education for such operations had suffered from neglect (though not in this course) since the Vietnam War. As for special operations forces (SOF), which have a big role to play in dealing with terrorists, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) had stood up in 1987, but mainstream military leaders and many civilian policymakers had resisted the use of SOF against Al Qaeda before 9/11. Seen in more favorable light after OEF, USSOCOM became the lead combatant commander in 2004 for planning and executing operations against terrorists around the globe. Yet, perhaps because of an institutional preference for quality over quantity, SOF numbers remain too limited to accomplish all necessary missions in multiple theaters in the Long War.

Non-military instruments and institutions were, if anything, in worse shape for key tasks in the Long War. The State Department no longer seemed attuned to the strategic dimension of statecraft as it had been in the early Cold War. Its focus had reverted to conventional diplomatic interactions, and even in this realm its diplomats had difficulty in adapting to the Bush administration’s new policy of promoting liberalization in old Arab regimes. Beyond the realm of conventional diplomacy, Foreign Service Officers with experience in the Muslim world did not show much inclination to volunteer

for Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq or for other tasks of high priority for the stability mission. The economic and informational instruments, which had been prominent in American strategy in the early Cold War and again in the 1980s, had to be rediscovered in the twenty-first century, and their use so far in the Long War has been lackluster. Expertise inside the government in deploying these instruments has been in short supply, and the resort to private contractors has not filled the gap well. To make matters worse, the interagency process for coordinating military and non-military instruments reached its nadir in the planning for and execution of OIF in 2002-2003. The Department of Defense shoved aside potential interagency partners. Since then, it has come to appreciate how much help it needs from those partners.

There may now be more will, but is there a good way to fix the problem of integrating different instruments in interagency operations to support strategy in the multiple theaters of the Long War? Students ought to weigh the merits of two broad options. One is the extension to the interagency realm of the Goldwater-Nichols model for fixing the problem of military jointness. That model highlights the role of education and training as well as reformed institutional processes and promotion standards in bringing about greater integration. The second option is “transformation” of the sort that the Pentagon has fitfully undergone in the past decade. That model stresses the need for new capabilities, new concepts, new career paths, perhaps even new institutions. From this perspective, the solution has to include new instruments to coordinate, not just a better process for interagency coordination.

The information domain of the Long War deserves special attention as the *seventh and final issue* on the agenda for this module. Intelligence, counter-intelligence, information operations, strategic communication, and other forms of information-gathering, opinion-shaping, and perception-management loom large in the Long War—as large as in any previous war that we have studied. Terrorists and insurgents have a limited repertoire of kinetic capabilities, mainly suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices. There is a huge gap to fill between the violent means that they currently use and the grandiose ends that they envision. Jihadists are trying to fill that gap with information operations and strategic communication. They need to amplify their violent actions with words and images. They need to recruit new supporters to their cause with those words and images, and they need to incite recruits to engage in terrorism. The Internet, satellite television, hand-held video cameras, and other new communications media have given them ways to spread their ideological message to far-flung audiences more readily than Maoist revolutionaries of previous generations that we have studied earlier in this course. From a military perspective, it is noteworthy that AQAM has used cyberspace for planning, intelligence collection, virtual training, and strategic debate, especially since it no longer can exercise the type of command and control possible when it had secure physical space in Afghanistan. But from a grand-strategic perspective, it is even more important that AQAM has used new means of communication to try to impel a wide range of Muslim audiences to transcend their multiple national, ethnic, and tribal sources of identity and embrace a single, extreme, religious identity as a global *umma* (community) in mortal confrontation with infidels. AQAM also addresses Western audiences with words as well as propaganda of the deed.

Its package of terrorism and strategic communication seeks to achieve psychological, economic, and political effects that, it presumes, will bring an end to the Western presence in the Muslim world.

So far in the Long War, the United States has been haphazard, and less agile than AQAM, in targeting multiple audiences through a full range of communications media and with messages that are well-attuned to cultural differences. Even with respect to the domestic American audience, President Bush did not communicate a well-formed picture of the Long War until late 2005 (see Reading 15). Across the cross-cultural gap between the United States and most Muslim audiences, information strategies have major disadvantages to overcome. The United States and its Western allies have relatively few officials, officers, and non-governmental organizations with the linguistic and cultural proficiency to bridge that gap and, thus, must rely heavily on partners, interpreters, and would-be “opinion leaders” in the Muslim world. Jihadists do not need to rely on such intermediaries. They share language, historical memory, cultural traditions, and religious teachings with their main audiences, even if they twist religion and history to serve their political purposes. They appeal to raw passions in the Muslim world—passions for retribution in the short term, passions for the restoration of political greatness in the long term.

Given that jihadists play to religious identity and feed on political passions among Muslim audiences, students should consider ways to counter jihadist information strategies. One possibility is to attack the source of the message and the media by which it is communicated. Projected to the twenty-first century, the archetypal information warrior Sun Tzu might point to the final chapter of *The Art of War*, “Employment of Secret Agents,” and suggest that the best strategy involves infiltration of jihadists in the physical spaces where they cluster. AQAM’s obsession with operational security makes such infiltration quite difficult. Second best, in a Sun Tzuian scheme, might be to infiltrate in cyberspace. Here information operations give way to disinformation operations, with an eye to sowing confusion and discord within the enemy’s coalition. Third best is to disrupt jihadists’ cyberspace connections. The disadvantage of doing so is not only that an adaptive enemy has “workarounds” to such disruption, but also that tracking and monitoring jihadists on the Internet are important means of “knowing the enemy.”

A more positive approach for the United States and its allies would be to convey a more powerful message. Above all, some would argue, Americans need to tell a big-picture, long-term story that links their past with the Muslim future. Social scientists who study communications nowadays suggest that the best way to get a big point across is to embed it in such a story. Joseph Nye, Harvard professor, former Defense Department official, and theorist of “soft power,” has argued: “In traditional international conflicts, the side with the stronger military force tended to win. In today’s information age, it is often the party with the stronger story that wins.” The second half of this course suggests the outlines of a strong story for the Long War. The United States in the twentieth century played a major role, with military and non-military instruments, in helping to bring about a transformation of two major regions—Europe and East Asia. That

transformation, over several decades, led to relative stability, unprecedented prosperity, and well-functioning democracy in much of both regions. It required the defeat or discrediting of totalitarian regimes and movements and the emergence or reemergence of moderate leaders in partnership with the United States. Such a transformation promises to be much harder in the Muslim world than it was in Europe or East Asia. But if the Muslim world truly wishes to recover its long-lost position as a major and respected region, it is much more likely to do so in association with the United States and its allies than with the ascendancy of a totalitarian caliphate.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Various analysts have defined the essential nature of the Long War quite differently: as a “clash of civilizations”; as a transnational insurgency within the Muslim world; as World War IV (with the Cold War having been World War III); or as a law-enforcement “hunt” against a terrorist network that has more in common with a criminal enterprise than a strategic entity. How would you define the nature of the war as it has unfolded so far?
2. Terrorist tactics played a significant role in the Asian Communist insurgencies of the twentieth century. Terrorist tactics play an even more significant role in the jihadist insurgencies of the twenty-first century. Is the heavy resort to terrorism by jihadists likely to give them a greater prospect of strategic success than Asian Communist insurgencies enjoyed?
3. President George W. Bush and others have pointed to similarities between the Long War and the Cold War. Is that historical analogy helpful or unhelpful in devising an effective strategy against AQAM?
4. The United States has so far had to confront two waves of jihadist terrorism—the first from Hezbollah in the 1980s and the second from AQAM in the past fifteen years. How would “lessons learned” from the first wave have been helpful or unhelpful in dealing with the second wave?
5. What adaptations in strategic thinking are necessary, and what guiding concepts are most useful, when one is planning to attack a transnational terrorist network rather than a state or a sub-state insurgency?
6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of defining U.S. political objectives broadly in the Long War as opposed to defining them more narrowly?
7. U.S. strategic communication in the Long War has emphasized the transcendent value of democratic forms of government. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of this American approach to the Muslim world.
8. Has the United States struck the proper strategic balance in the Long War

between offensive actions and defensive measures?

9. Rational risk management is especially difficult when risks are of “low probability” but of “high consequence” if they materialize. Since the 9/11 attacks, how well have U.S. strategic leaders managed the risk of a terrorist detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city?

10. The strategic theorist Colin Gray has written: “One of the costs of the ideological dimension to culture is that it can lead you astray in the perception and definition of threat.” To what extent does this comment apply to both sides in the Long War?

11. Was American theater strategy in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 well-aligned with American policy and strategy in the larger global war against jihadists?

12. In the context of the Long War against jihadists, was Operation Iraqi Freedom a good idea badly executed or just a bad idea?

13. What strategic effects have U.S. operations in Iraq since March 2003 had on AQAM in the Long War?

14. In a protracted, multi-theater war such as the ongoing war against jihadists, when and where does it make strategic and operational sense to open a new theater of operations?

15. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. How does that insight apply to the Long War?

16. To what extent can diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments help the United States achieve victory in the Long War, and how might some uses of these instruments be self-defeating in political terms?

17. Are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and terrorists than in the other kinds of war that you have studied in this course? If so, why? If not, why not?

18. Many have argued that the key to victory over AQAM in the Long War lies in the mobilization of Muslim opponents of jihadist terrorism. What U.S. policy and strategy are most likely to encourage such mobilization?

19. To what extent, and how, can the United States make progress in interagency operations similar to the progress made in military “jointness” since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986?

20. How and why do the multinational coalitions that the United States has formed to wage the Long War differ in strategically important ways from its coalitions in World War II and the Cold War?

C. Required Readings:

1. Naftali, Timothy. *Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*. New York: Basic Books, 2005. Pages 128-201, 227-320 (top of page).

[Naftali, a professor at the University of Virginia, wrote this book on the basis of research that he did for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. The pages assigned focus on the American response to two waves of jihadist terrorism from 1983 to 2001: Hezbollah attacks, especially in Lebanon in the 1980s; and the “new terrorism” perpetrated from 1993, mostly by al Qaeda. Naftali is illuminating on interagency friction within the American government over counterterrorism policy and strategy.]

2. Shultz, Richard H., Jr. “Showstoppers: Nine reasons why we never sent Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11,” *The Weekly Standard*, January 26, 2004. (Selected Readings)

[Shultz, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is a well-known expert on special operations forces and irregular warfare. This article is an unclassified summary of a study that he undertook as a consultant to the Department of Defense. In explaining the resistance to using SOF against Al Qaeda before 9/11, it complements the Naftali book by highlighting negative attitudes in the mainstream military leadership toward the use of unconventional forces in counterterrorism operations]

3. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Pages 47-70, 145-153, 330-352. (Selected Readings)

[With a readability that is unusual for official reports, this well-known document provides informative background on the emergence of Al Qaeda as a threat to the United States; on the reasons why the American government was surprised by what happened on 9/11; and on the early strategic planning by the Bush Administration to respond to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and to prevent any new attacks.]

4. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” *Foreign Policy* (January-February 2002), pages 52-62. (Selected Readings)

[Homer Dixon, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, provides insight into why a primarily defensive strategy for homeland security is very challenging for the United States against transnational terrorist networks. He argues that modern high-tech

societies have become increasingly vulnerable to terrorist attack because of two major trends: 1) the growing access that non-state actors have to the great destructive capacity made possible by technological development; and 2) the tightly coupled networks and dense concentration of “high-valued assets” in advanced societies.]

5. Bunn, Matthew, and Anthony Weir. “The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism,” *Current History* (April 2005), pages 153-161. (Selected Readings)

[The 9/11 attacks generated great anxiety in the Bush Administration that a future terrorist attack might involve the detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city. Preventing that risk from materializing drove the offensive strategy of the United States in 2001-2003 and became the top defensive priority of the new Department of Homeland Security. Bunn and Weir, researchers at the Kennedy School of Government in Harvard University, provide an analysis that enables readers to judge whether such nuclear terrorism is a “low probability” risk.]

6. Stern, Jessica. “Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons,” *International Security* (Winter 2002-2003), pages 89-123. (Selected Readings)

[Michael Chertoff, as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, has rated the threat posed by biological weapons as his #2 defensive priority, behind only the prevention of a nuclear detonation in an American city. Stern, a faculty member at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, analyzes the biological threat, highlighting the fact that as “the technology for producing these [biological] weapons continues both to improve and to spread, those who oppose their use are in a race with those who would do us harm.” She presents a risk-tradeoff method for assessing alternative courses of action for dealing with the biological threat and draws some provocative conclusions.]

7. Bensahel, Nora. “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2006), pages 35-47. (Selected Readings)

[In previous global conflicts, the United States benefited from formal multinational alliances. So far in the Long War, the United States has put together more *ad hoc* coalitions. Bensahel, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, shows how different partnerships have emerged in each of the various lines of operation and theaters. One result has been uneven degrees of effectiveness in the use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power.]

8. Crumpton, Henry A. “Intelligence and War: Afghanistan, 2001-2002,” in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005. Pages 162-179. (Selected Readings)

[Crumpton, who led the CIA’s effort in Operation Enduring Freedom from September 2001 until June 2002 and later became Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, describes the planning and execution of operations in Afghanistan in which

he was involved. He highlights the importance of understanding the Afghan cultural terrain and building a “complex partnership of power” that brought together different agencies of the U.S. government and different indigenous factions in Afghanistan.]

9. Lambeth, Benjamin. *Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005. Pages xiii-xxx. (Selected Readings)

[Lambeth, a retired Air Force officer and the author of many works on air power, here provides an overview of Operation Enduring Freedom from an air-power perspective. A key task was time-sensitive targeting of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. Lambeth points to political restraints and CENTCOM micromanagement that complicated such targeting. Students should consider whether U.S. strategic leaders struck the proper balance between operational opportunities and political considerations.]

10. Mary Ann. “Lost at Tora Bora,” *The New York Times Magazine*, September 11, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[The strategic effect on jihadism of capturing or killing Usama Bin Laden in Afghanistan within a few months of the 9/11 attacks might have been very great. Weaver, an expert on the Muslim world, highlights the issue of whether U.S. conventional forces, especially Marine Task Force 58, could have prevented the escape of Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders from Tora Bora in December 2001. While drawing on interviews with intelligence officials and military officers, Weaver may underrate operational and logistical impediments to moving conventional forces to Tora Bora in time.]

11. Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 309-331. (Selected Readings)

[In 2002, while winding down the campaign in Afghanistan and planning ahead for the next campaign in Iraq, the Bush Administration developed and enunciated the most important and controversial elements of its policy and strategy for what it then called the Global War on Terrorism. Mann provides a lucid account of the decision-making of key American strategic leaders at that crucial juncture.]

12. Kitfield, James. “America’s Nemesis,” *National Journal*, July 21, 2006. (Selected Readings)

[In protracted multi-theater conflicts, when and where to open a new theater is a major strategic issue. President Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002 identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an Axis of Evil—rogue regimes who pursued a nuclear capability and might enable Al Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Kitfield, drawing on interviews with government officials, suggests that Iran, not Iraq, should have been the main focus of American strategy after the toppling of the Taliban regime.]

13. Record, Jeffrey. *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, December 2003. 46 pages. (Selected Readings)

[Record, who has been a Senate staffer, a researcher in think tanks, and a professor in the U.S. system of professional military education, argues that American strategic capabilities were inadequate to address successfully the unrealistic political objectives and the multiplicity of enemies that American policy has postulated. He is particularly critical of the link that the Bush Administration made between Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism.]

14. Collins, Joseph J. "Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (2nd quarter 2006), pages 10-14. (Selected Readings)

[Collins, a retired Army colonel and a professor at National War College, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations from 2001 to 2004. He discusses problems in adaptation as well as in planning. The adaptation problems came in countering terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. The planning problems reflected "the limitations of our stovepiped, single agency planning systems." Both problems stem from insufficient appreciation that victory requires more than success in conventional military operations. Collins stresses the need not just for institutional reform in Washington but for greater interagency coherence and non-military capability in the field.]

15. Bush, President George W. Speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005; Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, May 27, 2006; and Speech to the Military Officers Association of America, September 5, 2006 (Selected Readings)

[These three speeches represent President Bush's most important efforts to communicate his strategic vision of the Long War. Students should take special note of the assessment of the enemy, the analogies with the Cold War, and the assumptions that underpin the strategies that the President lays out.]

16. "In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium" (August 2006).

[These translated primary-source documents, compiled by Professor Scott Douglas with help from Professor Heidi Lane and other colleagues, allow students to engage in "cultural intelligence" by assessing first hand AQAM's ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States, as well as their political objectives, strategies, information operations, and internal divisions and debates.]

17. Hoffman, Bruce. "The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists," Testimony presented to the House Select Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. (Selected Readings)

[Terrorists have long used images and words as well as deeds to communicate messages to various audiences. But jihadists have recently exploited the revolution in information technology to craft and control their messages to an unprecedented degree of sophistication and to make possible tactical training, operational planning, and strategic debate in a decentralized organizational framework. Hoffman, a longtime RAND Corporation expert on terrorism, analyzes the different ways in which AQAM leaders and operatives have used the Internet to advance their cause. He also notes U.S. shortcomings in contesting the “virtual battleground of cyberspace.”]

18. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Transatlantic Dialogue on Terror. *Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2006. (Selected Readings)

[Western Europe has become an important theater in the Long War, serving not only as a jihadist staging area for strikes against the United States, but also as a target for major terrorist attacks. This report, by a group of European and American government officials and private-sector analysts, discusses a wide range of issues: the challenges of integrating Muslims into European societies, the relationship between local conflicts and global jihadism, the need to counter radical Islamists in cyberspace, and—not least—trends in cooperation between the United States and Europe in the Long War.]

19. Corn, Tony. “World War IV as Fourth Generation Warfare,” *Policy Review* (January 2005). (Selected Readings)

[Corn, a State Department official, offers provocative observations about many different aspects of the Long War. He seeks to rectify what he sees as the lack of an interagency consensus in Washington about the nature of the war and the appropriate strategies for waging it—especially in the domain of strategic communication and information operations. Unlike Jeffrey Record, he does not believe that the strategic threat facing the United States and its allies can be neatly separated into discrete problems.]

20. Heghammer, Thomas. “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War,” *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2006), pages 11-32. (Selected Readings)

[Heghammer, associated with the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, has for several years been tracking Arabic-language primary sources, with special attention to the pronouncements of radical jihadists on Internet sites. In this article, after providing useful background on “global jihadism” and on the importance that its proponents attach to the Iraqi theater, he offers a clear and sophisticated analysis of various important effects that the war in Iraq has had on Al Qaeda and Associated Movements.]

D. Official Documents:

The following list represents the basic documents published by the U.S. Government that are of relevance to this module. All three academic departments at the Naval War

College make reference to these documents. Students should, at some time during their tour of duty at Newport, familiarize themselves with especially the most recent ones on the list. They can find links to the documents at:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/>

<http://www.teachingterror.com/pubs.htm>

President of the United States. *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. September 2006.

Department of Homeland Security. *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*. June 2006.

President of the United States. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. March 2006.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. February 2006.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. February 2006.

Department of Defense. *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. June 2005.

Department of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. March 2005.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*. 2004.

President of the United States. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. February 2003.

President of the United States. *The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets*. February 2003.

President of the United States. *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*. February 2003.

President of the United States. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. September 2002.

Office of Homeland Security. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*. July 2002.

XIII. SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A. General: This case, the capstone of the course, examines the ends, ways, and means of employing the U.S. sea services in the early decades of the twenty-first century. It does so by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the challenges that the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation will face in coming years. Students will:

- Assess the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. armed forces—and particularly of naval forces—in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint, interagency, and multinational operations against the spectrum of adversaries the United States may face in the early decades of the twenty-first century.
- Apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
- Evaluate the national military strategy, especially with respect to the changing character of warfare.
- Synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

Navies have historically served a range of missions. The very existence of a strong navy shapes relationships with friends, neutrals, and adversaries: it serves as the means to forge international coalitions, an enforcer of international norms, and a deterrent to potential adversaries. In time of war, navies exert sea control, permitting friendly forces to use the sea while denying its use to adversaries. Naval forces protect or disrupt sea lines of communications. Control of the sea can provide strategic depth and offer protection to the homeland. Navies also support operations ashore. Navies, too, serve as the platform for launching operations on the land, including the landing of expeditionary forces.

The United States will possess the world's most powerful navy for the foreseeable future. The United States—and indeed the world—is the beneficiary of the U.S. Navy's command of the sea. The U.S. Navy underpins the free flow of goods and services that serve as drivers of globalization. American naval forces also play an important role in shaping the choices of other states, friend and foe alike.

The economic and technological forces driving globalization are transforming the international strategic landscape. Dynamic economic growth in Asia, for example, is leading to a new distribution of power within the international system. The economic rise of Asia's giants, China and India, is creating a new set of power relationships. The economic development of China and India will enable both of them to afford higher levels of military spending. How major regional powers will seek to translate their growing economic strength into enhanced military capabilities is thus a key strategic

question facing American decision makers and defense planners. The rise of increasingly well-armed regional powers might make it more difficult for the United States to maintain command of the air, maritime, and space commons.

Meanwhile, access to resources is another factor that could drive military competitions involving the major powers. Economic growth in Asia critically depends on access to energy resources in the politically volatile region of the Middle East. The maritime great powers of the twenty-first century will face a vexing set of strategic challenges as they attempt to secure the important sea lines of communication that are the main arteries for the distribution of vital supplies of resources.

Although the United States is unlikely to face a blue-water naval competitor in the near future, it will face adversaries who have invested in anti-access and area denial capabilities. It also faces terrorist groups who use the sea to transport people and arms, as well as use it as an avenue to attack the United States or its allies. The United States and its allies must also deal with states and non-state actors who use the seas for illicit activities.

Three strategic challenges will dominate U.S. national security planning for the foreseeable future. Together, these challenges will determine the size and shape of the U.S. armed forces over the coming years.

The first is the so-called Long War, a protracted global counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist terrorist groups and their supporters.

A second, related challenge is the need to defend the U.S. homeland in depth and to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring and using nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The third challenge is the need to shape the choices of great powers, particularly those of China. China's rise as a great power does not imply competition, let alone conflict. It does, however, offer the most plausible contingency in which the U.S. Navy would confront stressing operational and strategic challenges, such as the need to operate in an anti-access or area-denial environment. In addition, Iran and North Korea, regional powers with substantial military capabilities, present serious strategic challenges to the United States. American naval forces would be in the thick of the fight in any future conflict involving Iran or North Korea.

Each challenge, while unique, also has historical antecedents. The maritime dimension of the Global War on Terrorism and maritime efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction in some ways both resemble the Royal Navy's efforts to police the global commons against pirates and slave traders in the nineteenth century. Similarly, naval rivalries of earlier eras and the Cold War at sea may provide insights into the maritime dimension of the long-term competition with China.

This case focuses on the strategic purposes and operational forms of future wars at sea and in the littorals. It analyzes trends in naval doctrine and explores how technology is influencing the evolution of maritime strategy and operations. It also examines the role of naval forces in shaping the maritime environment.

B. Topics for Discussion:

1. How can U.S. maritime forces contribute to the national security of the United States over the next two to three decades?
2. To what extent will technology alter the character of war at sea over the next two to three decades?
3. How is technological innovation and diffusion producing operational capabilities that undermine the United States' command of the maritime commons?
4. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the concept of sea control retain its relevance?
5. What difference would it make if the U.S. Navy could not support national policy and objectives? What would be the strategic consequences for the nation of such a failure?
6. Can economic globalization survive if the United States fails to provide security for the global commons?
7. President Bush has stated: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenges—thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace." Can the United States realistically expect to dissuade others from challenging American naval strength? Will the United States be able and willing to afford holding onto command of the commons against rising challengers?
8. How might the demands of fighting the Long War undermine the ability of the United States to maintain command the commons?
9. To what extent and in what ways can maritime operations contribute to strategic success in the Long War?
10. Corbett quotes approvingly the famous philosopher and scientist Sir Francis Bacon, who wrote: "This much is certain, he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will." Does this assessment remain valid at the beginning of the twenty-first century? How does command of the maritime commons contribute to homeland security?

11. James Fallows, a well-known policy commentator, posed the following provocative questions: “[W]hat if al-Qaeda’s leaders could see their faults and weaknesses as clearly as those of others? What if they had a Clausewitz or Sun Tzu to speak frankly to them?” How might Clausewitz and the author of the *Sun Tzu* assess the strategies and future strategic prospects of the jihadists?

12. A respected analyst of the role played by information in war writes: “in the new and strange kind of war [on terror] currently being fought, with the extraordinary premium that is placed on timely and accurate information to ward off attacks and to track down the enemy, intelligence may play an even greater role in national security than ever before. But even then, it will never be decisive on its own. Strength is.” Do you agree with this assessment that the strategic effect of information will ultimately prove secondary in determining the outcome of the Long War?

13. Assess the value of Mao’s strategic writings for examining the asymmetric strategies of irregular warfare employed by the United States’ adversaries in the Long War.

14. What lessons do the major regional wars examined in the Strategy and Policy Course hold for the maritime dimension of a conflict with China?

15. To what extent and in what ways might maritime operations contribute to strategic success in a conflict with China?

16. Assess the value of the strategic prescriptions attributed to Sun Tzu for understanding a conflict with China across the Taiwan Strait.

17. What lessons do the major regional wars examined in the Strategy and Policy Course hold for the maritime dimension of a conflict with North Korea?

18. What lessons do the major regional wars examined in the Strategy and Policy Course hold for the maritime dimension of a conflict with Iran?

19. What does the history of the Cold War suggest about the effectiveness of DIME in transforming the internal political makeup of authoritarian regimes that pose serious strategic challenges for the United States?

20. Assess the value of foundational thinkers about maritime strategy, as represented by Mahan and Corbett, for understanding the strategic and operational challenges facing the U.S. Navy in the twenty-first century.

21. Will submarines, mines, and missiles, in the hands of a major regional power, deny the U.S. Navy maritime access to critical regions of the globe?

22. Assess the principal risks that confront large surface combatants operating in the littoral waters of a major regional power. What strategic considerations might justify the running of such high-risk operations?

23. The example of Pearl Harbor suggests that naval forces and bases may be at risk of preemptive surprise attack. How vulnerable would forward-deployed American naval forces be to a preemptive surprise strike by a major regional power in the twenty-first century?

C. Required Readings:

1. Morgan, Vice Admiral John G., USN, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, USN, "The 1,000-Ship Navy Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings* (November 2005), pages 14-17; Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* (November 2005), pages 18-19. (Selected Readings)

[These articles by Navy and Marine Corps leaders provide complementary views of future naval and maritime warfare.]

2. Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Chapters 4, 9-11.

[The chapters from this book by one of the world's leading thinkers about naval strategy explore the role of technology in naval warfare, as well as navies in supporting diplomacy and enforcing standards of international conduct.]

3. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 418-444.

[This reading, by a professor and former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the development of the Maritime Strategy as a way of competing with the Soviet Union during the late Cold War.]

4. Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* (Spring 2004), pages 125-160. (Selected Readings)

[In this article Barry Posen, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argues that superiority at sea, in the air, and in space form the military foundation of American dominance of the international strategic environment. He discusses the nature of that superiority as well as challenges to it. (Those who have taken the National Security and Decision Making Course will only need to review this article before seminar, because they have already read it during the previous term.)]

5. Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006. (Selected Readings)

[This reading represents the official Defense Department assessment of China's policy, strategy, and operational capabilities.]

6. Betts, Richard K. and Thomas J. Christensen. "China: Getting the Questions Right," *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/2001), pages 17-29. (Selected Readings)

[This article by Betts, a professor at Columbia University and one of the nation's foremost thinkers on strategic matters, and Christensen, a Princeton University professor currently serving in government and an expert on Chinese foreign policy and strategy, provides a framework for thinking about the future of the U.S.-China relationship. The authors argue that China can cause problems for the United States even if it does not become a peer competitor, does not intend aggression, integrates into the world economy, and liberalizes politically.]

7. Rahman, Chris. "Ballistic Missiles in China's Anti-Taiwan Blockade Strategy," in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005*. London: Routledge, 2005. Pages 215-224. (Selected Readings)

[This short analysis examines the strategic effects of China's missile tests during the 1996 Taiwan Strait's crisis, arguing that they amounted to a partial and temporary blockade of the island.]

8. O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," *International Security* (Fall 2000), pages 51-86. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by a well-known defense expert at the Brookings Institution, explores future conflict scenarios between China and Taiwan. O'Hanlon argues that China cannot invade Taiwan even if the United States does not intervene. He also argues that a ballistic missile attack or naval blockade are more likely but also quite difficult.]

9. Goldstein, Lyle and William Murray. "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," *International Security* (Spring 2004), pages 161-196. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by two professors in the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies, provides a more pessimistic assessment of the China-Taiwan military balance. The authors assess the modernization of China's submarine force and also critique O'Hanlon's article, above.]

10. Erickson, Andrew S. and Andrew R. Wilson. "China's Aircraft Carrier Dilemma," *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2006), pages 13-46. (Selected Readings)

[Professor Wilson of the Strategy and Policy Department and Professor Erickson of the Strategic Research Department provide an astute assessment of the choices open to Chinese naval planners with regard to the development of a carrier force.]

11. Kilcullen, David J. "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (August 2005), pages 597-617. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by a retired Australian army officer serving now as the Chief Strategist in the office of the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, argues that the Global War on Terrorism should be conceived of as a global insurgency. The author suggests a strategy of "disaggregation" to break the bonds between terrorist networks.]

12. Luft, Gal, and Anne Korin. "Terrorism Goes to Sea," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2004), pages 61-71. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by two experts on international energy issues, explores the rise of piracy and terrorist use of the seas.]

13. Winner, Andrew C. "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction." *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2005), pages 129-143. (Selected Readings)

[This essay, written by a member of the Naval War College's faculty, is an insightful assessment of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The author concludes: "[T]he PSI should not be seen as a silver bullet but rather as one arrow in the quiver of governments attempting to stop proliferation." (p. 141)]

14. Department of Defense. "Operationalizing the Strategy," in *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2006. Pages 19-40. (Selected Readings)

[This chapter from the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* describes the challenges that the United States will face in coming years, the United States' aims in dealing with those challenges, and the strategy to address them. It serves as an analytical framework for thinking about the strategic challenges the U.S. Navy must address.]

15. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, February 2006. (Selected Readings)

[*The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* is the Defense Department's strategy for waging the Long War.]

16. *National Strategy for Maritime Security*. Washington, D.C.: White House, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[This reading describes the joint and interagency strategy of the United States for achieving maritime security. It identifies threats to maritime security, outlines strategic objectives, and discusses strategic actions to achieve those objectives.]

17. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2006. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/index.html>. (Selected Readings)

[This reading is the updated strategy put forward by the administration for fighting the war on terror. It characterizes the war on terror as “both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas.”]